第九章 人民战争
 
CHAPTER IX
 

THE PEOPLE'S WAR

第三十六节 活埋
36. Burying Them Alive
  在西方,人们不大了解什么是人民战争。这很奇怪,因为无论美国还是欧洲历史上,并不是完全没有经历过人民战争。美国当年在康考德和莱克辛顿,经历过这种类型的战争。欧洲在十九世纪打过这种战争:西班牙和俄国人民抗击拿破仑正规军时进行的游击战,就是人民战争。本世纪的俄国十月革命,西班牙内战,南斯拉夫卫国战争和希腊内战,也是游击战。这种类型战争的广泛运用说明,它将在今后的国际冲突中起决定性的作用。

  对于这种前景,绝不可等闲视之,人民战争不是什么浪漫主义的事物。毫无疑问,它使战争的暴烈程度大大提高了一步。当人民战争用来对付外国侵略时,其残酷性超过一切常规。当运用于内战时,人民战争就必然带有阶级战争的性质。在这种情况下,它比人们迄今所知道的任何类型的战争都更加激烈、更加野蛮,更加与个人息息相关。这里反映的人类天性是善还是恶,恐怕与战争问题本身一样不易回答。这两个问题可以暂时留给哲学家们去探讨。目前不如研究一下人民战争是怎样出现的。
IN THE West, not much is understood about a people's war. This is strange because the phenomenon has not been entirely unknown to America or Europe. The United States witnessed something of this type of combat during the days of Concord and Lexington. Europe saw it in the nineteenth century when the Spanish and the Russian people raised guerrillas and partisans to fight the regular armies of Napoleon. In more recent times, we have seen partisan warfare spring up during the Russian Revolution, the Spanish Civil War, the Yugoslav national war and the internecine strife in Greece. The spread of this kind of warfare suggests that it may well play a decisive role in any future international conffict.

  This is not a prospect to be faced with complete equanimity. People's wars are not romantic. Without a doubt, a people's war is an intensification of the already violent nature of war. When fought in the midst of a national invasion, such a type of combat violates all the so-called rules of civilized warfare. When combined with a civil war, however, a people's war cannot help but take on the nature of a class war. Thus, it becomes more passionate, more savage and more personal than any other type of war yet known. Whether this is salutary for human nature or otherwise is no more readily answered than the question of war itself. For the moment, both questions can be left to the philosophers. What, however, is instructive at this point is how such a war arises.
  大约在一百多年以前,普鲁士军事家克劳塞维茨自认对这个问题他不甚了了,但他指出,要有效地进行人民战争,必须有下列条件,

一、战争必须在本国境内进行。
二、战争的胜负不取决于一次作战的失利。
三、战场扩展到包括全国大部分地区。
四、战争的全民性对作战是有利的支持。
五、复杂的地形,如有高山、密林、沼泽及农作物,导致交通不便。

  所有这些条件中国都具备,而且达到了无与伦比的地步。战争在中国的内地进行,全面开花,并不集中,也无固定的形态,所以不能一举而决定胜负。作战范围几乎相当于从柏林到莫斯科的广大区域。农民是非常分散的,最适宜于打这种战争。中国的地形也是极复杂的。但是,据我的观察,中国之所以能有效地进行人民战争,并不光是由于上述几个原因,而且还由于另外一个极其重要的原因。这个原因可以概括为四个字:社会条件。因此,除了克劳塞维茨的五个条件外,我要加上第六条,这就是:

  人民同战争有着切身的利害关系。

  Nearly a century ago, Clausewitz, who admitted he knew little about the subject, declared that the conditions under which a people's war alone could become effective were the following:

1. That the war is carried on in the interior of the country.

2. That it is not decided by a single catastrophe.

3. That the theater of war embraces a considerable extent of country.

4. That the national character supports the measure.

5. That the country is of a broken and inaccessible nature, either from being mountainous, or by reasons of woods and marshes or by a peculiar mode of cultivation.

  All of these conditions existed to an unparalleled degree in China. The war was waged deep in the interior of the country. It had a nebulous, vapory essence, nowhere condensing into a solid body, so that it could not be decided at one stroke. The ground over which the war was waged extended over an area almost as far as from Berlin to Moscow. The peasants, strict individualists, were aptly suited to such a war and the country was decidedly broken up. Yet, as I observed, the Chinese people's war arose and became effective not only for these reasons, but for an additional and extremely important reason which can be summed up under the two words: social conditions. To Clausewitz's five conditions, I therefore would add a sixth:

  That the people have a personal stake in the war.

