第一章 进入红色中国

CHAPTER I

INTO RED CHINA

第四节 搭乘“联总”的便车
4. With UNRRA
  要去解放区,怎么个去法,却是有些问题。十年前,当埃德加·斯诺冲破国民党的封锁,成为第一个访问红色区域的外国记者时,共产党偏处西北一隅,还不难找到他们。如今他们在苏联边境和黄海之间的广大区域里驰骋,茫茫大地,如何才能与他们接上头?
JUST where to go in Communist areas, however, was somewhat of a problem. Ten years before, when Edgar Snow broke the Kuomintang blockade and became the first foreign correspondent to visit Red territory, the Communists had been confined to a very small area in the northwest, (1) and he could, so to speak, put his finger on them. But now the Communists were wandering to and fro across the continent from the borders of the Soviet Union to the Yellow River, and it was hard to decide in all this vast countryside where to contact them.

原注一:当抗日战争开始时,共产党只在西北控制了一块贫瘠的根据地,人口150万左右。抗战结束时,解放区面积达八十万平方英里(二百万平方公里),人口一亿四千万。虽然解放区并不巩固,但这一事实说明,共产党并不是靠俄国支援取得内战胜利的。他们实际上是在抗战中攒下内战获胜的资本的。

(1) When the Japanese war began the Communists had only a barren territory in the Northwest with a million and a half people. When it ended they had more than 800,000 square miles with 140,000,000 people. Their lands grew twenty fold and their population nearly 100 times. Of course, they had firm control over neither. Yet, this remarkable fact alone suggests that Communist victory in China had nothing to do with supposed Russian help given the Chinese Reds alter the start of the civil war. Actually the Reds won their civil war in the Japanese war.

  我本来可以搭乘那时还定期飞往共产党首都的美国联络飞机去延安。但是延安已经有点像是一个旅游中心,在中国的每一个外国记者都争着飞到那里去看共产党主席毛泽东和共军总司令朱德一眼。我不想去凑这个热闹,因为这种方式不能深入了解中国人民、中国内战和革命。

  我本来还可以去满洲。但是东北是在传统的中国生活的主流之外,那里没有轰轰烈烈的反封建主义斗争,没有严重的土地问题,因而不存在突出的革命形势。另外,和许多人的见解相反,满洲不是决定中国内战胜负的地方。我想正是这后一点促使我决定另找去处。

  当时最关键的战区是华北。这里是一片广大的平原,人口九千万,位于蒋介石的首都南京和满洲之间。蒋介石据守平、津和华北一些地方,但除非他能在这个平原上打开一条通路,使他的孤处华北的部队同他的首都连成一气,否则便休想统一中国。横亘在蒋介石南北两军之间、挡住蒋介石北上道路的,是共军陈毅和刘伯承两部。陈毅将军的总部设在上海以北、北平以南的滨海省份山东。独眼将军刘伯承则驰骋于晋冀鲁豫边缘的广大地区,时而横扫平原,时而向西退入高扼平原的山西丛山之中。于是我决定进山去探访这位名将。

  I could have taken one of the American courier planes which were then still flying to the Communist capital at Yenan, but that cave village had become kind of a tourist center with every foreign correspondent in China hopping over to have a quick look at Mao Tze-tung and Chu Teh, leaders of the Communist party and army, and I had no desire to get mixed up in that circus, fearing it might be very difficult for me to get in close contact with the people, the war or their revolution.

  I also might have gone to Manchuria, but the northeast was outside the mainstream of traditional Chinese life; there was no violent struggle against feudalism there, no great land problem and hence no particularly revolutionary situation, and besides, Manchuria, contrary to popular opinion, was not the decisive theater of war in China. I think it was this last that decided me to go elsewhere in the country.

