《中国震撼世界》1970年再版序
Introduction for the 1970 second Edition
　　在二十世纪二十年代末及其后战火纷飞的岁月里，杰克·贝尔登在我的心目中是一位传奇式的人物。而且我认为，许多在中国呆得比他更久的人也觉得他是个传奇式的人物。他这个人了解中国的藏污纳垢的阴暗面，这是我们一般人（除埃德加·斯诺和艾格尼丝·史沫特莱外）所望尘莫及的。我们当中，有的人是在中国长大的，有的是去中国任职的，也有的是为研究学术而去学习中国语文的。而当年杰克·贝尔登出国的时候，却是当海员，一路做工，到了香港才离船上岸。后来他浪迹中国沿海城市，还几次去内地游历。看来他从一开始起就不信任知识分子，而同情中国的劳苦大众。他十分熟悉那些时常没有活计的农民、那些收入低微的工人和潦倒的士兵，了解他们嫖女人、酗酒和吸毒的情况。
 In the late 1930's and the war years Jack Belden was to me, and I think to quite a number of people who had been in China longer than he had, a legendary figure. He was the man who knew the seamy side of China, where the lice lurked. Most of the rest of us, except for Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley, were a prosaic lot. Either we had been brought up in China or we had come out to take jobs that had been arranged beforehand, or to study the language on academic fellowships. Jack Belden had worked his way out as an able-bodied seaman and then jumped ship in Hong Kong. After that he knocked about in the seaport cities and made forays into the hinterland. From the beginning he seems to have distrusted the intelligentsia and to have had a fellow-feeling for the disinherited and the down-and-out. He was the man who knew what underemployed peasants, underpaid workers, and sullen soldiery did about sex and drink and drugs.
　　一九三七年日本开始大举侵华时，杰克·贝尔登已经在中国呆了五年。他到过中国很多地方，包括后来受日本侵略之祸最烈的地区，而且他粗通中国语。从他作品中的记述来看，他所熟悉的主要是那些文盲或文化水平不高的老百姓的语言，而不是文人和政客的语言。从贝尔登的整个作品来看，他显然喜爱实干家，而对知识分子怀有戒心。他对理论和意识形态问题有所了解，但未过多探讨。
 　　When the all-out Japanese invasion began in 1937 Jack Belden had already been in China about five years. He had seen a good deal of the country, in the areas where the shock of the Japanese invasion was going to be most brutal, and he knew something of the language. Judging from the indications here and there in his writing, it was more the language of the uneducated and the semi-literate than that of the intellectuals and political hacks. It is also plain, from his writing as a whole, that Belden has an affinity for men of action and is wary of intellectuals. He knows what theory and ideology are, but he is not captivated by them.
　　《中国震撼世界》这本书里有一段记述很能说明这一点。他在书中描绘了一个农民出身的人。这个人上过中学，后来进了蒋介石的一个宪兵训练班。他对自己在那里的遭遇极为反感，于是就开了小差，投奔延安。贝尔登见到他的时候，他已经是一位经验丰富的组织者、游击队的领导人。
 　　In a characteristic passage in China Shakes the World he describes a man of peasant origin who had gone to middle school and then to a course for training Chiang Kai-shek's gendarmerie. Repelled by the treatment he got there, the peasant had deserted and made his way to Yenan. By the time Belden met him be was a veteran organizer and leader of the guerrillas.
　　贝尔登写道：“这种类型的人在共产党地区绝非少有，他是其中一个最好的典型。在他身上，实干家和知识分子的气质得到了很好的结合。他那种沉着持重的风度使人觉得稳当可靠。我常想，如果共产主义运动由这一类型的人来掌握——共产党内部的权力问题还没有完全解决──那就没有什么可怕的了。如果让纯知识分子占了上风，那么个人迷信之风就可能统治中国。”
 　　"He was one of the finest examples of a type of man that was by no means rare in Communist areas," Belden writes. "He was that entrancing combination of man of action and intellectual. He had a grave, quiet manner that engendered trust. I often thought that if men of this type gained control of the Communist movement - and the question of power has not yet been completely settled among the Communists - then there would be little to fear from it. If the pure intellectuals gain the upper hand, then cultism may rule China."