  这里,我用“切身”这个词,是因为在观察中国的人民战争时,我发现,它与正规军所进行的战争主要的不同点在于:参战者的眼里始终能够清楚地看到自己的切身利益。职业军人则不是这种情况。职业军人虽然可能明白他个人的福利与他所属的单位、部队和国家的福利是一致的,但是,一般来说,作战对他没有什么具体的直接的切身利益,他说不出来什么“是我从战争中所得到的东西”。而且,人民战争总是在人们的家乡一带进行,离人们生活中最亲近和最珍贵的东西很近。我相信,要不是这些东西受到了威胁,人们是不会进行人民战争的。他们可能参军或被征入伍,但不会去组织自己的战争。

  我在安阳县的所见所闻,特别证明了这个道理。那里的情况生动地说明人民战争是如何以及为何打起来的。安阳三千多年前曾是商王朝的都城,也是中国历史上兵家必争之地。历次北进的大军都被宽阔的漳河挡住,连续数月驻扎在这个县里,老百姓只好等待着这方或那方解决战斗。

  辛亥革命以后,安阳县屡经军阀混战,所以很多武器散落到民间一些桀骜不驯分子的手里,从此盗匪蜂起,百姓遭殃。有些土匪摇身一变成为地主以后,建立起了自己的封建领地,豢养了大批武装扈从,对许多村庄实行专横的统治。有时这些地主兼土匪相互火并。为了扩充实力,他们建立民团一类的组织。然而,不管旗号是什么,目的都是为了征税、放高利贷和在当地进行政治控制。

  从一九三八到一九四五年期间,许多地方实力派的首领投靠了日本人。他们从日本人那里领取了武器,扩充了自己的组织,同时大肆兼并贫苦农民的土地。每逢荒年凶岁,贫苦农民先是把土地抵押给他们,接着就失去了土地所有权。抗日战争快结束时,日本人从该县的山区撤走了,很多地主把家里的事务交给了管家或小地主,自己却跟日本人一道走了。八路军游击队来到日本人和地主撤离的地方,实行减租减息政策。

  这样,很多农民收回了被夺去的土地。同时,人民建立了地方政权,组织了民兵站岗放哨,成立了妇女会为妇女的平等权利而斗争,另外,还成立了其他许多组织。当和平来到时,八路军已经开始教老乡们怎样进行选举了。

 

  I use the word "personal" here, because in watching the people's war in China, I found that what principally distinguished it from the war fought by regular armies was that the combatants had an immediate and direct advantage always before their eyes. Such is not the case at all with the soldier. Although he may identify his own welfare with the welfare of his unit, with the army and with his country, he usually has not any advantage immediately before him that he can grasp and say: "This is what I get out of the war." A people's war, however, is always waged right around a man's home and close to what he holds most near and dear in life. Unless these things are threatened, I do not believe men will start a people's war; they may join the army, or be drafted into it, but they won't organize a war of their own.

  This I found particularly true of Anyang County which offers a striking example of how and why a people's war begins. Anyang, which was the site of the Shang emperor's court, some three thousand years ago, has always occupied an important place in China's civil wars. Many times the broad Chang River has blocked the onward march of troops coming from the south and for months on end soldiers have quartered in the county while the people waited for one side or the other to obtain a decision.

  After the 1911 Revolution, as campaign after campaign was fought through the county, arms spread among dissident elements of the population and powerful bandits rose and crushed the people. Becoming landlords, the bandits organized their own feudal fiefdoms, kept large bands of armed retainers and exercised undisputed dominion over many villages. Sometimes the landlord-bandits fought among themselves. Then, to enlist support, they called their organization chu ti or "bandit protection corps." The purpose however, was the same - tax collection, usury, local political control.

  Between 1938 and 1945, many of these local leaders went over to the Japanese from whom they obtained arms with which to enlarge their organizations. At the same time, they also increased their landholdings at the expense of the poor peasants who mortgaged, then lost their possessions during the famine, which was here quite severe. Near the end of the war, the Japanese retreated from the mountainous parts of the county, and many of the landlords went with them, leaving their affairs in the hands of agents or smaller landlords.

  Guerrillas of the 8th Route Army, entering the evacuated places, instituted their program of rent and interest reduction so that many people got back the land that had been taken from them. At the same time, the people formed local governments, militiamen to stand sentry duty, Women's associations to fight for women's equality and many other organizations. When peace came, the 8th Route Army had just begun to teach the villagers how to vote.

