第六章 革命的前奏
 

CHAPTER VI

PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION

第二十六节 土地问题
26. The Land Problem
  共产党如果没有人民的全心全意拥护,就绝不可能推翻蒋介石。土地问题的解决确保了人民的拥护。

  早期来华的欧洲人看到,中国农业固然有其不同的特点,但是水平和西方数百年前差不多。土地占有的状况则已存在严重问题。大约在克伦威尔领导工匠和农民的军队同英国国会作战的时期,清帝国疆域内的全部耕地有八亿亩,人口则有七千万,土地问题显然已到了危机关头。在以后的三百年中,耕地面积扩大了一倍,而人口却增加到六倍以上!公有土地渐渐被化为私产的趋势,使这种人多地少的状况更为恶化。辛亥革命以前,满族贵族几乎侵占了所有的皇田。辛亥革命以后,贪官和豪绅又通过非法买卖,攫取了大量的庙产、学田和军垦土地。中国近代加入世界贸易,也无疑大大推动了化公田为私产的过程。加以土地越来越集中,耕作方式又十分落后,自然加深了农业人口过剩的危机。农民还没有摆脱中世纪的压迫,又陷入了另一重困境,这是因为上述过程不是在中世纪时代发生的,而是在西方资本和廉价舶来品的巨大压力下发生的。

  国民党的缔造者孙中山和共产党人都认识到,不解放农民,中国就不能解放,因此他们鼓吹耕者有其田的纲领。他们对农民说:“你们要支持我们北伐,打倒军阀,我们一定帮助你们获得土地。“显然,这只有牺牲地主,才能办到。国民党资产阶级向农民提出统一国家或打倒帝国主义的口号,农民并不响应。但是孙中山的“耕者有其田”口号,却得到农民十分热烈的反响,因为农民渴望获得土地,要求打倒地主。这个口号把农民大大发动起来,踊跃参加蒋介石的军队,以及参加农民协会。蒋介石正是踏着农民的肩膀取得政权的。

THE Communists could not hope to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek without finding a mighty support in the hearts of the people. Such a support was guaranteed by the land problem.

  Early Europeans arriving in China had found agricultural industry, with admitted differences, almost on the same level as it had been several hundred years before in the West. Nevertheless, conditions of land-ownership were already acute. About the time Cromwell was leading army of artisans and peasants against the English Parliament, the whole area of cultivated land within the limits of the Manchu Empire was 130 million acres. With a population of seventy million, the land problem was plainly critical. But within the next three hundred years, while the area of cultivated land was doubling, the population was in creasing over six times! This tremendous overcrowding was made worse by the fact that there was a tendency of public land to become private. Before the 1911 Revolution, Manchurian nobles had already usurped almost all the royal land and after that revolution corrupt bureaucrats and greedy gentry seized vast amounts of temple, educational and military land through illegal sales. No doubt China's contact with modern sharpened the crisis caused by excess rural population. World commerce was the chief compelling force in bringing about this change from public to private ownership. Such a process, accompanied increasing concentration, together with archaic methods of farming, scarcely emerged from the Middle Ages, was doubly trapped process was not taking place in medieval times, but under pressure from Western capital and cheap Western products.

  Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of the Kuomintang, and the Communists both realize that China could not be freed unless the peasant were freed and they began preaching a program of land to the tiller - that is to say, they proposed to the peasant that he support them in their northward march against the warlords in exchange for their help in getting him land. This could obviously be achieved only at the expense of the the landlords. The peasant did not react to the slogans of unifying the country or overthrowing imperialism, presented him by the Kuomintang bourgeoisie. But he did react, and with impassioned violence, to Dr. Sun's slogan of "Land to the tiller," because, choking in his narrow plot, he wanted to throw out the landlord. On this basis, the peasants rose up like a mighty flood, some pouring into Chiang Kai-shek's armies, some joining the peasant unions. On the broad backs of these farmers, Chiang Kai-shek swept to power.
  但是中国资产阶级与地主有千丝万缕的关系,他们不遵守与农民的盟约,竟派农民出身的士兵镇压农民协会。并不是所有的农民都起来革命,但是所有起来革命的农民都遭到了镇压。因此,尽管提出了耕者有其田的诺言,地主并没有受到清算。杜月笙的青帮流氓镇压了上海的工人,发出了反革命的信号。多数是大地主出身的高级军官立刻抛弃了国民党所议决的二五减租纲领。地主不但不减租,还常常把百分之五十的稻麦租子提到百分之六十五。佃户要是反对,地主立刻就让管家把他关入地牢里。农民帮助蒋介石上了台,得到的报酬并不是土地,连减租都不是,而是恐吓、咒骂、毒打,甚至是一口棺材。

  国民党背叛了孙中山的纲领后,蒋介石的御用经济学家为这种背叛辩解,竟称土地问题是虚构的,硬说根本不存在这个问题。他们既然采取这种态度,当然可以随心所欲地举出一些对他们有用的数字作证。蒋介石在上海发动政变后,中国的全部耕地估计为十三亿亩,而中国的人口约为四亿五千万,其中有三亿五千万是农民。这等于是说(在最理想的条件下)每个农民顶多有四亩地,而捐税、吃的、烧的、穿的——实际上是他一生中从铁锄到木棺的一切东西,都要靠这四亩地得到。

  这种情况足以说明,中国如不消灭封建制度,就会完蛋。但是蒋介石御用的农学家却从这些数字里得出了另外一种结论。“分地有什么用,”他们厚着脸皮问道,“地本来就不够嘛。”至于土地集中,那是不存在的,因而也就没有革命的理由了。无疑,这些经济学家企图为他们出卖农民进行狡辩。可是他们那一套不仅无视农民的愿望(似乎这些血肉之躯在他们的数字里是无足轻重的),而且不顾在他们眼前发生的土地集中的事实。

  The Chinese bourgeoisie, however, was so tied up with the landlord that it could not abide this ally and turned the peasant soldiers against their brothers in the village associations. Not all the peasants had risen, but those who had were suppressed. Thus the landlords were not settled with despite all the promises of soil to the tillers.