　　贝尔登报道了日本侵华战争初期的情况。当时豫北的农民被蒋介石的军队和官府横征暴敛，残酷压迫，逼得走投无路，竟然群起欢迎日本侵略者。首先把这个消息报道出来的就是他。（我现在还能记得，一九三三年在热河省发生的类似情况。当时，日本人十天内就占领了十万平方英里的中国国土。有一回，我同一群农民聊了起来，当时日本人已经推进到离当地只有几英里远的地方，这些农民正在等着日本人来。我问他们怎么办。他们满不在乎地说，“日本人怎么样，我们不知道。我们的省长怎么样，我们很清楚，我们恨不得吃他的肝，喝他的血！”）
 　　Belden reported the early stages of the Japanese invasion. He was the man who broke the Story of how the peasants of northern Honan, embittered and crazed by the way they had been racked and taxed and exploited by the army and officials of Chiang Kai-shek, rose up and welcomed the Japanese invaders. (I can remember something similar in the province of Jehol, in 1933, when the Japanese took 1oo,ooo square miles of territory in ten days, When I asked the peasants who were waiting for the oncoming Japanese, who were only a few miles away, what they thought of it all, they said stolidly, "We don't know the Japanese. We know our own governor. If we can eat his liver and drink his blood, that's enough.")
　　后来贝尔登亲眼看到了英、美、中三国军队在缅甸的大溃败（见《跟随史迪威将军撤退》），以及盟军在北非作战和在欧洲登陆的情景（见《马革裹尸仍其时》）。他目睹了不少战争场面，是一个优秀的战地记者，却没有像其他人那样出名。原因是他所写的报道未被全部采用发表，也因为他不为政界和军界高级人士所欣赏，而那些人手里有权，能使一个记者红起来。
 　　Later Belden saw the great Anglo-American-Chinese defeat in Burma (Retreat with Stilwell) and the war in North Africa and the landings in Europe (Still Time to Die). He saw a lot of war. He was one of the great war correspondents, but not as famous as others because his despatches did not get printed in full and because he did not catch the fancy of those at the upper levels of the political and military establishments who had it in their power to make a reporter fashionable.
　　一九四六年底，贝尔登重返中国，这时蒋介石同共产党之间的最后一场内战已经开始。要报道这场战争，各国记者中只有他最胜任。他了解中国，中文较好，对美国人和蒋介石的军事思想都有较透彻的了解，也了解美国人对中国的看法。
 　　When he got back to China late in 1946 there was no reporter of any nationality better equipped to record the final civil war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists. He knew the country, he knew far more of the language than most correspondents, and he knew and saw through both the conventional military thinking of the Americans and the Chiang clique and the conventional American image of China.
　　当时在许多中国城市都驻有美国领事，许多中国军事机构都有美国军事顾问，此外还有许多传教士和各种救济机构的代表，都可以对中国革命的情况进行观察，可以说这场革命简直就是在美国决策人的眼皮底下进行的。但是美国的决策人却采取了一种不近情理的、愚蠢而顽固的态度，根本不愿意正视中国革命的实际情况。他们一味以为，只要整天念叨“自由”和“民主”之类的辞句（再加上投入大量金钱），就可以象变戏法那样，变出一个象俄亥俄州的或者象新英格兰那样的政权，以挽狂澜于既倒。鉴于上面所说的情况，我们应该感到庆幸的是，报道这场革命的最佳着作也是由美国人撰写的。
 　　Considering the sour, dense, obstinate refusal of the makers of American policy to look at the facts of a revolution which was going on right under their eyes, and being observed by consuls in many Chinese cities and officers attached to many Chinese military units, not to mention missionaries and the representatives of various relief units, and considering their bewitched belief that the incantation of words like "freedom" and "democracy" (accompanied by the spending of lots of money) could somehow conjure up an Ohio-like or New England-like regime capable of reversing a revolution already in being, we are lucky that the best reports on that revolution have also been written by Americans.
　　这些作品涉及的范围很广，不能一一列举。不过在介绍贝尔登的这部着作时，还有两本书是必须一提的。
 　　They cover a wide range, and this is not the place to write an essay on all of them, but there are two that must be mentioned if one is writing about Jack Belden's work.?