  令人奇怪却又重要的事实是,当内战打响、八路军撤退并把安阳县几乎全部放弃给国民党时,当地几乎没有人跟共产党一起撤走,相反,他们却留下来欢迎国民党。不但大多数农民留下来了,而且许多当地干部、民兵和妇女会的领导人也留下来了。安阳人告诉我说,他们之所以没有逃避国民党,是因为他们相信八路军所推行的改革,不过是从日本人手中夺得政权的任何中国政府都要推行的改革而已。他们留在家里是为了避免卷入今后的任何一种战争。

  但是,当国民党军队进村时,那些在日本统治时期当过汉奸和有时干过强盗勾当的土匪兼地主往往跟他们一起进村。这些人很快就当了区长。与此同时,他们的代理人当了村长。他们立即开始对本村的群众搞“反攻倒算”。他们或者亲自下毒手,或者检举某些男女而由国民党军队或特务机构立即处决。正是这种反攻倒算激起了目前这种势不可挡、席卷全国的人民战争。

  地主十分阴险毒辣。每当他们从赤色分子手中夺过村子时,他们或者国民党军官马上召开群众大会宣布大赦。“共产党在这里实行的土地政策非常好,”国民党说,“我们不想加以改变。除了村长、民兵队长和本村的共产党头目外,普通群众概不追究。大家不必害怕。不过,你们当中有些人受了共产党宣传的骗做过错事,只要到村公所去,在悔过书上签个名,就什么事都没有了。”

  于是出逃的农民回来了。他们糊里糊涂地到了村公所,承认自己曾参加妇女会或民兵。

  一些农民游击队员没有识破这个诡计上了圈套。妻子们说服自己的丈夫从山里躲藏的地方回来了。当差不多所有的农民积极分子都回到村里时,国民党便把他们统统抓起来当众处决。

  Now it is a curious and important fact that when the civil war started and the 8th Route Army retreated and gave up nearly all the county to the Kuomintang, almost none of the people went with the Communists, but remained behind to welcome the Kuomintang. Not only did the majority of the farmers remain at home, but also many local cadres, the militiamen and the heads of the women's associations. From what the people in Anyang told me, they did not flee from the Kuomintang because they believed that the reforms the 8th Route Army introduced were merely the reforms that any Chinese government, taking over from the Japanese, would bring. Not wishing to be involved in any further war, they stayed at home.

  But when the Kuomintang armies entered the villages, very often there entered with them the former bandits and landlords who had been puppets and sometimes robbers under the Japanese. These men soon became district heads while their bailiffs became village chiefs. Immediately they began a "Countersettlement" against the people of their own villages. They either did this directly or "put the finger" on certain men and women who were dealt with summarily by the army or the Special Service Section of the Kuomintang. It was this countersettlement that had fanned into being a people's war that was now raging with undiminished violence throughout the whole country.

  The landlords were cruelly subtle. On taking over villages from the Reds, either they or the Kuomintang officers would call a public meeting and declare a general amnesty.

  "The Communist policy about the land here was very good," the Kuomintang would say. "We don't want to change anything. We can forgive everyone but the village chief, the head of the militia and the chief of the Communist party in this village. Nobody has anything to fear from us. However, some of you have been led astray by Communist propaganda. If you will just come to the village office and sign a repentance slip, everything will be all right."

  And the peasants came. Not knowing any better, they went to the village office and admitted they had joined the women's association or the militia.

  Seeing nothing wrong in such actions, the gullible peasants fell into a trap. Wives persuaded their husbands to come back from hiding places in the hills. Then, when it seemed as if all the active peasants were once more in the folds of the village, the Kuomintang rounded up all the self-repenters and publicly executed them.

  地主比国民党更加残忍。他们经常是把那些参加过减租斗争的人活埋。如果找不到本人,便活埋他们的家属。有时,他们还把跟共产党毫无关系的妇女和儿童活活投到水渠、深坑或水井里,然后用土将他们埋掉。

  根据安阳县政府的统计,到我抵达时,在落到国民党手中的四百二十三个村子里,有四百名男女和儿童遭到活埋。

  我无从核实这些数字。但是我有充分的理由相信,这不是言过其实的。在一个村子,当时我正在那里,人们从一个大坑里挖出二十四具尸体,其中有妇女和儿童。他们被活埋后,有一部分尸体被狗扒开吃掉了。我走过许多村子,见到了许多亲属被活埋的人。

