第三章 一支军队的创建

CHAPTER III

BIRTH OF AN ARMY

第十二节 杀光,烧光,抢光!
12. Kill All, Burn All, Loot All!
  日军的主要目标是消灭刘伯承的正规部队,或者使其无法立足,同时消灭各地方抗日武装,并在农村实行恐怖政策,迫使人民群众放弃武装抵抗。在历时四年的战争中,日本人也学到了不少中国人的战术。现在他们又采取了一套新的战术以对付来自曾经一度是其后方,而如今已变成其主要前线的威胁。

  日本人的战术可谓五花入门,在此我略举一例——“铁壁合围战术”。对于西方军界,这个名称听起来颇有点离奇古怪;对于日本人,这意味着一种特殊的进攻手段;而对于中国人,这可是生死攸关的事。所谓。“铁壁合围”,就是把中国人围困在一个狭小的区域之内,日军可随时进行纵横扫荡,围歼抗日武装。

THE main aim of the Japanese was to wipe out the regular force of Liu Po-cheng, or to make their existence impossible, to annihi1ate people's bands and to terrorize the countryside so that the people would abandon both their arms and resistance. In four years of war, they had learned much about Chinese tactics and they now adopted tactics of their own to combat the menace of what had once been their rear, but had now become their main front in China.

  Although these tactics were many and varied, I shall mention here only one - "The Prisoner's Cage Tactic." To a Western military ear, this name may sound with a quaint and ridiculous ring, but to the Japanese it meant a particular way of attacking and to the Chinese it meant a matter of life and death. The Prisoner's Cage Tactic was a stratagem designed to bottle up the Chinese in a small area so that the Japanese could move in at will in criss-crossing columns and wipe out all troops caught in their box.

 

  日军以城市作为“铁壁”的门锁,并沿铁道和公路修筑互相连通的封锁沟,沟宽两丈,深如护城河。在他们准备进攻的区域周围,还横越公路和田野垒起封锁墙。据薄一波估计,若把这些土墙首尾相连,可环绕地球一圈半。听起来这似乎有点夸张,但我可以用亲眼所见来证实这一点。当我穿越冀中平原时,看见碉堡林立,封锁沟墙纵横交错,简直令人难以相信中国抗日武装还能立足其中。封锁墙筑好之后,日军又在铁路之间修筑了公路,沿公路建了许多碉堡,然后进行分片合围,把封锁区像切豆腐一般分割成小块。到最后,简直就找不到一块超过二十里长,可供抗日武装活动的地方。

 

  Using cities as locks in this military prison, the Japanese built connecting ditches along railways and roads, twenty feet wide and to the depth of moats. Then across roads and fields about the area they wanted attack they erected earth walls. So long and numerous were these walls that Po estimated they would go around the earth one and a half times if put end to end. If this seems exaggerated, I can only offer the testimony of my own eyes. Going across the plain, I saw so many pillboxes, ditches and walls that it is almost inconceivable that the Chinese could have existed in the midst of them. Once the walls were erected, the Japanese would build roads between railway lines and forts all along the roads. Then they would gradually close in on all areas, cutting up the prison like bean curd so that in the end there was no territory anywhere larger than ten miles in which Chinese troops could operate.

  尽管如此,日本军队仍然消灭不了抗日武装。于是,在一九四一年冬和一九四二年春,他们提出“杀光,烧光,抢光”的口号,开始了见人就杀,见物便烧的大扫荡。   Yet the Japanese did not succeed in annihilating the forces opposing them. So, in the winter of 1941 and the spring of 1942, they began to burn and kill everything and everyone in their path. Their slogan was: "Kill all, Burn all, Loot all."

  每扫荡到一个地方,他们就把青年人统统杀光,还宰掉或掠走所有的牲畜,农具和粮食也被洗劫一空。其目的是要制造一个生命绝迹的无人区。另一方面又加紧施行经济封锁,严禁向游击区输运食盐和布匹,妄图以饥荒来破坏人民群众的反抗。

  As they moved into an area on their mopping-up campaigns, they killed all young men, destroyed or stole all cattle and broke or made off with all farmers' tools and grain. Their object was to create a no man's land in which nothing could live. At the same time they reinforced their economic blockade, halted all salt and cloth from entering the guerrilla regions and tried to starve the population out of resistance.

  中国人又如何对付这种战术呢?正如日本人不得不采取新的策略去对付游击队一样,中国人也必须采取新的策略对付日本人的“三光”战术。

  情报人员和地下工作人员组成了抗战的第一线。日军出动扫荡时,中国人总是事先得到情报。中国军队立即撤离日军要去的地区,并乘日军外离之际,袭击敌人的铁路和碉堡。所以双方实际上并未交火,只不过相互交换了一下位置而已。日军在所进攻的地区找不到抗日武装,却得悉他们刚刚离去的据点正遭到游击队的袭击,只好收兵回营解围。等他们回到老巢时,游击队早已远走高飞了。

  How could the Chinese combat such tactics? As the Japanese had had to invent new methods to fight guerrilla warfare so the Chinese also had to invent new methods to fight the Japanese annihilation tactics.