　　埃德加·斯诺的《西行漫记》一书是在日本开始全面侵略中国时问世的。该书一直被尊为经典着作，这一方面是因为作者的记述忠实、严谨，同时也因为在三十多年前，最早使我们了解中国共产党情况的就是他。当时中国共产党人刚刚结束长征，正在延安集结。斯诺引用中共主要人物自己所说的话，介绍他们本人和中国共产主义运动的情况。我现在还记得，多年以前曾经同一位共产党人谈起斯诺，当时蒋介石的信徒们正骂他纯粹是共产党宣传的传声筒。这位共产党人摇着头说，不是这么回事。他们盛赞斯诺十分诚实，说他所报道的情况是可靠的，但是他有他自己的“解释”，他不是中共的“发言人”，因为他并不真正了解马克思主义。
 　　Edger Snow's Red Star over China, published just as the all-out Japanese assault on China began, holds its place as a classic because of the author's own unchallengeable honesty and because he was the first to tell us, more than thirty years ago, what the Chinese Communists were like when they assembled at Yenan at the end of the Long March, and what their leading representatives had to say for themselves and their movement, in their own words. I remember talking to a Communist about Snow, years ago, at a time when adherents of Chiang Kai-shek were denouncing him as nothing but a mouthpiece for Communist propaganda. The Communist shook his head. No, he said, they respected Snow as a completely honest man. His reporting of facts could be relied on. But his interpretations did not entitle him to rank as a "spokesman," because he did not really understand Marxism.
　　尽管如此，只有那些当时身在中国的人们，才能回味斯诺的《西行漫记》所产生的巨大影响。那时，国民党一再谈“赤匪”已经剿灭或即将剿灭，已经讲了十年。而另一方面，左翼刊物刊登共产国际的报告和热情洋溢的文章，传颂在“无产阶级领导”的鼓舞下，为“群众”的事业而战斗的农民英雄的事迹，可惜，这些英雄都象是一个模子里出来的，而不是真正有血有肉的人物。我们这些人大都从来没有见到过那些左翼刊物，我自已当时也只是模模糊糊听说有这类刊物。我们这些外国人，在治外法权的庇护下，依旧比赛马球，参加鸡尾酒会，去北京西山野餐，或者利用中国货币的外汇行市进行投机。
 　　Be that as it may, only those who were in China at the time can recall the full impact of Snow's Red Star over China. For a decade, the Kuomingtang had been alternately reporting the extermination or the approaching extermination of the "Red bandits." From the other side, in Comintern reports and fervid articles in the left-wing journals, which most of us never saw (I myself, in those days, had only a hazy idea that they even existed), came stories of peasant heroes, under the inspiration of "proletarian leadership," battling for the cause of "the masses"; but these heroes, alas, were stereotypes, not real flesh and blood. We foreigners, under the shield of extraterritorjal privilege, continued to play polo, go to cocktail parties, picnic in the western hills of Peking, or speculate on the exchange value of the Chinese dollar.
　　当时大乡数外国人的政治词汇不外就是一些陈词滥调，说什么中国人，特别是农民，对政治不感兴趣。只要做到确保治安、赋税合理，他们是不会给任何人制造麻烦的。至于“阶级”和“群众”之类的说法，乃是“煽动分子”所用的术语。中国所需要的是“应天示运”一类的非凡人物。问题在于，蒋介石能否证明自已是足以“平天下”的铁腕人物──而同时又保证列强的利益。当时有不少在中国的外国人认为，日本“来强硬的一手”是件好事，可以叫“中国人识相一些”。
 　　The political vocabulary of most foreigners did not go beyond cliches: the Chinese, especially the peasants, were not interested in politics. Give them law and order and reasonable taxes and they would make no trouble for anybody. Talk of "classes" and "masses" was the jargon of "agitators." What China needed was men of striking personality, "mandate of heaven" types. The great question was whether Chiang Kai-shek was going to prove himself enough of a strong man to subdue "all under heaven" - and at the same time guarantee the interests of the foreign powers. Quite a few foreigners in China thought that the "firm hand" of Japan was a good thing; it might "bring the Chinese to their senses."