  At the moment, the most decisive theater of war lay on the North China Plain, a vast flat pavement, filled with ninety million people, that lay between Chiang Kai-shek's capital in Nanking and his troops in Peiping, Tientsin, North China and Manchuria. Unless the generalissimo could beat his way across this plain and link up his capital with his isolated troops in the north, he could not hope to unify China. Opposing the march of the generalissimo from the south and lying between both his southern and northern forces were two Communist generals, named Chen Yi and Liu Po-cheng. The first of these generals made his head-quarters in the seaboard province of Shantung, north of Shanghai and south of Peiping. The second, one-eyed General Liu Po-cheng, roamed far and wide over the four-province border region of Shansi, Hopei, Shantung and Honan, (2) sometimes operating on the plain and sometimes retiring into the mountains of Shansi Province which dominated the plain on the west. I decided to beard this latter general in his mountain lair, if he was available.

原注二:当时解放区有七个边区,每个都有自己的军队和选出来的政府。共产党并没有全国统一政权。1948年,几个边区合并为华北解放区。这给了共产党建立中央政府提供了一个基础,如果他们确有此意的话。 (2)At this time, there were in the Communist areas, seven border regions, each with their own army and their own elected governments. There was no central government for the whole area. In 1948, however, several of these border regions amalgamated into the North China Liberated Area. This laid the foundations for the Communists to set up a central government of their own, should they so desire.

  刘伯承不但是共产党最骁勇善战的将领之一,而且关于他的传说也是最多的一个。他早年追随过孙中山,一九二七年举行起义,反对蒋介石,参加毛泽东在华南井冈山创建的中华苏维埃政权。他一度做过红军的总参谋长,并曾在苏联高级军事学院学习过。一九三四年,红军举行两万五千里长征时,他是开路先锋。他同彝族首领歃血为盟,使红军得以安全通过这个骠悍的少数民族地区。在战斗的岁月中,他的一只眼睛被手榴弹炸瞎,所以得到了“刘瞎子”、“独眼将军”等外号。有时人们叫他“独眼龙”,因为在中国的传说里,龙是象征权力和机智的。他身上多次负伤,但都不是伤在要害处,因此人们称他是“福将”。那时,中国军界有一句话,说中国有三个半战略家,而刘伯承被认为是其中的一个半。

(李根注:刘伯承的右眼是在讨袁护国战争中,于1916年3月攻打丰都时被子弹击伤的。子弹射穿颅顶,从右眼眶飞出。经德国医生开刀摘除右眼球时,为保护脑神经,未用一点麻醉药。刘伯承清楚地数出了七十四刀。)

  General Liu Po-cheng was not only one of the ablest, but also one of the most colorful of the Red commanders. A former associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, he had revolted against Chiang Kai-shek after 1927 and joined Mao Tze-tung in the first Chinese Soviet on the mountain of Cbikanshan in South China. At one time, he had been chief of staff of the Red Army. At another time, he had attended the highest military schools in the Soviet Union. He had been in the vanguard of the Red Army's six-thousand-mile Long March in 1934 and had eaten the blood of a chicken with a Lolo tribal chieftain so that the Reds could obtain safe passage through the land of those savage tribesmen. During years of combat a hand grenade had blown out one of his eyes so that he had acquired the nickname of Blind Liu, the One-Eyed General, etc. Sometimes, he was referred to as the One-Eyed Dragon, as, according to Chinese lore, a dragon symbolizes power and cunning. He had also been wounded several other times, but always on the right side, so that sometimes he was also known as the Rightest General. There was in those days a saying among military men in China that there were three and a half strategists in the country. Liu was recognized as one and a half of these.

  刘伯承的总部设在邯郸附近,从北平前往那里要穿过平原走三百英里路程,其中至少三分之二的路程须乘大车,绕过国民党占据的几个城市,而且是我自己一个人,没有译员同行。但我中国话讲的还可以,同时这样可以有机会现察共产党的后方地区而不受中国译员的监视,所以我不很在乎此行的艰难条件。

  虽说前往刘伯承的总部并不十分困难,但第一步是要设法进入解放区,这却不是易事。为了解决这个因难,在北平的几位共产党人士跟联合国善后救济总署洽商,让我搭乘他们运送救济物资的便车前往解放区。

  To get to Liu's headquarters near Hantan, three hundred miles away across the plain from Peiping, I would have to go at least two-thirds of the way by cart, around a few Kuomintang-held cities and by myself, without an interpreter. However, as I spoke quite a bit of Chinese and as I would thus have an opportunity to observe the Communist rear areas without being overseen by a Chinese translator, I did not object to these conditions too strenuously.