  The first line of Chinese resistance was formed by spies and underground workers. Whenever the Japanese started a mopping-up cam paign, the Chinese would have word of it beforehand. Their forces would immediately move out of the threatened area and launch an attack on the railways and blockhouses which the Japanese had just left. So the two sides would merely have exchanged positions. The Japanese would find no military force in the area they attacked, but would learn that an attack was being made on the positions they had just left. There was nothing for them to do but return to meet this force. Of course, when they arrived, it was gone.

  当时,这一地区最普遍运用的策略叫做“坚壁清野”,也可称之为消耗战术。在日军到来之前,所有的家当、粮食、牲畜以及一切对敌人有用的东西,都被转移到山洞里,或者埋藏在事先准备好的地方。所有人员也都全部撤离这一地区。日军到来时,就连一个带路的人也找不到。如果敌人进攻山区,民兵就在每一座山头上严阵以待;如果敌人进攻平原地区,民兵就打地道战。

  日本人一来,到处都遭到伏兵的狙击。这些承担狙击任务的战土绝不是胡乱放枪,他们都是从民兵队伍中挑选出来的神枪手。一遭到这样的伏击,日军就龟缩作一因。一听到哪个山头有枪声,他们就叫嚷:“八路在那里!”可是当他们扛着迫击炮和辎重爬上那个山头时,却连个人影也没见著。他们又继续向前开进,不料从另一个山头又有人向他们开枪,于是又爬上另一个山头搜索,结果仍然扑空。

  就这样一连折腾了好几次,什么也没有发现,于是他们就以为万事大吉,撤回了斥候,加速向前开进。就在这个时候,一支早已埋伏好的八路军正规部队突然向日军发起强大进攻,出其不意地给敌以重创。另外,如果日军试图进入山区,还会踩响埋在山坡各处的土地雷。如果日军兵力甚强,民兵就避免与敌人正面遭遇,只是进行狙击。但若发现掉队的小股敌人,民兵就以鸟铳、土炮以及手中的各种武器,予以迎头痛击。这种战术打得敌人狼狈不堪。不出一个星期,日军就被搞得粮尽弹绝,只好收兵回巢。老乡们又重返家园,取出埋藏在地下的粮食,准备对付敌人下次扫荡。

  这种名为“坚壁清野”的消耗战,只有在广大群众的全力配合之下才能进行。这种广大群众的密切配合,在西方工业化国家中是罕见的,在中国农村也不多见。但在中国某些地区,特别是山区,群众配合之密切到了难以置信的地步。下面略举一例。

  The most famous method adopted in the area, however, was one known as, "Emptying the House and Clearing Up the Field." It could be called a tactic of attrition. Before the Japanese advanced, furniture, grain, cattle and anything of use to the Japanese would all be moved to caves or buried in a prepared hiding place. All people would evacuate the area. Not a guide could be found. If the attack were in the mountains, militiamen would take up positions on every peak; if in the plains, in underground tunnels.

  When the Japanese advanced, they were fired at by snipers from all sides. These were not fortuitous snipers, but the best shots picked out of village units for that purpose. Thus attacked, the Japanese would be afraid to split up. Hearing shots from one mountain, they would say: "There's the 8th Route Army." But when they climbed the mountain with their mortars and heavy equipment, they would find no one. Again, they would move forward, again they would be sniped at from another peak, and again they would sweep and search the hill in vain.

  After repeating this process two or three times and finding nothing, they would begin to feel safe. Their scouts would be drawn in and they would move forward swiftly. Just at this time, a regular detachment which had been held back and concealed for the purpose would strike them in force and inflict heavy damage on them before they could recover. In addition, as the Japanese tried to penetrate further into the mountains, they would run into homemade land mines planted all over the hill slopes. If the Japanese were in some strength, the militia would not attempt to attack them, but would content themselves with sniping. But if a small detachment split off from the main group, the people would attack with bird rifles, homemade mortars and anything to hand. Such tactics developed a messy military situation. It might last a week. Then the Japanese would get out of supplies and retreat and the farmers would go back to their homes, dig up buried grain and wait till the next attack.