　　但是，确实也有一些外国人担心，让日本割去象“满洲国”那样的大片土地作为自己的特殊利益地区，会使暗中控制中国的那个国际俱乐部的制度遭到破坏。理论上这个国际俱乐部是保证帝国主义列强互相自由竞争的。如果它不去制止身为俱乐部成员国之一的日本推行无法无天、胡作非为的政策，它又怎么还能要求维护法律和秩序的准则呢？
 　　It is true, however, that some were worried by the fact that Japan, by carving out huge areas of special interest like "Manchukuo," was breaking the rules of the international club that controlled China by indirection and insured, theoretically, free competition among all the imperialist powers. How could the club continue to demand a standard of law and order while refusing to restrain Japan, a club member, from carrying out a policy of lawlessness and disorder?
　　在人们政治上陷入思想苦闷的情况下，斯诺的《西行漫记》就象焰火一样，腾空而起，划破了苍茫的暮色。书中介绍了人们闻所未闻的、或者只是隐隐约约有点儿感觉的情况。那本书里没有什么宣传，只有对实际情况的报道。原来还有另外一个中国啊！斯诺给我们转述了共产党领导人的谈话，这些谈话不是背诵教条的留声机唱片，而是适合中国国情、可以据以组织抗日的精辟主张。不仅知此，《西行漫记》是一部巨着，它的长远的重要意义，绝不仅是由于书中记录了一些领导人的讲话。斯诺是最早描写中国革命进入由共产党领导的新阶段的作家；这场以共产党为领导核心的革命运动日益发展，吸引着越来越广大阶层民众的衷心拥护。
 　　In this depressing twilight of political thinking, Snow's Red Star over China burst like a fireworks display. It revealed the outlines of things until then unseen or only dimly guessed at. This was not propaganda. It was description. There was another China. Snow relayed to us what the Communist leaders had to say, and what they had to say turned out to be not gramophone records reiterating doctrine, but pithy suggestions applicable to the existing problems of China and to the possibility of organizing resistance to Japan. Moreover, Red Star is a big book, and its abiding importance rests on much more than quotation of the words of leaders. Snow was the first to describe the Communist-led phase of the Chinese revolution as a movement in which widening circles of voluntary adherence kept spreading out around a nucleus of Communist leadership.
　　孙中山在世的时候，也曾经有过类似的现象：以国民党为核心，吸引广大群众的拥护。但是到了三十年代后期，国民党自命为社会中坚，负有强制群氓俯首听命之责。因此，如果把国民党和中国共产党之间的对抗说成是两种极权主义之间的斗争，就必然是理解错了。事实上，斗争的一方是企图强行统治人民的一个自封的领导集团。另一方则是一个“辩证”的群众运动，领导这个运动的共产党人虽然也是一个自封的集团，但是他们努力探求能够得到群众自愿拥护的方针和方法。至于中国的芸芸众生，他们正在寻找一个他们觉得能够代表他们、为他们谋利益的领导，他们将衷心拥护这样的领导。他们经过年复一年的寻找，坚信中国共产党就是这样的领导，并为此而欢欣鼓舞。
 　　In the days of Sun Yat-sen there had been a similar phenomenon of outer voluntary adherence to the inner core of the Kuomintang, but by the late 1930's the Kuomintang was thinking of itself as an elite, charged with a mission to impose discipline and obedience on the unenhightened masses. For this reason the confrontation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party (Kungch'antang) is bound to be misunderstood if it is represented as a rivalry between totalitarianisms. The contest was in fact between a self-selected leadership which aimed at imposing control, and a "dialectical" movement in which the Communists, also a self-selected group, sought those principles and methods that would attract voluntary support, while vast numbers of a still inchoate nation were in search of a leadership which they could willingly follow because it represented and served what they felt to be in their own interests - and increasingly, year by year, rejoiced when they convinced themselves that they had found that leadership in the Communist Party.