  As soon as the mobsters of Tu Yueh-sen's Green Gang had cut down the workers in Shanghai and given the signal for the counterrevolution, the higher army officers, most of whom were large landowners, abandoned all thought of reducing land rents by 25 per cent in accordance with the adopted and passed program of the Kuomintang. Far from reducing rents, the landlords often demanded and received 65 percent instead of 50 percent of the tenant's rice or wheat crop. Should the tenant protest, the landlords would simply have their bailiffs throw him in their dungeons. The compensation the peasant received for putting Chiang Kai-shek in power was thus not land or even rent reductions, but threats, curses, blows and sometimes a coffin.

  With the party traitor to the program of their founding fathers, the learned economists in Chiang's government began to justify the betrayal by finding that the land problem was a myth and did not exist.

  In adopting this attitude, they could conceivably find support if they wished in some very useful figures. On the morrow of Chiang Kai-shek's coup d'elat in Shanghai all the arable land within China was estimated at one and one-third billion mow (1). The population of the country was around four hundred and fifty million, of which about three hundred and fifty million were farmers. In effect, and under the most ideal conditions, this meant that the peasant would have to extract taxes, food, fuel, clothing - in fact, everything he would ever use in his life from an iron hoe to a wooden coffin - out of no more than four mow (two-thirds of an acre) of land. This fact by itself suggested that China would have to end feudalism or perish. But Chiang's agronomes now discovered in these figures proof of another sort. "What is the use of dividing the land?" they blandly asked. "There is not enough anyway." As for land concentration, it did not exist and hence there was no cause for revolution. No doubt, the economists wished to rationalize their betrayal of the peasants. But their assumptions not only ignored the wishes of the farmers' if this flesh-and-blood man were too insignificant to find a place in their figures - but also ignored the process of land concentration which was taking place before their eyes.

原注一:一亩大概是六分之一英亩(亩:666.67平方米;英亩:4046.85平方米)。

(1) One mow equals approximately one-sixth of an acre.

  有些人看到中国农民种的田亩小得可怜,就很容易得出结论说,中国没有大地产。但是,田亩小并不能说明没有土地集中,倒是说明经济落后,地主不搞大农场生产,而是把地分佃出去,坐收租利。在河南,黄河之南,乘驴车走—整天,经过几十个村庄,还走不出一家大地主的地界。在山东,孔子的后裔霸占着大量的族田。作者在许多地方还见过“百顷拜”一类名目的地主团体。在苏北,有个寺院拥有二十万亩地。寺院长老又收租子又放高利贷,家里人丁兴旺,有三房四妾,宅邸比县太爷的还豪华。佃户的农具全部要向和尚借,因此常被这些沙门地主的看家护院恶奴逼迫着出劳役。

  虽然国民政府没有进行全国的统计,但是从许多地方的统计也足以看出土地占有的状况正在造成革命形势。我绝不想在本文中罗列烦琐的数字,但是我不能不举出蒋介石、宋子文、孔祥熙以及陈立夫陈果夫兄弟四大家族的家乡的土地占有状况的统计数字。

(表一)

 

  People who note the incredibly small plots of Chinese farms are apt to draw the conclusion that there are no large landholdings in China. But small fields, far from showing no land concentration, illustrate the backward nature of an economy in which the landlords do not manage large farms for production, but parcel out their land to tenants in order to obtain rents. In Honan, south of the Yellow River, one might ride a donkey cart past scores of villages for a whole day and still be on the same family's land. In Shantung large areas of clan land were monopolized by the descendants of Confucius and in many places the writer came across associations of landlords known as the Hundred Ching Pai, or the Ten Thousand Mow Group. In northern Kiangsu, there was a temple that owned two hundred thousand mow (thirty-three thousand acres) of land. (2) The chief monks, engaged in rent collecting and the practice of usury, maintained big families, including concubines, and had dwellings far grander than even the magistrates. Utterly dependent on the monks for farm tools, the tenants were often conscripted for labor by the armed guards of these ecclesiastical landowners.

  Although the national government had no nationwide statistics, there were nevertheless innumerable provincial statistics that formed a most impressive picture of the revolutionary situation engendered by the conditions of landownership. With every desire not to burden this text with figures, I cannot refrain from introducing the statistics of land-ownership in the home provinces of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and the brothers Chen Li-ju, and Chen Kuo-fu, party bosses of the Kuomintang.

  这个统计表给我们展示了一个孕育着农民战争的国家。在中国这样落后而人口极为稠密的国家里,有没有土地往往决定生死命运,因此这些数字的意义比起在美国这样土地甚多的国家里要大得多。

  在全中国,一般而言,占人口百分之十左右的地主和富农,拥有百分之五十五至六十五(1)的土地。如果你不愿意相信这个数字,那么还有数年前在土地集中程度尚未达到现在这样严重时蒋政府地政署发表的数字。地政署调查了十一个省的情况,发现一千五百户大地主平均每户有两千多亩地。对这十一省的七十万农户的调查表明,这些农户平均每户有地十五亩多,比大地主少一百三十倍。仅此一端就不能不使人认为,在少得可怜的土地上无法活命的农民,在地权不平等的逼迫下,必然会铤而走险,组织起来从地主那里夺取土地,求得一条生路。

  这种状况本来应该使地主和蒋介石政府惊醒过来。但是中国的统治者历来蔑视人民群众掌握自己命运的能力。国民党官僚不设法通过土地改革改善情况,反而采取了相反的政策。

  There is here before us a picture of a nation carrying in its womb a peasant war. In a backward and terribly overcrowded country such as China, where a plot of land often means the difference between life and death, these figures are of far greater significance than they would be in a land-rich country such as the United States.