  我所看到的最惨的例子是在秦德沟。这是一个靠近无人地带的只有一百三十口人的村子。全村二十八户有二十四户家中都有人被一个叫李庆章的恶霸地主给活埋或枪杀了。

  日本人从山区撤走时,李庆章和其他地主跟日本人一道逃跑了。村里人分了李家的土地。当国民党退回这个地区时,李庆章带着十五个武装人员回来了。就在他进村前,村里的男人都跑光了。

  李庆章见剩下的妇女和儿童都很害怕,就骗他们说:“不要怕,咱们都是一家人嘛。”但是,当天深夜村里人都熟睡的时候,他就带着打手把各家各户的人都拉出来,仅有四户幸免。他把十个人投到一个枯井里活埋。他又逼着另外十四个人躺在一条沟里,然后填土活埋。被活埋的人当中有一个刚两个月的婴儿,一个十岁的男孩和一个八十岁的老太太。

  More brutal than the Kuomintang were the landlords. Very often they buried alive men who had engaged in the struggle for reduction of rents. If they could not find these men, they buried their families. And sometimes they threw living women and children who had no connection at all with the Communists into ditches, pits and wells and covered them with earth.

  According to the Anyang County government, up to the time my arrival, four hundred men, women and children had been killed and buried alive in the 423 villages that had fallen into Kuomintang hands.

  I have no way of checking these figures, but I have every reason to believe they are not exaggerated. In one village, while I was there, twenty four bodies, including women and children, were exhumed from a common pit where they had been buried alive and then been partially uncovered and eaten by dogs. In wandering from village to village, I came across numerous people whose relatives had been buried alive.

  The worst case of this kind that I saw was in Chintekou, a village of 130 people, on the edge of no man's land. Here, out of twenty-eight families, members from each of twenty-four families had been buried alive or shot by a landlord bandit, named Li Chin-tsang.

  When the Japanese evacuated the mountains, Li and the other landlords went with them. The people then got together and divided Li's land. When the Kuomintang returned to the region, Li came back with fifteen armed men. Just before his arrival, all the men in the village fled away.

  Seeing the remaining women and children were frightened, Li tried to calm them. "Don't be afraid," he said, "We are all from the same family." Late that night, however, when the village was asleep, Li and his men went around to all but four houses in the villages and took the people out. Ten people, he threw down a dry well and buried alive. Fourteen others, he forced to lie down in a ditch, then he covered them with earth. Among those buried were a two-month-old baby, a boy of ten and a woman of eighty.

  这是我亲眼见到的最惨的例子,但这决不是绝无仅有的。在一个管辖十八个村的区里,地方干部告诉我说,国民党第四十军杀害了四十六个民兵和地方干部,其中七人被枪杀,三十五人被活埋,四人被吊死。

  我每到一个地方都听农民们亲自讲述许许多多这类事件。在讲述时,他们的声音很悲切,眼皮下垂、嘴唇紧咬,表现了极大的痛楚。我所听到的这类事件中,最凄惨的莫过于一个三十三岁妇女的遭遇。这位妇女嫁给府城附近东大洲村的一个农民。八路军进村前,她和丈夫靠耕种二亩地过着半饥半饱的生活,土改时,这对年轻夫妇分得了地。后来,女的当了村妇女会主任,男的参加了民兵,护村抗日。日本投降后,八路军游击队离开这个村子,这对夫妇留在村里。他们做梦也没有想到自己做了什么错事。

  当国民党进村时,逃亡地主也跟着还乡了。这个地主亲自跑去把这位妇女抓起来。她的丈夫当时就被带走枪决了。

  地主把她交给国民党军队说:“她是八路。”“你就是共产党,”一个军官说,“你一定会唱歌。”接着,那个军官把她带到兵营里,强迫她唱歌。一连三天,她被迫从一个班到另一个班,唱的是能记得的童年时的歌。一些士兵糟蹋她,但也有些士兵见她哭泣而感到羞愧,就走开了。天黑时她被关起来,夜里被带去供国民党军官泄欲。第四天,她被送进监牢。他们不给她东西吃。她的叔父给她送饭。有一天,叔父看到饭留在牢房外边没动,才知道她已被杀害。他到处寻找,在附近的一座桥下找到了她和另三个人被肢解了的尸体。这位妇女仅仅因为相信妇女应当与男人平等便犯了死罪。在游击区这就被认为是共产主义。