  The war of attrition that is implicit in the phrase "Emptying the House and Clearing Up the Field" is a kind of war that can be carried out only by the co-operation of almost all members of society. This cooperation is seldom found in the industrialized societies of the West and not often in the agrarian villages of China either. But in some areas, especially in the mountains, it was carried on to an almost unbelievable extent, as the following story illustrates.
  在山西省太岳山区,有个六万人口的沁源县。县城就叫沁源,周围原来有城墙,后来日本人入侵时,人们把它拆除了。这里的居民天性独立不羁,在抗战期间表现了高度的爱国主义精神,全县没有一个人投靠日寇当汉奸。这在当时的中国确实是难能可贵的。因此,沁源就成了日本人的眼中钉、肉中刺。到了一九四二年二月,日本人决心要除掉这个心腹之患,调遣了一个团的兵力沿公路进犯沁源县城,另派一个团部署于县城以南。

  沁源人民发觉敌人的行动后,立即召开誓师大会,一致表示誓死不向敌人屈服。城里所有的居民以及粮食、牲畜和一切对敌人有用的东西很快撤离一空。同时,居住在日军必经的百里公路沿线的二万群众,也都撤离了家园,躲进山里。不仅仅是地方民兵,所有身强力壮的青年,都拿起了武器。他们以一万支枪的火力,在山头上摆好了阵势。山区群众把自己的土地、棉花、家畜与那些逃进山里的难民合用,虽然住房很紧张,但孩子们都得到妥善安置。由于没有力量与拥有重武器的日军正面交战,群众决定对敌占的县城,布下包围圈,切断敌人的供应线。

  日本人大摇大摆地通过公路往城里运送给养,每隔一天运送一次。民兵就在一处叫生福岭的狭隘山口设下埋伏,开始埋伏了五百人,后来又增援至一千人。当敌人的运输车队艰难地通过山口时,民兵们鸟枪齐放,子弹像瀑布一样向敌人倾泻下来。从二月到五月,民兵们一直采用这种办法袭击敌人,平均每天消灭五个日本兵。这个山口使当地的口本驻军丧胆,以至每个被派去执行押运任务的日本兵,都要在头天晚上给妻子写一封诀别的家书。后来,日本人就把生福岭称为“鬼门关”。

  在撤离沁源之前,群众把所有的水井都用泥土给填死了,占领县城的日军饮水只好到附近的沁河去取。河的两岸矗立着高山绝壁,山上埋伏着民兵的神枪手,日本人不得不派一个班的兵力来回护送运水队,于是运水也成了一场战斗。另外,城里没柴烧,日本兵不得不出城去打柴,山上的民兵了望哨一发现他们砍柴,就放冷枪于掉他们。日军甚至出来大小便,也会遭到同样的下场。游击队还常常在夜里下山来摸哨。就这样,日军在运水、打柴、放哨以至上厕所时,都可能遭到游击队的袭击,每天又要损失十来个兵员。日军终于无法支持,只好撤出沁源。

链接:关于沁源围困战

链接:关于王二小放牛郎

  There is in the Taiyueh Mountains of Shansi a county called Chingyuan in which there are sixty thousand people. The center of the county is a town, bearing the county name, which was once surrounded by a wall that the people knocked down after the Japanese invasion. The residents of this region are independent by nature and during the war were so patriotic that not one traitor or collaborator was found throughout the whole county, a rare thing for China. Chingyuan became a thorn in the Japanese side so, in February 1942, they decided to knock it out of the war. For this purpose, they sent a regiment along a motor highway to occupy the city while another regiment was disposed to the south.

  Noting the Japanese advance, the people held a public meeting and gave a pledge never to submit to the enemy. Then the city was im mediately emptied of all its inhabitants, grain, livestock and whatever would be of use to the Japanese. In addition, twenty thousand people living along the thirty miles of road of the Japanese advance evacuated their homes and went into the mountains.

  Not only the local militia, but all able-bodied young men obtained arms, and with ten thousand rifles they took up positions in the moun tains. Those living in the mountains divided their land, cotton and animals with the refugees while all children were distributed around the few available houses. Unable to fight the heavily equipped Japanese, the people decided to lay siege to the city and its supply artery.

  The Japanese in typically orderly fashion brought up their supplies to the city by road every other day. The people immediately moved five hundred, then a thousand militiamen to the peaks of a narrow pass known as Sheng Fulin, and every other day rained down a cascade of birdshot on the convoys slowly struggling through the pass. From February to May, this attack was kept up so that, on an average, five Japanese soldiers were killed every day. The pass became so infamous to local Japanese units that anyone put on convoy duty would write a letter to his wife the night before. Finally, Sheng Fulin was known as Ghost Gate in the Japanese Army.

  Before evacuating the city of Chingyuan, the people had filled all the wells with earth. Consequently the regiment garrisoned in the city had to obtain their water from the Chin Ho River near by. About this river are high hills, where the people stationed experienced snipers, so that the Japanese had to send a squad of soldiers along with their water carriers. Thus getting water became an engagement. In the city there was no firewood, so the Japanese had to come outside to get their wood. When they climbed trees, they were also picked off by the mountain watchers. When they came out to answer the calls of nature, they were also picked off. In addition, the mountain people would come down in the night and kidnap or kill sentries. Thus, in carrying water, relieving themselves, getting firewood and standing guard, the Japanese lost another additional ten men a day. In the end Chingyuan became too costly for the Japanese to hold.