  Generally speaking for the whole of China, landlords and rich peasants farming about io per cent of the population occupied 55 to 65 (8) percent of the land. If you do not wish to accept these figures there are those made some years ago, before concentration reached its present height, by the National Land Commission of the Chiang government. This commission, investigating conditions in 11 provinces found that 1500 big 1andlord families owned on an average over 333 acres per family. Another investigation of over 700,000 peasant families in the same districts showed the average ownership of these families to be 2.6 acres - 130 times smaller than the big landlord families. This remarkable fact alone would suggest the thought that the peasant, impelled by the inequality of landownership and dying on his pitiful plot, must at whatever cost produce an organization able to wrest land from the landlord to give himself a chance to live.

  These conditions should have been a warning to both the landlords and the Chiang Kai-shek government. Chinese rulers, however, are traditionally contemptuous of the masses' ability to interfere in their own fate. Instead of seeking to alleviate these conditions by land reform, the Kuomintang bureaucrats adopted just the opposite policy.

原注二:见《中国农业》,太平洋研究所出版。

原注三:中国当时没有准确的土地统计数字。共产党声称百分之十的人拥有百分之八九十的土地,但这似乎是略有夸张。

(2) See Agrarian China - published by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(3) There are no accurate land statistics in China. The Communist party declared 10 Per cent of the people held 80-90 per cent of the land. But this seems an exaggeration.

  在抗日战争时期,土地集中达到了近代中国前所未闻的程度。尽管估计河南、湖北、湖南三省有五千万亩地荒芜着,尽管估计有一千万到一千五百万农民在抗战中和抗战后饿死,蒋介石的官僚们却利用自己的军事实力和权位在中国内地大肆侵夺土地。抗战结束后,蒋介石政府对土地的侵夺更加肆无忌惮。日本人从中国人民那里夺去的土地,并没有归还中国人民,而是被国民党全数接收了。日本人在台湾的土地被大陆来的接收大员据为已有,华北垦业公司则侵吞了河北几十万亩土地。

  小官吏和低级军官也学他们上级的榜样。他们靠蒋政权发的纸币薪饷是没法生活的,所以也聚敛土地,以防通货膨胀。由于蒋介石这帮从沿海来的大员的巧取豪夺,就连富农和小地主也纷纷失去土地。据估计,八年抗战中,四川地主中百分之二、三十是新置产的,他们攫取了老地主百分之九十的田产。对本地地主老财的这种沉重打击,引起了强烈的反应。中国有句古语,“普天之下,莫非王土”。现在,失去土地的地主恨恨地说:“普天之下,莫非蒋土”。这种说法当然是发牢骚,但也隐伏着革命的因素。

  事情还不只是出现了新乡绅。随着土地的兼并,不但产生了新的农衬资产阶级,而且产生了新的穷人。抗战期间蒋管区和沦陷区由于典押和负债而丧失土地的农民增加了不知有多少万。华北荒年期间,农民为了借粮度过春荒,必须拿地作抵押,两三年内无力赎回就完了。七口之家因此而有三四口人饿死的是常事。土地集中的结果造成许多肥田的尸骨,但也造成千千万万要求土地革命的人们。

  During the Japanase war, land became concentrated to an unheard of degree in modern China. Despite the fact that an estimated fifty million mow of land were lying desolate in the provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Hunan and despite the fact that an estimated ten to fifteen million farmers died of starvation during and after the war, Chiang Kai-shek's bureaucrats using their superior military force and their bureaucratic positions began a gigantic land grab in the interior of China. At the end of the war, the land grab by the Chiang government was even more callous and more open. All the land that the Japanese had robbed from the Chinese people, instead of being turned back to them was taken over by the Kuomintang. Japanese land in Formosa was appropriated by mainland carpetbaggers, while the North China Exploitation Company seized several hundred thousand mow of land in Hopei.

  Taking a leaf from the book of their masters, the smaller bureaucrats and the militarists, unable to live on the paper money salaries given them by the Chiang government, also began amassing landholdings as a means of security in times of inflation. Under the concerted drive for land by Chiang's interlopers from the coast, even rich peasants and small landlords began to lose their holdings. In Szechuan, it was estimated that during eight years of war anywhere from 20 to 30 per cent of the total landlords were new landlords who occupied go per cent of the land owned by the old landlords. This explosive bomb directed against the native money-landlords brought forth a bitter reaction. "All land under the sky belongs to the emperor," used to be an old Chinese saying. Now the dispossessed landlords complained: "All land under the sky belongs to Chiang Kai-shek." Such a way of speaking, of course, was mainly symbolic, but it had revolutionary significance.

  Ths creation of a new rural gentry, however, had another side. There was arising from the seized land not only a new rural bourgeoisie but new paupers. The number of peasants dispossessed from their land because of unpaid mortgages and unpaid debts, both in Chiang's areas and in the Japanese-occupied areas, rose by untold thousands during the Japanese war. In the famine periods in North China, peasants who had to give land as security for grain borrowed during the spring, within a space of two or three years would lose everything. It was common for three or four members of a family of seven to starve to death for these reasons. Land concentration thus meant corpses to fertilize the earth, but it also meant thousands of souls for agrarian revolution.