　　韩丁所写的《翻身》是美国人记述中国革命的第二部经典著作。他在那本书里更加有意识地、非常具体地描述了领导和群众息息相通这一共产党领导的群众运动的特色。韩丁只写了华北一个范围很小的地区。他先简要地追溯了日本侵占这个地区以前的情况：由于多数地主附敌，国民党特权统治集团留下的人员又同侵略者互相勾结、狼狈为奸，当地自发的抗日活动起来又垮了下去。柱下他写人们如何重新坚定抗日的意志。这不仅是由于共产党八路军的武工队和干部不断进行鼓动的结果，而且农民相互之间的口头传闻也起了很大作用──这一点说明“群众运动”能够发挥越来越大的能量，这与“受人操纵的”革命不同。农民们奔走相告“怎么干起来”、“如何干才对头”以及“人家（八路军）就是这么干的”，等等传闻。 　　This feeling for the difference between a movement in which leaders and followers interact is deployed even more consciously, and in great detail, in a second American classic of the Chinese revolution, William Hinton's Fanshen. Hinton deals with a limited region in North China. He reaches back in time to give a sketchy account of the region before the Japanese invasion, with spontaneous local resistance crippled at first because too many of the landlords and what was left of the Kuomintang structure of privilege and control collaborated with the invaders. He then discussed the revival of the will to resist, increasingly stimulated not only by the advanced outlying agents and organizers of the Communist Eighth Route Army but - and this marks the difference between a "movement" increasingly generating its own momentum and a "controlled" revolution - by the word of mouth, spread from peasant to peasant, of news and stories of "how to do it," "the right way to do it,"
and "this is the way 'they' [the Eighth Route Army] do it."
　　迎来胜利：日本驻军撤走了，远方传来了日军全部投降的消息。人民尝到了自己英勇斗争的硕果。
 　　Triumph: The local Japanese withdraw, and from far away comes the news that all the Japanese have surrendered. The people savour the rewards of their own heroism.
　　灾难临头：蒋介石的军队、地主、国民党的接收大员以及一心想升官发财之辈都回来了。抗日英雄不但无功，反而被当作“颠覆分子”遭到捕杀。
 　　Disaster: The troops of Chiang Kai-shek, the landlords, and the Kuomintang place-holders and place-seekers all return. They hunt down the heroes of the Resistance, who are no longer heroes but "subversives."
　　盼来了解放：但是，有两个方面的情况已经发生了变化。首先，有很大一部分农民曾经为自卫而斗争，并且也学会了互助。他们同甘共苦，不再是昔日那种听天由命、任人摆布的旧式农民了。同时八路军的主要任务已经不再是发动民族战争、抗击外国侵略者。不单八路军本身，而且还有同八路军紧密配合的外围组织、游击队和农村民兵，现在都准备支持农民的要求，使他们在决定自己命运的问题上，获得发言权──其结果是必然爆发一场阶级战争，于是“解放”一词不仅意味着政权的更替，还包含摧毁旧的阶级关系，改造整个社会。
 　　Liberation: But two things have changed. By reason of what they have done for themselves and learned to do for each other, by reason of their common suffering and common achievements, a significantly large proportion of the peasants are no longer the same old peasants, resigned to being ordered about. And the main function of the Eighth Route Army was no longer to inspire nationalistic resistance to foreign invaders. The Army itself, and the outlying partisans and village militiamen who had more and more closely affiliated themselves to the Eighth Route, were now ready to support the demands of the peasants for a voice in deciding their own fate - demands that led inevitably to class warfare, so that in the end "liberation" came to mean more than pushing an old party aside and putting a new party in power: it meant the destruction of a class system and the transformation of a society.
　　我们最好不要把农民（和其他部分人）的要求称为“民主”要求，因为不同的人对“民主”各有不同的理解。韩丁写的一件事足以说明此中的问题。为了节省篇幅，现在我用自己的话来把这件事转述一下，希望不至于走样。共产党开始是发动农民诉苦并提出该怎么办的意见。然后共产党干部在党内对群众所提的意见和要求进行研究：如果根据当时群众的强烈要求规定政策，那运动能得到多大的推进，会遇到多大的阻力？对此研究以后，他们连续召集全村大会，申明支持群众要求的总的态度，但提出一些修改意见。于是进行反复多次的协商。共产党绝不强令人接受自己的修改意见。如果群众明确坚持自己的要求，党有时也可以改变自己的意见。他们不断派人向上汇报本村讨论的结果──村的上一级就是区，一个区管辖好几个村。有一次，韩丁问一位区干部，这样没完没了的讨论，反复征求意见，难道农民不感到厌烦吗？这位区干部回答说：“他们不会厌烦的，因为他们是在决定自己的未来啊！”
 　　It is better not to call the demands of the peasants (and others) "democratic," because "democracy" means too many different things to different people. What was involved is illustrated by one of Hinton's stories. For the sake of brevity, I paraphrase his description, and hope that in doing so I do not distort his meaning. The Communists encouraged the villagers to speak out on their grievances and to speak up on what they thought should be done. The Communists, as professional revolutionaries, would then discuss among themselves what the people were saying and demanding. If they adopted as policy what the people were calling for in the heat of the moment, how far would it broaden the movement, and how far might it stiffen opposition? They would then call more village meetings, make it clear that they sympathized in general, but suggest some changes. These exchanges went on and on, back and forth, the Communists not imposing changes and sometimes modifying their own suggestions, if the popular will was firm and clear. Prom time to time the results of the village debates would be carried, by delegates, to a higher level - a region that included many villages. Hinton once asked a regional official if he didn't think the villagers Would get tired of this endless talking and referring back and forth. "They won't get tired. It's their own future they're deciding."