  Although to get to Liu's headquarters was not so hard, to get into the Liberated Areas in the first place was another matter. To solve this difficulty, some Communists in Peiping had persuaded UNRRA to drop me over the lines by means of one of their ambulances which were about to run supplies into Red areas.

  在天津,我和“联总”的人员一起过了几天,颇受启示。在那以后的一年时间里,我又在各地和其中一些男女成员混得很熟。当我回顾过去十年战争期间我所见过的许许多多卑鄙的事件时,不得不说“联总”在中国的工作是最不像话的了。“联总”在华人员包括美国、英国、澳大利亚、加拿大、南斯拉夫、法国、奥地利等二十几个国籍,他们无不对蒋介石政府在“联总”物资上营私舞弊的行为感到惊骇。然而更使我在“联总”的朋友们气愤的,是美国政府如此纵容蒋介石,任他肆无忌惮地处置“联总”的物资,而这些物资是五十二个国家的人民捐赠的,其目的在于减轻饱受战祸的人们之困苦。

  首先是公然歧视华北受苦难的人民,只因为他们是在共产党管辖区内。这完全违反“联总”的一项决议,其中明文规定;“在任何时候,救济和善后物资不得被当作政治武器使用,在分配物资时,不得因种族、主义或政治信仰而有所歧视。”在中国,歧视是十分明显的,而且是故意的。因日本占领而遭难的中国人民估计有二亿六千六百万人,其中一亿二千万人(如果包括满洲应为一亿五千万人)是在共产党领导的解放区内。如果“联总”的物资是公平分配的话,那么运抵中国的二百七十万吨物资中,至少半数应分给解放区。但实际上,住在共产党地区的人民只得到百分之二,百分之九十八都给了蒋介石。

  蒋介石使用了从消极的封锁到悍然发动军事进攻的一切手段,竭力阻止“联总”物资运入共产党地区。更恶劣的是,蒋介石的官吏上下其手,在这些捐赠给中国人民的救济物资中大捞一把,营私自肥。

  这种恶劣行径使“联总”工作人员大为沮丧。他们当中很多人是出于高尚的动机志愿参加这项工作的,有些人是由教会派出的,每月只拿三十美元的工资,因此当他们看到,一列车一列车的粮食经过一千英里的路程运到内地,本来是为救济中国饥饿的农民用的,岂料军人们又把这些粮食用车载船运经过一千英里倒运回来,在黑市上售卖时,他们倍加感到痛心疾首。我永远不会忘记一位美国姑娘,她自告奋勇照顾一批孤儿,“联总”发送一批食物供她养育那些孤儿,可是蒋介石的军官们不准她提取。结果,很多孩子饿死了,而那些本来可以救他们一命的食物,却在附近的仓库中出售。这位美国姑娘给她在上海的上司写信说:“仅此一事就足以使我变成一个共产党员。”她的上司照例提出了抗议,但心中明知这是白费劲。


  I spent several revealing days with UNRRA people in Tientsin and later during the course of a year, here and there, I came to know a number of these men and women quite well. As I look back over a long series of fouled-up situations that I have seen in ten years of war, I am inclined to say that UNRRA's work in China was tops on my snafu list. There were Americans, British, Australians, Canadians, Yugoslavs, Frenchmen, Austrians; in fact, the nationals of a score of different countries working for UNRRA in China and I never found one who was not amazed at the foul and corrupt use made of UNRRA supplies by the Chiang Kai-shek government. What seemed even worse, however, to many of my UNRRA friends was the way the American government toadied to Chiang Kai-shek and let him get away with a monstrous misuse of supplies that had been contributed by the people of fifty-two nations to alleviate the suffering of people made needy and destitute by the war.