  在人口稠密的中国,土地集中的后果自然与人口稀少的美国大不相同。美国的大亨攫取西部土地的手段固然凶狠,但却产生了铁路、矿山、大牧场——这一切大大有利于资本主义的发展。而中国的土地兼并只是使地主的囤子堰满租粮而已,这是寄生性的,而不是生产性的。

  同普鲁士的容克地主和沙皇俄国的贵族地主比起来,中国地主是非常落后的。德国和俄国的富农租进土地来经营大规模的农场,而中国地主却把土地出租以榨取佃户的血汗。俄国富农和德国地主固然反动,但在农业经济中有时还有进步作用,中国地主就没有任何进步作用可言。这种封建土地所有制的另一面,就是农民租入土地只能过奴隶般的生活。在资本主义国家里, 无地的农民可以进工厂,或者当雇工。而中国既无工业,又无大农场,无地农民只能租地为生。所以,农民一方面缺少土地,另一方面又被束缚在土地上面。

  Concentrated ownership of land in crowded China could not help but produce different results from what such a process produced in unpeopled America. In the United States, the way American moneyed barons seized the Western lands was brutal enough, but out of it came railroads, mines, great cattle ranches - all the overflowing gifts of capitalism. But land grabbing in China only filled the granaries of the landlords with grain rents. Thus the process was not productive, but parasitic in nature.

  Compared to Prussian junkers or the landed nobility in czarist Russia, the Chinese landlord was a very backward man. While the rich German and Russian peasant leased in land for large-scale farming, the rich chinese leased out land merely to suck profits from the sweat of his tenants. Reactionary as they were, the kulak and the junker performed at times progressive functions in rural economy; the Chinese landlord performed none. The obverse side of this feudal medal was that the peasant leased in land to maintain a slavelike livelihood. In capitalist countries a landless peasant either goes to the factory or hires himself out as a laborer. But in China there was no industry and no large-scale farming and he had to become a sharecropper in order to live. Thus, while he suffered land hunger, he was at the same time chained to the land.
  这种半奴隶制的租佃制度,与中国的高利贷制度是分不开的。村镇中最有气派的房子总是当铺。银行是为富人开的,当铺则是为穷人开的。当铺老板大都是地主或与地主有联系的商人。当铺是兼并农民土地的最常用的工具。我在河南一个只有四千多亩地的村子里看到一个地主占有近二千亩地,绝大部分是通过当铺吞并的。

  这种交易只有在农民走投无路的情况下才做得成。农民急需填充饥腹,利息再高也不得不借债。在蒋介石统治时期,利率增长到了惊人的程度。一九三二年,农民借一百块钱,到年底要还一百二十五块钱。一九三六年,就要还一百四十块至一百六十块钱了。抗战期间,利率猛涨到三个月百分之百,用粮食计算。负债农民的境遇有时是骇人听闻的。

  作者在河南见过一位农民,他在春播前向地主借了一百斤小米,借约规定,到了秋收时节要还两百斤。他后来还不起这么多,就请求宽限,答应来年秋后还三百斤。可是因为遭灾,到期还是还不起,他只得把自己的地抵押出去,最后结果是丢了四亩地。由于这个原因,母亲和两个孩子就饿死了。为了区区一百斤粮食的债务,竟赔了四亩地和三条人命。

  This semislave type of tenancy was inseparable from the system of usury practiced in China. The most massive and best-built houses in the villages and small towns were always the pawnshops. What the banks were to the rich, these shops were to the poor. The majority of the pawnshop owners were landlords or merchants tied to the landlords. These pawnshops were most often instruments for getting hold of the peasants' land. In Honan, I found a landlord who owned 350 acres of land in a village with only seven hundred acres. Most of this land had been acquired through the pawnshop.

  Such deals were possible in the first place only because of the desperate condition of the farmer who had to agree to any rate of interest when in need of food. These rates of interest increased in alarming proportion during the reign of Chiang Kai-shek. In 1932, a peasant borrowing $100 had to pay back at the end of the year $125. By 1936, he had to pay $140 to $160. During the war, the interest jumped to 100 per cent in grain for a three-month period. The severity with which peasant debtors were treated was sometimes unbelievable.

  The writer came across a farmer in Honan who borrowed a hundred catties of millet from his landlord before planting. (4) At harvest time, according to the agreement, he was to pay back two hundred catties. When he could not raise the amount, he begged for more time and agreed to pay 300 catties at the next harvest. Unable to pay, because of drought, he was then compelled to convert the loan into a mortgage on his land, four mow of which he eventually had to give up. Because of this his mother and two children starved to death. Thus, what originated as a small grain loan of a hundred catties ended up as a debt of four mow of land and three corpses.

原注四:一斤折合一又三分之一磅(一斤:500克;一磅:454克)。 (4) One catty= 1.33 lbs.

  “好年地里收谷,歉年家里生财。”

  山西穷苦农民这句悲愤的歌谣,确切地反映了地主和富农利用灾荒聚敛土地、钱财的事实。抗战时期在沦陷区,这一过程急剧发展了,而在蒋管区,国民党政府的金融机关则开始排挤当铺和高利贷商。过去,当铺在农村的放债额是银行的五倍,而到了一九四六年,当铺的放债额据估计只及银行的八分之二。但是,银行放的款也是高利贷。农民不仅没有得到解脱,反而被国民党银行剥削得更厉害了,农村信贷和一般的农业金融业务全让它垄断了。

  情况是这样的:银行控制了高利贷的发放,它只放款给乡绅组织的农村合作社,作为对地主的照顾。县合作社再把钱借给村长,村长又转借给农民。这样,农民头上不是一个高利贷债主,而是三个了。但是,事情并不这么简单。地方党部的官员,在国民党右翼势力的支持下,要把农村资产阶级组织的并受到中国财政部长孔祥熙部分支持的农村合作社从乡村中赶出去。这种行动常常有地方军人或党棍的配合,如果各种手段都不奏效,他们就指控地方商绅是共产党。这种只把钱借给一小撮地方党棍,而歧视一些地主和广大农民的作法,无异于把中农和小商人逼入绝境,而这些人在抗战期间本来是习惯于自己组织互助会的。这进一步加深了乡村中的矛盾。抗战结束后,当蒋军返回沿海,北进攻打共产党的时候,这一过程大大加剧了。蒋介石命令农民银行加强对各县合作钱庄的控制。这无疑是鼓励地主和上层农民放高利贷,使这些富有的农民成为蒋政权的支柱。这一切农民都看在眼里,他们八年没见到蒋政权的影子,现在清楚地看到,国民党是地主及村霸的朋友。蒋政权在光复区为了获得地主的支持,不仅得罪了贫农,也得罪了中农,这无异于自杀。蒋介石没有造成多少新的资产阶级,倒是为共产党八路军造成了千千万万拥护者。

  "In good years, the landlord grows crops in the fields. In bad years, the landlord grows money in his house."