  这只是我从农民那里听到的许许多多事件中的一小部分。在那段恐怖时期中,许多人的父母、儿子、妻子被杀害。从此各个村便组织起来进行自卫。后来,我到国民党的防线后采访时,人们给我讲述一些更加凄惨的事件。人们一般不愿意勾起亲人被害的伤心事。我要费很大的劲儿才从他们那里打听到一些情况。不管怎样,有一点是清楚的—这些遭遇给人们深深打下阶级仇恨的烙印,这是他们一辈子也不能忘掉的。这是否说,当他们被共产党发动起来后他们自己就不杀人呢?我看不是这样。

  以后我将记述我亲眼看到的农民是怎样向一个地主讨还血债的情形。不过,首先让我们先看看游击区的农民被激怒的其他一些原因。

 

  Although this was the worst case I personally came across, it was by no means unique. In one chu (1) of eighteen villages, local officials told me that forty-six militiamen and local cadres had been killed by the 40th Army, seven being shot, thirty-five buried alive and four forced to hang themselves.

  Everywhere I went heard many such stories from the farmers themselves - stories told in a dreary monotone, with downcast eyes and tightened lips, and with accents of deep hopeless despair. One of the saddest stories of this kind I heard concerned a girl of twenty-two years who was married to a farmer in the village of Tungtachou near the town of Fucheng. Before the arrival of the 8th Route Army, she and her husband barely kept alive by cultivating one-third of an acre of land. During the land reform, the young couple received two-thirds of an acre more. Afterward, the girl became head of the Women's Association in her village and her husband entered the militia, guarding the village against the Japanese. When the Japanese surrendered and the 8th Route guerrillas left, both the girl and her husband stayed behind in the village, not dreaming that they had done anything wrong.

  When the Kuomintang entered the village, there came with them the local landlord who went personally and dragged the woman out of her home. Her husband was immediately taken away and shot without the girl's knowledge.

  The landlord turned the girl over to the Kuomintang army, saying:"She's 8th Route." "So you're a Communist," said an officer. "You must know how to sing." And with that he led her among Kuomintang soldiers and commanded her to sing. For three days, she was forced to wander from squad to squad, singing what songs she could remember from childhood. Some soldiers manhandled her, but some turned away in shame when they saw her crying. In the evening she was locked up. At night, she was taken to sleep with Kuomintang officers. On the fourth day, she was taken to prison. She was not fed, but her uncle brought her food. One day, the food was left outside her prison cell. From this he knew she had been killed. Searching, he found her mutilated body beneath a near-by bridge with three others. The crime of this girl was that she had believed in the equality of women. In the guerrilla areas, that was Communism.

  This is only a little - only a very small part - of the stories I heard from peasants whose mothers, fathers, sons and wives had been killed in that terrible period before the villages organized to defend themselves. Later on, I talked to people behind the Kuomintang lines and they told me stories more pitiful still. They did not like to talk about what had happened to their loved ones, and it was only with great difficulty that I dug stories out of them. One thing was clear, however - their experiences had marked them with deep scars of class hatred that would not be wiped out for the rest of their lives.

  Does this mean that when aroused by the Reds that they did not indulge in killings, themselves? I do not think so. Later on I will relate the story of how I personally saw these farmers retaliate against one of their landlord tbrmentors. But first of all let us see in what other ways the peasants had been inflamed in the guerrilla areas.

李根注:这里提到的国军暴行,还不算最狠的。土地革命时期,国民党对付根据地老百姓的手段更加残酷血腥,口号花样层出不穷。最变态的两个例子是红四方面军(张国焘徐向前部)反围剿失败撤出鄂豫皖根据地之后,和红一方面军(中央红军,朱毛周彭林部)反围剿失败后撤出中央根据地之后。屠杀和清洗之彻底,到了建国之后毛泽东周恩来派人去看望老区人民时,连他们住过的村子都找不到的地步。“杀光、烧光、抢光”的“三光”政策,原著作权实在是蒋介石的,只是后来在日本鬼子手里进一步发扬光大而已。而且国军还干了一些连日本人都想不到的勾当:每攻下一地,杀光青壮年,就把年轻妇女糟蹋后,成批用汽车拖到人口市场卖掉。这些妇女一般沦为娼妓。儿童,尤其是男孩,也能卖出好价钱,不少国军将领以此发财。诚如国民党政府在报告书中得意洋洋地吹嘘和恐吓,在“清剿”区内,“无不焚之居,无不伐之树,无不杀之鸡犬,无遗留之壮丁,闾阎不见炊烟”。“斩草除根,诛家灭种”。“茅草要过火,石头要过刀,人要换人种,谷要换谷种”。本文中提到国军一般采用活埋的方法,这说明他们已经开始懈怠偷懒了。土地革命时期经常是采用更加刺激和更具观赏性的石灰池烧杀法,或者剥皮挖眼、破肚取肠种种会弄脏手的方法。如今日之井冈山,真正的革命群众后代极少。本人亲自到过洪湖(原湘鄂西革命根据地的中心,贺龙、周逸群等领导),听到幸存的老人讲述红军撤退后他们的遭遇,确实令人发指。周围几个县,每个乡的烈士名录都是厚厚一大本。  
原注一:“区”是县的下一级行政机构。 (1) An administrative district somewhat similar to our county, but smaller.