  在边区的平原地带坚持抗战,比在山区还要困难。例如在冀南,二、三十里之内没有日军的地区,就算是“根据地”了。由于到处都有日军,中国人无法保持较大的机动部队,因此就把队伍分散,最大的编制也不超过一个营。

  在平原上,有些家家户户都用泥灰砌房屋的大村庄里,往往是村西头驻有日军,而东头却住着游击队。即使在这样的环境中,游击队也很少被发现,日本人竟打不着他们。

  所有这些,似乎令人难以置信。共产党把他们之所以能够这样生存下去,归因于他们对群众和伪军所做的大量工作。在平原上,游击队往往在日军出动前四个小时就得到了情报。在日军每次大扫荡之前,伪军都会给游击队通风报信。游击队还把儿童、孕妇以及伤员送进城里,交给伪军的家属和医务人员照料。日军进攻游击村时,总是命令伪军打头阵,伪军就对空放枪,虚张声势地喊叫:“八路在哪儿?”这就使游击队有充裕的时间撤走。

  On the plains of the Border Region, it was even more difficult to maintain the war against the Japs than in the mountains. In southern Hopei Province, for example, any place that did not have Japanese soldiers within six to ten miles was called a "base." Since the Japanese were everywhere, the Chinese could no longer maintain a large mobile army. Units were so dispersed that on the plains there was not a larger echelon than a battalion.

  Some of the mud- and plaster-hut villages on this plain are extremely large and often the Japanese would be found living in the western part of the village while Chinese guerrillas lived in the east. Even under these circumstances, the Chinese units were seldom surprised and Japanese attacks did little damage.

  This seems incredible, but the Communists lay their ability to exist like this on their work among the people and the puppet troops of the Japanese. In the plains, the guerrillas always knew four hours ahead of time when an attack was coming. Whenever a large mopping-up campaign was coming, the Chinese would be informed by the puppets. Children, pregnant women and wounded men would he sent into the towns and put under the care of puppet families, doctors and nurses. In their attacks on guerrilla villages, the Japanese would always put their puppet troops first and these would fire in the air and shout loudly: "Where is the 8th Route Army?" There was always ample time to get away.
  游击队还在公路上到处挖沟,使日军的汽车无法通行,只好绕道田野,迂回行进。游击队在沟里却能够行动自如,撤退也很方便。

  平原的游击队和民兵以及地下工作者还修建了四通八达的地道网。一遇紧急情况,就把队伍带进地道,领导机关也进入地道继续工作。地道口都经过巧妙伪装,往往就开在干部住房的墙壁里或地板下。地道长约五至十五里,不仅户户相通,而且村村相连。地下通道纵横,多处开有进出口,而且还有不少拐弯抹角的地方,一遇紧急情况,就在那里布置武装岗哨,以对付进入地道的敌人。但这样的情况极少发生。因此抗日政权的干部能泰然安居,即使故人进了衬,他们也能处变不惊。假如敌人逼近家门,游击队就先应付它几招,然后纷纷钻进地道。倘若日军闯进屋里,也只有徒然四壁,空空如也。有时也许只见一个老妇人安坐在椅子上。

  中国共产党人就是采用这样的办法,保持住了边区政府和抗日武装。但是,尽管他们进行了英勇顽强的斗争,根据地还是日渐缩小,正规部队也由原来的十万人减员到七万人。但民兵的力量却发展到五十多万人。

  The guerrillas also dug hundreds of trenches across the highways so that Japanese cars had to make constant detours through the fields. The guerrillas, however, could go up and down the trenches at will and escape easily.

  Finally, the guerrillas, militia and underground workers in the plains built a vast system of tunnels beneath the fields where units could hide in time of danger and directing organs could carry on work. These tunnels were entered from a carefully concealed hole in the wall or floor of a government worker's house. They extended from two to five miles, coming up not only in different houses, but in different villages. They had many pathways, entrances and exits and many turns at which in time of danger armed guards would always stand in case the Japanese ever got into the tunnels. They seldom did. So the underground government would sit in peace in their houses, not even paying attention to the Japanese if they entered the village. If the Japanese should come to the door of a house, the guerrillas would put up a brief fight and then disappear one by one into the tunnel. Should the Japs enter the house, they would find nothing, except perhaps an old lady sitting quietly in a chair.

  The Chinese in this fashion were able to maintain their governments and their fighting organizations, but despite all their heroic efforts, their base grew smaller and the number of regulars in their armed forces was knocked down from one hundred thousand to seventy thousand. The militia force however had grown to over five hundred thousand.