  This bitter verse of poor Shansi farmers aptly describes conditions whereby drought and famine were often the very instruments landlords and rich peasants used for amassing land and wealth.

  In the Japanese areas during the war this process was much accelerated, but in Chiang Kai-shek's areas, the financial organs of the Kuomintang government began to overpower the pawnshops and the local usurers. Formerly, pawnshops had loaned five times the sums the banks loaned to the villages, but by 1946, pawnshops were lending an estimated two-eighths of the amounts loaned out by banks. The usurious character of the loans, however, was maintained. Instead of getting relief, the farmer was only exploited more intensely by Kuomintang banks, which monopolized the operation of farm credit loans and general agricultural finance.

  This is explained by the fact that the banks, having muscled in on the usury racket, compensated the landlords by limiting the loans to rural co-operatives organized by the gentry. The county co-operatives would then lend money to village chiefs who would in turn lend it out to farmers. Thus the peasant now had three usurers on top of him instead of one. The process, however, was further complicated by the fact that the local party officials, with the support of the right-wing clique of the Kuomintang, began to expel from the villages rural co-operatives organized by the rural bourgeoisie and partly backed by Dr. H. H. Kung, finance minister of China. This was often done in co-operation with the local military or by party rascals who, when all other measures failed, accused local merchants of being Communists. Giving loans to a small majority of the local party officeholders while discriminating against some of the older gentry and the majority of the farmers was like holding a pistol against the head of the middle peasants and small merchants who had often organized self-help groups of their own during the Japanese war. This produced further contradictions in the villages. The process, however, was greatly accelerated after the Japanese war when Chiang's armies returned to the seacoast and began to drive north against the Communists. Chiang instructed the Farmer's Bank to strengthen control over the co-operative county treasuries. This meant: encourage the gentry and the upper strata of the peasantry to go into usury and convert these rich farmers into a support for the Chiang regime. This lesson was not lost on the peasant who had not seen Chiang's government for eight years, but now quite clearly saw that the Kuomintang was the friend of the landlord and the bailiff. In this attempt to create a firm base of support among the gentry in the reconquered areas, the Chiang regime alienated not only the poor, but also the middle peasant, and in the process committed suicide. For what Chiang created was not so much a new bourgeoisie but thousands of supporters for the Communists' 8th Route Army.

  国民党不但没有在农村中实行改革,反而使情况变得更糟。造成这种情况的,与其说是由于贪官污吏的个人因素(诚然这类人多得很),倒不如说是国民党没有抓住中国农村社会的中心问题——封建主义。蒋介石、国民党执政二十年竟然还不能解决这一问题,充分说明他们的统治陷入了多么深的矛盾。十分清楚,国民党统治者除了依赖外国资本以外,还把地主作为自己的统治基础,而全然不顾国家现代化的迫切需要。由此可见,杜鲁门总统的殷切希望和马歇尔将军要求蒋政权实行改革的诤言,都不过是白费心机。蒋政权只要不敢打击地主,就谈不上进行改革。而获政权之所以不敢打击地主,乃是因为它在本质上是代表封建主义的。

  我们说的封建主义,是指什么呢?严格地说,用这个名词并不正确。某些中国和外国的学者,煞费苦心地想说明中国不存在封建主义,因为没有农奴制,也就是说,人们可以自由出卖劳动力。不错,中国多年前就在形式上废除了这种封建制度,而且,西方势力的侵入也破坏了中央集权封建社会自给自足的自然经济,使社会生活的很大一部分受贷币经济的支配,不过,正如我们所了解的,这并没有多少进步的效果。如果用这种观点看待中国问题,未免过于迂腐,这是全然不顾封建残余在中国人的生活、思想、风俗、习惯、情感中还有极大影响。中国废除农奴制的时候,并没有废除地主摊派劳役、监禁债户以及决定佃农生死的种种权力,也没有完全废除蓄奴、买卖少女、纳妾、包办婚姻等等陋俗。这一切都是地主豪绅统治的必然产物。

  在中国,地主的权力并不处处相同。沿海和长江流域的省份是外国资本渗入的地方,市镇工商业比较发达,乡绅的权力往往为城市商人所分享。而在西部和北部的省份里,由于资本主义前的特色很浓,地主的政治权力几乎是无限的。就是在上海并离上海不远的苏北,地主也像封建领主一样住在土围子里,有民团守护,统治着一、二十个村庄的佃户。这种土围子是佃户集市贸易的场所,他们完全受地主及其狗腿子的摆布。佃户不但要把收成的百分之五十向地主交租,而且自己的个人问题和家庭问题也要由地主决定。在山西,我发现地主往往包揽一切红白喜事,不经这伙封建老爷的同意,就不能成亲,也办不了丧葬。

  The failure of the Kuomintang, not only to introduce reforms in the villages, but rather to make conditions worse than they ever had been, was not so much a personal failure of evil and greedy men - though these there were in abundance - as it was the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with the central problem of Chinese rural civilization: feudalism. That Chiang Kai-shek and his party alter twenty years still could not grapple with this problem furnished abundant proof of the terrible contradictions with which their rulership was riven. It was quite clear that the Kuomintang rulers, in addition to leaning on foreign capital, and in spite of their urgent needs to modernize the country, predicated their own rule on the rule of the landlords. In view of this fact, all the pious hopes of President Truman and the bitter blasts of General Marshall calling on the Chiang regime to reform, were just so much wishful thinking. The Chiang regime could not reform as long as it dared not attack the landlords. And it dared not attack the landlords because in essence it represented feudalism itself.