 

  蒋介石的军官们并非完全不懂得游击战的危险性。但是,他们错误地认为靠武装一支地主领导下的民团就可以对付游击队。其实,这只能使农村的情况更加恶化,更加激怒农民。

  在“剿匪”的口号下,那些自己曾是名副其实的土匪的地主们组织了还乡团,并向各村摊派枪支捐。他们按人头征收三万至四万边币,或者与其价值相等的粮食或棉花顶替一支枪。尽管国民党军队宣传说,征枪捐是为了剿匪保民的,但是人们不信这一套,因为事实证明这是某些人聚敛钱财的一种手段。

  在一个有一百一十五户的村子里,我发现已经征收了八十三支枪的捐。实际上,还乡团只买了九支枪,其余的钱被地主、保长和国民党贪污了。根据安阳县政府的统计,在四百二十三个国民党占领的村子里,人们被迫交了五千支枪的现金或折成实物的捐。这足够组织一支规模可观的宪兵队了。但是,还乡团把这笔旨在加强防卫的款项的大部分塞到自己的腰包里,从而破坏了他们自己的计划。另外,国民党军官们发觉在太行山区布防十分枯燥无味,又看不出这场战争对他们自己有何切身利益,所以,他们经常向游击队出售子弹。这种交易往往是通过某些农民进行的。他们花七万元买一箱弹药,以十万元的价格卖给游击队,每箱获利三万元。

 

  Officers in Chiang Kai-shek's army were not entirely unaware of the perils of partisan warfare. They made the mistake, however, of thinking they could prevent such a war from occurring by arming a militia corps of their own under various landlord leaders. This only made conditions in the villages much worse and aroused the peasants still more.

  Under the slogan of "fighting bandits," the landlords, who in reality were ex-bandits themselves, organized a Home Returning Corps and placed a rifle tax on all the villages. In lieu of a rifle, they collected thirty or forty thousand Border Region dollars from each person or the equivalent in grain or cotton. Though the Kuomintang army tried to sell the tax to the people as a self-defense measure against the bandits, the people could not believe them, because it developed in practice as a get-rich scheme.

  In one village of 115 families, I found that taxes had been collected for eighty-three rifles. Actually, the Home Returning Corps bought only nine rifles, the rest of the money being grafted by the landlords, the pao leader and an officer in the Kuomintang army. In the 423 fallen villages, the Anyang County government figured that five thousand rifles, or their equivalent in money, had been collected. This would have been enough to form a sizable gendarmerie, but the Home Returning Corps defeated their own purposes by pocketing most of the self-defense funds.

  On the other hand, Kuomintang officers, finding garrison duty in the Taihang Mountains dreary and seeing little sense in the war in which they had no particular stake, often sold bullets to guerrilla units. Generally the sales were carried on through peasants who paid seventy thousand dollars for a box of ammunition and sold them to the guerrillas for one hundred thousand dollars a box, thus making a profit of thirty thousand for themselves.