　　现在回头来谈贝尔登。他采访的地区，有一部分是同韩丁重叠的，但是范围要比他大得多，包括东北（满洲）和长江、淮河下游。时间上同韩丁也有所重迭，写的主要是解放战争（日本投降以后爆发的内战），但也追溯许多历史背景，并提及其他地区内战进行的情况。因此，他所涉及的面要比韩丁广得多。不过，他虽然也深入描写了几个地方所发生的事情，却没有象韩丁那样系统地集中叙述一个特定地区的情况。他的态度也比韩丁超然得多。他毕竟是新闻记者，他只是在进行观察，既不帮忙，也不参与。而韩丁却同学生和干部一起下乡去发动并参加农民闹翻身的斗争──这是“群众”推翻旧秩序，同时又进行自我“改造”的极不平凡的过程。韩丁同土改工作队员以及村里的农民打成一片。
 　　This is where Jack Belden comes in. His area of travel and observation overlaps Hinton's but is much wider - it includes the Northeast (Manchuria) and the lower Hwai and Yangtze valleys. He also overlaps Hinton in time, dealing in the main with the Liberation War (civil war after the Japanese surrender), but with many references to the past and to the course of the civil war in other regions. His account therefore ramifies much more widely than Hinton's, but while he has a number of intensive descriptions of limited areas and what happened there, he has no long-sustained account centered on a particular area, as Hinton does. He is also measurably more detached than Hinton. He was, after all, a newspaperman; he was observing, not helping, not participating. Hinton was working with students and cadres who had been sent to the villages to promote and participate in fanshen - that unique process in which the "mass" overturns the old order, and the individual "converts"
himself - and he identified himself very closely with his companions and with the village people.
　　贝尔登的经历有一个方面同斯诺和韩丁都不一样。在一九四七到一九四九年间，中国局势越来越乱，蒋介石的专制统治日益削弱。当时，一个美国记者可以在共产党（八路军）巩固统治的地区、共产党控制下的游击区（所谓控制，是指影响所及，而不是建立了政权）以及国民党地区之间偷偷地来来去去。贝尔登利用了这种机会。由于国民党完全依赖美援，一心指望美国继续提供援助，所以尽管他们对记者很不放心，但是也无法完全限制美国记者的活动。至于共产党，他们对记者开放的做法，充分说明他们对于自己、对于自己的事业信心十足。他们心中有数，知道在当时情况下，一般的美国人在国民党地区亲眼看到垂死挣扎的蒋政权蹂躏百姓的情景之后，再穿越前线来到共产党地区，必然会对所见所闻产生好感。 　　In one respect, Belden's experience differed both from Snow's and Hinton's. In 1947-48-49, as chaos deepened and Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarian control weakened, an American reporter could slip back and forth between areas that were under full Communist (Eighth Route Army) control; partisan and militia areas that were controlled by the Communists, as far as they were controlled at all, by influence but not by authority; and Kuomintang areas. Belden took advantage of this. The Kuomintang were so deeply dependent on American aid and the hope of more aid to come that they could only partly limit the movement of reporters, even when they distrusted them. As for the Communists, their liberal treatment of reporters is extraordinary evidence of their confidence in themselves and their cause, and their subtle understanding that, things being as they were, the average American would be more sympathetic to what he saw behind the lines than to what he encountered in regions being ravaged by the death-throes of the Kuomintang.