  What do we mean by feudalism? Technically speaking, the name is incorrect. And certain learned philosophers, both Chinese and foreign, have taken great pains to point out that feudalism does not exist in hina because there is no serfdom; that is, men can sell their labor freely. It is true that China abolished this formal type of feudalism many years ago, just as it is true that the penetration of the West destroyed the self-sufficient natural economy of the centralized feudal society and placed much of Chinese life under the demands of a money economy, though with few progressive results, as we have seen. But this manner of looking at the problem of China is academic in the extreme and takes no cognizance of the feudal remnants that exercise such an important role in the lives, thoughts, customs, habits and emotions of the people. In abolishing serfdom, the Chinese did not entirely do away with the power of the landlord to conscript labor, to jail debtors and to control the life and even death of his tenants; it did not completely abolish child slavery, the custom of buying and selling girls nor the system of concubinage or forced marriage. All of these conditions are irrevocably bound up with the rule of the landlords and the gentry.

  The power of the landlords in China was not everywhere the same. In the provinces along the seacoast and in the Yangtze Valley where foreign capital penetrated and where mercantile and small industrial cities grew up, the power of the rural gentry in many cases had to be shared with city merchants. In the western and northern provinces, however, the landlords had almost unlimited political power because of the thicker atmosphere of precapitalism. Even in northern Kiangsu, along the seacoast and not far from Shanghai, landlords lived like feudal barons in mud castles, surrounded by armed guards and controlling tenants in fifteen or twenty villages. Such castles acted as a trading center for tenants who were completely at the mercy of the landlord or his bailiffs. Not only had the tenant to bring 50 per cent of his crops to the manor, but also his personal and family problems. In Shansi, I found that landlords often governed all wedding ceremonies and funerals, so that no one could get married or be buried without the approval of these feudal lords.

  地主仗着自己的权势,任意奸淫村里的妇女,特别是佃户的妻子,更是地主随心所欲地玩弄的对像。佃户夫妻因为害怕,往往敢怒不敢言。佃户要是反抗,也绝不会有好下场。我在鲁西一个村庄里见过一个地主,他经常把佃户支出去干活,然后乘机调戏他的妻子。这位姓李的佃户表示了抗议,于是地主便指使土匪把他绑走了。地主为了掩盖自己的干系,假装请伪军解决这一绑架事件,还代替佃户摆了一次酒席。请看地主有多么狡诈吧。佃户被释放了,感激不尽,向仁慈的地主借钱偿还那顿酒席。当然,利息低不了。佃户还不起债,就把自己那一小块地抵出去了。最后,地主要他把老婆也送去顶债,这一桩事才算了结。

  实际上,常常不必如此设局。富农或地主只需等到佃户下地后,就溜到佃户家里奸污他的老婆。佃户要报仇,只有去杀地主,但这很因难,因为地主有保镖,控制着村里大部分的武器,还因为地主或其狗腿子就是村长,掌握警察的权力。

  我在鲁西的另一个村子里,还听说这样一件事:一个地主看上了邻舍的一个女子,这女子是他表兄的儿媳妇。因为女的深居简出,地主很难上手。唯一的办法就是来硬的。一天,地主叫上村长,自己和管家拿着手枪和刀,闯入屋里,把女的强奸了。没有人敢说什么,也没有地方可以投诉,因为地主即官府。

  在河南安阳县的一村子里,一个年轻的农妇告诉我,她被迫经常接待本地一个地主,国民党民团的头子。她和丈夫都抗拒不得,因为那个地主是地方一霸,他的意志就是村里的王法。

 

  The power of the landlords gave them control over village women, especially the wives of their tenants, with whom they could have whatever relations pleased them. Very often, the tenant and his wife acquiesced in these relations out of fear, but if the tenant should protest, he had little chance to make his protest effective. In a village in western Shantung I came across a landlord whose common practice was to make his tenant go out into the fields and work while he took his pleasure of the tenant's wife. When Li protested, the landlord had him kidnaped by bandits. In order to cover his participation in the kidnaping, the landlord pretended to mediate the affair through puppet troops, preparing a banquet on the tenant's behalf. But observe the cleverness of this plot. The grateful tenant was released and borrowed money from the kindly landlord to pay for the banquet. Of course, a high interest rate was charged, the tenant could not repay his debt, and lost his own small plot of ground. The landlord then consummated the whole affair by taking the peasant's wife as payment of the debt.

  Such subtlety as this, however, was often unnecessary. A rich peasant or landlord merely had to wait until a farmer was in the fields and go around to his home and force the farmer's wife to his wishes. Short of murder, which was difficult because of the landlord's guards and because the landlord controlled most of the spears in the village, the farmer had no recourse, especially since the landlord or his henchman was village chief and hence the police power, too.

  In another village of western Shantung, I heard of a landlord who had been attracted by the charms of a young neighbor girl, the daughter-in-law of his own cousin. Because the girl was kept behind the mud walls of her house, the landlord had little chance to approach her. The only method was direct assault. So one day, having summoned his village chief and having armed both himself and his bailiff with a pistol and a sword, he made his way to the girl's home and deliberately raped her. No one dared protest - in fact there was no one to whom a protest could be made - because the landlord was the government.