  我曾对这种交易迷惑不解。有一次我询问一个倒卖弹药的农民,他是怎样开始这种买卖的。他说,驻扎在他们地区的一个国民党上校要他给搞些鸦片烟来。他答称,他不知道那里有鸦片烟。

  “你这个笨蛋!”军官说,“我知道,八路军在这里时,不少庄稼人把大烟埋了起来。去给我搞点来。”几天以后,这位农民回来说,他找到了一些大烟,但诡称价钱很高。

  “没关系”,上校说,“把这些弹药拿去卖了,给我换回‘黑货’来。”

  “可是,这里没人要子弹呀,”农民说。

  “送到八路军那里,他们会买的。”“我怎么敢到那里去?”农民问道。

  “你只管去,保你没事。只要搞到‘黑货’ 就行。”

  自然,贪污枪捐、出售弹药直接有利于八路军。蒋介石军官贪婪无度,则使得游击区老百姓一贫如洗。蒋军和地主不断地征兵拉夫,比刚才所讲的苛捐杂税更加厉害。横征暴敛使土地荒芜,整家整户的人被迫投井自杀。

  除了被杀、活埋和苛捐杂税外,安阳人民还遭到敲诈勒索和绑架。在这方面,蒋介石的军官,尤其是他的特务们经常同地主勾结在一起,狼狈为奸。这种敲诈勒索常常是通过政治恐怖手段进行的,达到了骇人听闻的地步。

  农民,有时连他们的妻子也一起被抓起来,直到他们付出高额赎金后才能获释。借口总是说他们通八路。至于他们是否真的通八路则不管,目的是勒索他们的钱财。

  This trade used to intrigue me and once I asked a peasant who brought over some ammunition how he got started in the business. According to his story a Kuomintang colonel stationed in his area had asked him to find some opium. The peasant protested he didn't know where there was any opium.

  "You wooden head!" said the officer, "I know many of you peasants buried your opium when the 8th Route Army was here. Go find me some." A few days later the peasant returned and said he had found some opium, but slyly added that it was very expensive.

  "Never mind," said the colonel, "take this ammunition, sell it, and bring back the 'black goods.'"

  "But nobody here wants the ammunition," said the peasant.

  "Take it to the 8th Route Army. They'll buy it."

  "Do I dare go over there?" asked the peasant.

  "Yes, yes, anything. Only get the black goods."

  While the grafting of rifle taxes and the selling of ammunition naturally worked directly in favor of the 8th Route Army, the excessive greed of Chiang officers completely impoverished the people in the guerrilla areas. Levies extracted by the army and the landlords went far beyond even the brutal taxation of which I have already spoken. Because of requisitions, land was being abandoned and whole families were drowning themselves in village wells.

  Besides killing, burying alive and terrible taxation, the people of Anyang also had to endure extortion, blackmail and kidnaping. In these activities, Chiang's officers, but more particularly his special agents, often gave the landlords a helping hand. Such blackmail carried on by means of political terror sometimes reached astounding proportions.

  Farmers and sometimes their wives were arrested and not released until high ransoms had been paid. They were always arrested on the pretext that they had connections with the 8th Route Army. Whether they had or not, actually made little difference. What counted was their ability to pay.

  我在安阳从一个村子走到另一个村子,每天都听到许多悲惨的故事。我有时对于这种反攻倒算的后果感到可怕。什么时候才算完呢?老百姓根本没有安全的保证。

  男人根本不知道什么时候会被抓壮丁。不但驻在这一带的蒋介石第四十军抓丁,还乡团也抓丁。一天晚上,我正在无人地带的一个村子里,九个惊恐的农民带着家属跑到我们这边来。他们气喘吁吁地说,他们的村长开会宣布,国民党需要九个兵。人们都站起来准备开溜,但是,地主的武装入员包围了会场。没人志愿去当兵,只好用抓阄儿的办法定了九个人。没等天黑,这九个人带着家属朝山这边跑来了。

  还有一次,在国民党占领区的边缘地带,我正同副区长在一起时,一个学生逃到我们这边来了。在复活节假日期间,他从南京乘火车打算去北方探亲。在安阳车站,他被征兵人员抓住了,被迫在当地的一个团里当文书。他只干了一天,夜里就逃出来,翻山跑到我们这边。

  有一次,我在国民党防线后采访时,路过一个村子,全村没有一个四十岁以下的男人。原来,还乡团把这个村子的全部青年叫去修工事,他们扛着锄和锹刚走出村子不远,突然被武装土兵包围,上了手铐,装到卡车里运往安阳。

  因此,山那边不少农民想法把自己弄残废——切断手指或者让妻子把他们的一只眼弄瞎。即使这样也不是都能幸免被征兵拉夫的命运,因为抓壮丁的人不管残废、瘸子、瞎子、肺病患者,还是穷苦可怜的人,统统都抓。可想而知,恐怖、敲诈勒索、苛捐杂税和贪污舞弊己把安阳人民的经济生活弄到甚至低于维持生存的地步。地主和蒋介石的军队如此贪婪,差不多毁掉了他们所到的每一个村庄。

  As I wandered around from village to village in Anyang, every day hearing fresh tales of misery, I sometimes used to get frightened at the implications of this countersettlement. Where would it all end? People just had no safety.