　　《西行漫记》早已是一部脍炙人口的经典著作。《翻身》也不容置疑是一部经典著作。我认为《翻身》极生动地揭示了那个时期的毛主义的“行动方式”。例如，当时甚至实行这样大胆的方针，允许群众召开大会，把干部和党员叫来，不客气地质问他们，不但可以对他们的工作和执行政策的情况提出批评，而且也可以对他们的个人品德加以指摘。《中国震撼世界》在这两部书之间问世，但是至今仍是一部被埋没的杰作。这该作何解释呢？
 　　Red Star over China is a long-established classic. Fanshen is also an unchallengeable classic. It is, I think (for that period of Maoism), the best revelation of the Maoist "style in action," including the bold principle of allowing mass meetings to call the cadres and Party members before them, question them roughly, and challenge not only their actions and policies, but even their personal integrity. Standing between these two, China Shakes the World has until now been a neglected masterpiece. How is this to be explained?
　　《西行漫记》发表以前的十年正是世界多事之秋──日本侵占满洲、意大利侵占埃塞俄比亚、西班牙内战、日本大举侵华以及慕尼黑事件等等接连发生。由于这一连串局部侵略战争所造成的后果，世界大战的危险正在明显增长，这场大战将给人民带来空前巨大的破坏、恐怖和苦难。究竟到哪里才能找到可以团结的反法西斯和反军国主义的力量呢？德、意、日三国大肆宣扬共产主义对世界的威胁，这把保守派和无数“温和派”或“自由主义分子”都吓昏了，他们将信将疑，莫非法西斯分子和军国主义分子果真在遏制“布尔什维克的赤化浪潮”？突然，斯诺使人们看到，原来还有一个共产主义运动是吸收无数非共产党人参加的，它并不拘泥于那些脱离群众的教条，它的领导人走在延安街头时不带警卫员，他们以民族团结为重，营救了自己那个不共戴天的仇人蒋介石的性命。现在回顾起来，很显然，斯诺起下具有重要世界历史意义的作用，因为他推动美国以至世界舆论接受共产党作为盟友参加反对国际侵略的斗争。
 　　Red Star was published when a decade of frustration was coming to an end - Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the Spanish Civil War, renewed Japanese encroachment in China, Munich. The effects of these regional aggressions were clearly converging toward a world war of incalculable sweep, terror, and suffering. Where were the forces which could be rallied against fascism and militarism? Conservatives and untold numbers of "moderates" or "liberals" were paralyzed by German, Italian, and Japanese propaganda describing a Communist world menace; they hesitated and wondered if the fascists and militarists might indeed be holding back a "Red tide of Bolshevism." Suddenly Snow revealed a Communist movement which included untold numbers of non-Communists; which did not stand apart in doctrinal isolation; whose leaders walked about the streets of Yenan without bodyguards; who, in the name of national unity, had saved the life of their most embittered enemy, Chiang Kai-shek. Looking back, it is clear that Snow's part in preparing American opinion - and indeed world opinion - for a stand against international aggression in which Communists would be acceptable allies, was of world historical importance.
　　《翻身》是在书中所写的那个时期过去很久以后才出版的。韩丁于一九五三年回到美国时，正当麦卡锡参议员以及麦卡伦参议员为首的参议院国内安全委员会滥施淫威之际。韩丁的手稿被没收，后来打了好几年官司，花了不少钱，才算索取了回来。因此《翻身》一书迟至一九六七年才得以出版。这时麦卡锡——麦卡伦主义已经渐渐失势（虽然直到现在还没有完全销声匿迹）；新的一代人成长起来了，他们读了《翻身》之后，不禁追问，“如果书里所写的确是中国当时发生的其实情况，那究竟为什么当时美国人被灌输以种种骇人听闻的谎言，说什么莫斯科的独裁政权指使用恐怖手段把共产主义强加于中国？又为什么人们会听信那些谎言呢？”这些问题的答案何在？
 　　Fanshen was published long after the period it describes. Hinton returned to America in 1953. The influence of Senator Joe McCarthy, and of Senator Pat McCarran's Senate Internal Security Committee, lay heavy on the land. Hinton's papers were seized and it took years of litigation - costing a lot of money - to get them back, which explains why Fanshen was not published until 1967. By then, McCarthy-McCarranism was fading (though it has not altogether faded out, even yet), and a new generation had grown up to read Fanshen and, having read it to ask the probing questions: "If Fanshen describes what was really happening in China, then why, at that time, was America being fed with horror tales about Communism being imposed on China by methods of terror directed by a Moscow dictatorship, and why did people believe these tales?" What is the answer?