  To begin with, there was outright discrimination against the suffering people of North China because they happened to be in Communist territories. This was in direct violation of an UNRRA resolution which provided that "at no time shall relief and rehabilitation supplies be used as a political weapon and no discrimination should be made in the distribution of supplies because of race, creed or political belief." In China, however, it was quite obvious that discrimination was being practiced, and deliberately. Of the estimated 266 million Chinese people who had suffered under Japanese occupation, 120 million (150 million, if Manchuria were included) lived in the Communist-led Liberated Areas. If UNRRA supplies were to have been distributed on a fair basis, at least half of the 2,700,000 tons shipped to China would have gone to the Liberated Areas. Actually, 2 per cent went to the people living under the Communists and 98 per cent went to Chiang Kai-shek.

  Every device from passive blockade to outright military attack was used to keep UNRRA supplies out of Communist areas. Far worse than this, however, was the way officials became wealthy by means of supplies meant for their own people.

  These practices had a demoralizing effect on UNRRA workers. Many of them had volunteered out of idealistic motives for the work, some of them had been sent out under church auspices and received only thirty dollars a month, so it was doubly disillusioning to them to see trainloads of food that were meant to go to China's starving peasants go one thousand miles into the interior and then come one thousand miles back again by truck and boat to be sold by the military on the black market. I shall never forget the American girl who had volunteered to take care of some orphans. UNRRA had sent her supplies to feed her orphans, but Chiang's officers prevented her from getting the food. Many of the children had died while the food that would have saved them was being sold out of a warehouse just around the corner. "This is enough to make a Communist out of me," she had written in a letter to her superiors in Shanghai, who had filed the usual protest, knowing full well that nothing would come of it.

  “联总”的一些较年轻的工作人员的愤慨之深,也颇使我惊异。他们当中有许多人在美军中服役过,另外一些人则在欧洲参加过反希持勒的地下斗争。他们过去斗争时目标很明确。他们反对蒋介石如此刁难他们的国际事业,横加阻挠救济物资运入华北,不让救济在抗日战争中受难最深的华北人民。

  正好这时“联总”天津办事处想开辟一条路线,把药品和医院用的病床穿越战线运往共产党地区。这是一件冒险的事。双方部队的防线不断变化着,又没有公路,而双方的士兵有时还向“联总”的汽车乱放枪。但是这毕竟是通过前线的最好办法。等到以后蒋介石完全切断“联总”的运输线路时,那就得自行设法偷越了。

  经历了几桩小小的冒险之后,我到了沧县,这是国民党在华北这一带据守的最后一个城市。在那里我遇到一位名叫乔治·巴克莱的年轻美国人,他正要把三卡车的廉价病床运交给共产党。这批货物并不十分有价值,但是巴克莱非常认真负责。不过,对他轻易冒风险的做法,我认为无论是他自己的上级还是共产党,都不会赞赏的。至于蒋介石的官员们就更不用说了。

  我对巴克莱说我愿跟他同行,并说明我非去不可。他想出一个主意,叫我冒充一名“联总”代表。他交代我;“上车后请坐在我身边,不要说话。”

  I was surprised, too, at the depth of the feeling of some of the youthful UNRRA workers. Many of them had been in the American Army and some had been members of the European underground against Hitler. They knew what they had fought for; and they were against the way Chiang Kai-shek horned in on an international project and stopped relief supplies from going into North China; that is, to the very people who had suffered most in the war against Japan.

  Just now, Tientsin UNRRA was trying to find a route to send medicines and hospital beds across the lines to Communist areas. This was a rather tricky business. The boundaries between the two forces were constantly changing, there were no roads, and soldiers of both sides, sometimes took pot shots at UNRRA trucks. Nevertheless, this remained the best way of crossing the lines until Chiang Kai-shek eventually put a halt to all UNRRA traffic and one had to sneak across by oneself.

  After a few mild adventures, I made my way down to Tsanghsien, last Kuomintang-held city in this part of North China. There, I ran into George Barkley, a young American, who was just in the process of taking three truckloads of cheap beds over to the Communists. Such a cargo was more than worthless, but Barkley was very conscientious in his duties, taking risks which I am sure were appreciated neither by his superiors, the Communists, nor, of course, by the officials of Chiang Kai-shek.

  I told Barkley that I would like to go along with him; that I had to go. He got the idea that I should pose as an UNRRA representative.

  "Just ride along beside me and keep quiet," he said.