  In a village in Anyang County in Honan, I found a young farm wife who told me she was constantly forced to receive the attentions of a local landlord, the head of a Kuomintang militia corps. Neither she nor her husband was able to resist, simply because the landlord was the boss and hence the law in the village.

  对于中世纪的因素在中国农村仍居统治地位这一点,还需要什么证据吗?在西方,随着农奴制的废除,贵族的初夜权也被废除了,然而在东方,地主虽然对佃户的妻子没有初夜权,却可以在许多个夜晚和下午跑去奸污她。

  蓄婢、纳妾和包办婚姻的习俗也是与地主制度分不开的。如果不废除地主制度,国民党法律中有关这方面的一切条文都是毫无意义的。穷人女儿在内地地主家当丫头,有的被商人贩卖到上海当妓女,太丑的,就送到工厂做工。她们自己毫无选择的余地,因为已经卖身给他人,只得任人摆布。蒋介石的“国民革命军”不但不去消灭这种制度,反而维护这种制度。在许多国民党军司令部里,我亲眼看到长官把当地地主叫来,向他们要年轻姑娘,供自己在驻扎期间享用。这样弄来的姑娘并不是娼妓,往往都是贫农家的黄花闺女。

  这些地主老爷在私生活中向佃户滥施淫威,有时也很惊人。佃户经常被迫做一些下作的事以满足地主的低级趣味。鲁北的北县有个地主婆,强迫一个佃农咬一个丫环的小脚,供她取乐。佃农把丫环咬得大叫,丫环的小脚把佃农熏得呲牙咧嘴,使得地主婆大为满足。在北县另一个村子里,有个地主往一个十六岁婢女的阴户里塞麦子来满足某种色情虐待狂。玩腻了这个游戏,他就把婢女的双手捆上,在她的裤档里放进一只猫,把裤管扎紧。看着婢女被折磨得在地上拼命打滚,他乐得放声狂笑。这些就是旧中国乡村里地主取乐的方式。

  在中国,正式的分封制早在纪元前就基本上完全消失了,这比欧洲分封制的发生还早五百年。但是,所有中世纪社会的残余——蓄婢、徭役、凌辱佃户妻女的特权、横征暴敛等等,却延续了两千年,就像挽歌一样萦回在封建制腐烂的、但并未人土的尸体上。中国农村社会的这些毒疮本来足以激发千千万万的农民愤然投入农民战争,但是这并不是决定性的因素。决定性的因素是中国整个农业处于衰败之中。

  抗日战争结束后,农民正处于这种状况。军队抽壮丁使农业劳动力减少了一千二百万至一千五百万,饥荒中饿死了大约一千万人,还有成百上千万流离失所的难民。首先遭殃的是无地的农民,其次是半自耕农。丧失土地的人成千上万地增加。到了抗战的第三年和第四年,轮到了中农。然后又轮到一些富农。战争快结束时,中小地主以至一些大地主都感到了蒋介石官吏和伪军兼并土地的压力。荒芜的土地达几千万亩,而缺地的情形却像瘟疫一样蔓延。高昂的地租使农民没法活命。农民的财产已经所剩无几,无法再缴从前那种百分之五十的租子,更不必说百分之八十、九十以至百分之百以上的租子了。地租不仅耗尽了农民的剩余劳动,而且还侵占了农民维持自己生存的必要劳动。 当时大家都在问:“什么时候能把倭寇赶出去呢?”可是,抗日战争结束了,一场新的战争又开始了。农民感到,蒋介石新派的乡村官吏比日本人和旧日的地主更可恨。农民开始有怨言,进而落草为寇。在八路军驻区附近,农民则盼望八路军来。

  What more proof does one want that medieval factors still controlled Chinese rural life. The droit du seigneur was abolished with the abolition of serfdom in the West, but in the East, though the landlord did not have the right of the first night with his tenant's wife, he nevertheless had the right of many succeeding nights and afternoons, too.

  The institutions of slave girls, concubinage and forced marriage were also irrevocably tied to the landlord system. All the fine Kuomintang laws on this subject were meaningless unless landlordism itself were abolished. Slave girls not only worked in landlord homes in the interior, but were bought by merchants and shipped to Shanghai where they were forced to become prostitutes or, if too ugly, factory girls. In this they had no choice, being bound over to the party who had contract to their bodies. Far from helping to end this system, the revolutionary army of Chiang Kai-shek helped to perpetuate it. In various Kuomintang army headquarters I have seen with my own eyes officers call in the local gentry and ask their aid in securing young girls for their use as long as they were in the territory. The girls, so obtained, were not prostitutes, but generally the virgin daughters of poor farmers.

  The powers these landed nobles wielded over their tenants even in their personal affairs was sometimes amazing. Often the tenant had to commit degrading acts just to satisfy his landlord's whims. In Peihsien County in northern Shantung I found a landlord's wife who derived pleasure out of forcing her husband's tenant to bite the bound feet of her maid servant. This noblewoman not only took delight in the girl's screams when she was bitten, but also in the tenant's nausea over the odor given off by the bound feet. In another village in this same county there was a landlord who found some masochistic satisfaction out of stuffing wheat into the vagina of a sixteen-year-old girl servant. When he wearied of this sport, he would tie up the maid's hands, put a cat inside her trousers, which he fastened securely with a rope, and then howl with delight as she rolled around in frenzy on the floor. Such were the entertainments in the villages of the old China.

  In China, formal feudalism had disappeared almost entirely by the time of Christ - that is, nearly half a millennium before it arose in Europe. But all these medieval remnants - slave girls, corvee labor, seigneurial rights, brutal requisitions of labor and property - lingered on for the next two thousand years like a long-drawn-out funeral dirge over the rotten, but not buried corpse of feudalism.