　　《中国震撼世界》至少提供了部分答案。这部杰作之所以在出版时没有成为畅销书，一直被埋没，是同它提供的这个答案有很大关系的。贝尔登同韩丁不一样。韩丁既是参加者，又是观察者，但不是一位观场报道员。贝尔登却是一位正在执行任务的记者。但是他当记者的时候，“院外援蒋游说团”已经在毒化美国的气氛，后来又出了麦卡锡─麦卡伦集团，更是闹得一片乌烟瘴气。他在书中多次提到，他发回美国的某些报道竟然只字未登，而已故的共和党加利福尼亚州参议员诺兰和已故的蒲立特歪曲中国局势真相的言论，却广为流传。
 　　China Shakes the World supplies at least part of the answer, and the fact that it was not a best-seller when it appeared, and has since then a neglected masterpiece, has much to do with that answer. Unlike Hinton, who was both participant and observer, but not an on-the-spot reporter, Jack Belden was a working reporter; but he was a reporter at a time when the "China Lobby," which was to become the McCarthy-McCarran cloud, was already smudging the American horizon. More than once he mentions that not a word of some reports he sent to America was published - and mentions at the same time the distorted version of what was going on in China put out by the late Senator Knowland (Republican, California), and the late William C. Bullitt.
　　正是由于这种情况，值此越南战争时期，现在阅读贝尔登的这本书，甚至比阅读埃德加·斯诺或韩丁的书有更加重要的意义。在这本书里，一页又一页地记载了美国政治和军事当局在中国所犯的许多不应有的、愚蠢而明显的错误，如今美国在越南又犯了，并且还在继续犯同样的错误。
 　　It is this aspect of his work that makes it even more important to read Jack Belden at the present time, the time of the Vietnam war, than to read Snow or William Hinton. Page after page is a reminder that the stupid, obvious, unnecessary mistakes made by the American political and military establishments in China have been made over again, and are still being made, in Vietnam.
　　这些错误难道还需要一次又一次地详细指明吗？其实，对于当前的局势及其中存在的严重问题，美国人民早已比那些当权派看得更清楚。这是因为那些当权派因循苟且、墨守成规，陷在官僚主义的泥坑里不能自拔。这种状态，只能由人民对政府进一步施加强大的压力，才能加以改变。如果有人想要进一步了解在这方面还必须做些什么工作，那么杰克·贝尔登的这部着作可以提供极其可贵的启示。本书所述的很久前在遥远的中国所发生的情况，概括地说明了任何一个亚洲国家所存在的各种问题。这些国家一方面受到过去殖民地传统的束缚，一方面又正在争取自立于二十世纪。不仅如此，这部着作还说明，一个国家要是被帝国主义偏见蒙蔽了眼睛，那么它所产生的政府，不管是民主党政府也好，还是共和党政府也好，决不可能实事求是地观察问题，更谈不上实事求是地解决问题。 　　How many more times must these mistakes be spelled out, syllable by syllable? Already the American people understand more about what is going on, and what is going wrong, than those in authority, who are trapped in the channels of bureaucracy and precedents, and trammelled by the rules of prescribed behavior. This gap can only be filled by the bulldozer of more pressure from the people on the government. For those who want to know more about the job that has to be done, Jack Belden's account of what went on so long ago and far away in China is invaluable as a general description of the problems of any Asian society, fettered by the colonial heritage of the past and trying to win a foothold in the Twentieth Century; and more than that, it shows why a society blinded by imperialistic preconceptions cannot produce an administration, Democratic or Republican, capable of seeing the facts as they are - let alone dealing with them.
欧文·拉铁摩尔

一九七〇年一月于利兹大学

 OWEN LATTIMORE

January, 1970, The University of Leeds