  A man never knew when he might be conscripted. Not only by Chiang's 40th Army near by, but by the Home Returning Corps. One night when I was in a village in no man's land nine frightened farmers and their families ran over to our side. According to the story they panted out, the chief of their village had called a meeting and announced that the Kuoinintang wanted nine soldiers. Everyone got up to leave the meeting, but found they were surrounded by armed guards of the landlord. No one wanted to volunteer, so lots were chosen and nine men picked. Scarcely waiting for dark, the nine men had gathered their families and headed for the hills.

  Another time, I was with the assistant district magistrate, just on the edges of Kuomintang territory, when a student fled over to us. During the Easter holidays he had taken a train from Nanking intending to see his family in North China. At the Anyang station, he had been seized by draft agents and forced to become a clerk in the local regiment. Serving only one day, he ran away at night and walked up through the hills to us.

  Once on a trip behind the lines, I came across a village in which there was not one single man below the age of forty. One day the Home Returning Corps had called out all the out s of this village to build defense works and they had gone out on the road with hoes and shovels. Some distance from the village, they were suddenly surrounded by armed soldiers, locked up and then taken away in trucks to Anyang.

  As a result, many farmers across the hills from us were mutilating themselves, cutting off their fingers and getting their wives to put out one of their eyes. Not even then could they always avoid conscription, for the agents took the lame, the halt, the blind and the tubercular, as well as the poor.

  As might be expected under the terror, the extortion, the taxation and the corruption, the economy and whole livelihood of the people of Anyang had declined even below the subsistence level. So rapacious were the landlords and Chiang Kai-shek's army that they ruined nearly every village they touched.

  虽然共产党的“土改清算”有时也很激烈,但是一般来说,运动的结果是减轻了经济上的困难。而地主和国民党搞反攻倒算以后,老百姓除了拿起武器外,没有其他生路。经过屠杀和活埋后,国民党再来时,男人和妇女再也没有留在村里的了。地主暴行的消息像野火一样从一个村庄传到另一个村庄。所以,一见到国民党军队的影子,村里的男女积极分子马上就逃跑了。

  发人深省的是,当八路军从安阳大部分地区撤离时,退处该县西部一隅的少数干部在开始时发动不起游击战。可是,国民党来到这里几个月以后,游击战蓬勃发展,规模之大超过了抗战时期。地主杀人促使一些人跑到山里来寻求复仇的机会。巧取豪夺,苛捐杂税和敲诈勒索迫使另一些人跑到山里找活路。还有一些人为逃避征兵拉夫而逃到山里。与此同时,山里的老百姓看到他们山下的近邻所遭遇的厄运,为了防备也组织了自己的民兵。

  这样,一方面,那些失去了一切的人们横下一条心要报仇;另一方面,那些担心失掉现在依然占有并视为珍宝的东西的人们看到,除了拿起武器没有其他办法以自保。这两部分人终于找到了切身利益之所在,并为之而战。在这个基础上,他们走出家门,展开了一场你死我活的人民战争。

  Though the Communist land "settlement" was sometimes violent, the end result was generally less economic hardship. But after the Kuomintang and landlord countersettlement, the people had no way of subsisting other than by taking up arms. After the burials and the killings, no longer did men and women remain behind when the Kuomintang came. Like a prairie fire, the tale of the brutality of the landlords spread from village to village so that at the first sign of Chiang's troops, all those men and women who had taken an active part in village affairs immediately fled away.

  It is a very instructive fact that when the 8th Route Army evacuated most of Anyang, the few cadres huddled up in the western corner of the county were unable to start guerrilla warfare. Yet within a few months of the arrival of the Kuomintang, that guerrilla warfare was being waged on a scale that dwarfed anything seen in the Japanese war. Murders drove some people up in the hills to seek revenge. Extortion, taxes, blackmail drove others over to seek a way of living. Still others fled over to avoid conscription. At the same time, the mountain people, seeing what had happened to their neighbors in the foothills below, out of precaution organized their own militia bands.

  Thus, on the one hand were men of desperate resolve who, having lost everything, now wanted revenge; and on the other hand there were men who feared to lose the things they still possessed and held dear and saw no way to save them, but by taking up arms. These men had at last found a stake for which to fight, and on this basis, they emerged from their homes and with crude violence began to fight a people's war.