  These excrescences on Chinese rural life would have been enough to create thousands of impassioned soldiers for a peasant war, but in themselves they were not decisive. That factor was provided by the decline of Chinese agriculture as a whole.

  The end of the Japanese war found the peasantry in this condition. The army had carried away about twelve to fifteen million fieldworkers, famine perhaps another ten million, and there were untold millions of refugees. The landless farmers went under first, the semitenants next. Those dispossessed from the land increased by the hundreds of thousands. During the third and fourth years of the war the middle peasants began to go under. Then some of the rich peasants. By the end of the war small and middle landlords and even large regional landlords began to feel the pressure from Chiang's land-hungry bureaucrats and Japanese puppets. The desolate land ran into millions of acres. Land hunger also spread like the plague. No longer could the peasants live under the system of extortionate land rents. The peasant's holdings had grown so small that he could not afford to pay the traditional 50 percent, to say nothing of 80, 90 and over 100 per cent, of his main crop. Rents not only used up all his surplus labor, but encroached on the labor necessary to keep him alive. Everyone was asking, "When will these Japanese dwarfs be driven out?" But when the Japanese war ended and a new one started, the peasant found Chiang's new rural bureaucrats even more hostile to him than the Japanese or his old gentry had been. He began to grumble. From grumbling, he passed into banditry. Near the 8th Route Army areas he began to look for allies.

  统治阶级不是看不到农民中即将爆发大动乱。但是他们不愿意正视这种不祥的前景。国民党头目、孔孟之道的鼓吹者、匹茨堡矿业学院出身的陈立夫对一位外国记者这样说:分土地是不必要的,因为中国的家长去世时,总要把地分结儿子们。此论使记者颇感新鲜。宋子文,广东省的大地主,在出任广东省主席后对另一记者说; “我们不打算在广东搞土地改革,多年来这里现有的制度是令人满意的。”还有一位在山东省政府兼职的教会大学教授(其人是一个自由派)对笔者说;“中国不像沙俄,我们没有大地主,因此没有土地改革的必要,只需对吏治进行改革。”(没有土地改革,如何进行吏治改革?这位基督教教授没有解释)在农村中进行土地改革,在这些党魁、省长、基督徒的眼中,似乎是与中国的生活方式格格不入的。然而,简直无需指出,这种东方哲学是农民根本不能接受的。

  农民认为,唯一的出路,就是推翻地主,平分土地。对于佃农、长工、苦力来说,这就是革命的真谛。

  如果说蒋介石后方的村庄还比较平静,那只是因为农民在等待起义的领头人和时机。他们并没有忘记土地问题。国民党官员尽管声称没问题,但心里是明白农民的怨恨的。中国统治者叫嚷土地改革不必要的一切论调,不过是为了掩饰他们内心深处向来对农民存有的恐惧。官老爷们一想到那些粗野的泥腿子冲进他们的衙门,就感到做了《水浒传》里的恶梦。

  这些老爷们怎能不发抖!

  因为,朴实的农民,祖祖辈辈当佃户,当封建奴隶,在一小块耕了又耕、拥挤不堪的地里干活,在地主贪婪的魔爪中,忍气吞声;他们的土地被巧取豪夺,他们失去妻子的爱抚和孩子的笑声,他们满腔怒火,揭竿而起;他们置生死于不顾,现在就要夺回土地,要报仇了。

  The ruling classes could not help but see that the peasant was going to explode in a violent upheaval. But they kept putting these black thoughts from their minds. Here is what Chen Li-fu, graduate of the Pittsburgh School of Mines, Kuomintang boss and preacher of the Confucian way of life, revealed to one impressed foreign reporter: To divide the land is not necessary because when the head of a Chinese family dies, he divides the land among his sons. Here is what T. V. Soong, after his appointment to the governorship of Kwangtung Province, where he is a large landholder, unveiled to another correspondent: "We are not planning a land reform in Kwangtung because the system we have had here for years is satisfactory." Finally, here is what a liberal professor in a Christian university and at the same time an official of the Shantung government had to say to this writer: "China is not like czarist Russia; we have no large landlords so there is no need for land reform, but only a reform of the officials." (How one of these things was to be done without the other, the Christian professor did not explain.) To introduce a land reform into the countryside thus seemed in the eyes of these party bosses, governors and Christians something alien to the Chinese way of life. It is hardly necessary to remark that such Oriental philosophizing was quite beyond the peasant. He thought there was only one thing to do: throw out the landlord and divide the land. That was the essence of the revolution to the tenant, to the rural worker, to the coolie.

  If the villages behind Chiang Kai-shek's lines remained comparatively peaceful, that was only because the peasant was awaiting leadership and an opportunity to rise. He had not forgotten about the land. Nor did the Kuomintang officials, despite their utterances, think he had forgotten either. All their remarks about there being no need for land reform were merely a camouflage for the deep-seated fears that Chinese rulers have always felt toward the peasantry. To the official the thought of this ignorant clod covered with the good Chinese earth rushing into his yamen was like some terrible dream out of the pages of the Shui Hu Chuan. (5)

  Well might the officials tremble!

  For this simple man, born to tenant, feudal slavery, to an overworked and crowded plot of ground, stunned into obedience beneath the grasping landlord's hand, dispossessed from his land by crooked deals and savage violence, robbed of his wife's caresses and his children's laughter, suddenly rose with an impassioned thrill and, under the threat of death itself, began to demand land and revenge.

原注五:《水浒传》,中国四大名著之一,讲的是一帮亡命之徒造了北京(!)朝廷的反,一度占据山东西部三十六县。

李根注:贝尔登看问题大处很透彻,但细节有时候不准确。这正是例子之一。

(5) Water Margin, one of China's most famous novels, deals with a band of outlaws who revolted against the emperor at Peking and occupied thirty-six counties in west Shantung.