第十一章 内战

CHAPTER XI

CIVIL WAR

第四十四节 共产党的战略战术
44. Red War Policies

  我在中国内战面临决定性转折的时刻来到共产党地区,这不是有意的安排,而是一种巧合。在我漫游解放区的几个月当中,发生了三个事件,对中国内战的军事方面有着直接的影响。

  共产党的首都延安失守了;蒋介石堵住了黄河大堤的决口,使洪水浸淹了解放区;八路军开始转入反攻,这场反攻终于歼灭蒋军大量有生力量,使共产党得以控制从满洲到长江的大片土地。

 

MORE by accident than by design, my arrival in Communist areas coincided with a decisive turning point in China's civil war. During the several months that I had been wandering around the Liberated Areas, there had taken place three events that had an immediate effect on the military aspects of that war.

  The Communist capital at Yenan had been lost. Chiang Kai-shek had closed the breach in the Yellow River dikes and turned loose a flood into the Liberated Areas. And the 8th Route Army had begun to mount a counteroffensive that was ultimately to destroy a good part of Chiang Kai-shek's armies and bring a huge slice of China, from Manchuria to the Yangtze River, under Communist sway.

  这些事件很使我感到震惊,尤其是八路军的转入反攻。因为我来到解放区之初,几乎没有发现任何迹象表明这一重大事件正在蕴酿之中,刷在农民的泥屋与村庄的土墙上的标语都是防御性质的。“恢复停战协定规定的边界线!”“打退蒋介石的进攻!保卫解放区!”这两条标语是我到解放区时最常见的。任何地方都看不到象“打倒蒋介石”那样的口号。当时,这一切都令人十分奇怪。

  我曾问刘伯承将军总部的一些参谋人员,为什么不号召人民起来推翻蒋介石?所得到的各种回答,虽然有趣,但不太令人信服。一个参谋对我说:“你这个家伙真坏。”另一个则说:“还有很多人拥护蒋介石,提打倒他的口号还不合适。”较普遍的回答是“我们无意推翻蒋介石,我们希望与他实现和平解决,对他进行改造。”这些久经征战的游击队领导人物,在革命和战争的问题上难道会抱有这种基督徒式的态度?这在我看来当然是荒谬的。

  All of these things greatly surprised me, but especially the counter-offensive. For when I first arrived in the Liberated Areas I could discover almost no outward signs that such a great event was in the offing. On the peasants' huts and on the mud walls of the villages, the slogans were all of a defensive nature. "Restore the lines of the truce agreement." "Beat back the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek and keep our Liberated Areas free." These were two of the most popular slogans at the time of my arrival. Nowhere was there any such exhortation as "Down with Chiang Kai-shek!" At the time, it had all seemed very strange.

  When I asked various staff officers in General Liu Po-cheng's headquarters why they were not appealing to the people to overthrow Chiang, I received a variety of answers as amusing as they were unconvincing. "You are a very bad boy," one officer would say to me. Or another one might remark: "Too many people support Chiang; such a slogan would not be appropriate." Or most commonly someone would say: "We don't want to overthrow Chiang; we want to make peace with him and reform his character." That these hard-bitten guerrilla leaders actually believed in such a Christian approach to the problem of war and revolution of course, seemed to me preposterous.

  一天,刘伯承将军亲自对我说,中共现阶段对蒋介石作战的目的在于恢复马歇尔主持下谈定的停战线。这次我决心弄个水落石出,于是脱口提出下面的问题:

  “难道你是说,等你们打败徐州和蚌埠一带的蒋军,向南京进军(后来的情况果然如此)的时候,如果蒋介石提出;‘不要再前进啦!请退回到停战协定规定的线上去。’你们就马上停止前进,把部队撤回来,同蒋介石实现和平解决吗?”

  独眼将军以探询的目光注视了我一会儿,说道:“我们同蒋介石打了二十年的仗,对他是很了解的。如果出现你所说的那种情况,我们是不会伸出脖子,让蒋介石来砍头的!”

  我得到了我所希望的答复。几天之后,我从总部的一个参谋人员的口里得到了更加明确的回答。他说;“注意,这只是策略问题,时机成熟时,我们就会提出:‘打倒蒋介石!’ 的口号而把他推翻。”

  One day, when General Liu Po-cheng himself, told me that the present aim of their civil war against Chiang was to restore the lines of the Marshall truce agreement, I suddenly decided to take the bull by the horns and blurted out:

  "Do you mean to tell me that if you have defeated Chiang Kai-shek's army around Suchow and Pengpu and are advancing on Nanking [this is exactly what happened] and if Chiang says at this time: "Advance no further, go back to the lines of the truce agreement", do you mean to say under these circumstances, you will suddenly halt your advance, withdraw your forces and make peace with Chiang?"

  The one-eyed general looked at me quizzically for a moment. "We have been fighting Chiang for twenty years," he said; "we know him very well. If such a condition as you outline arises, we will not stick our necks out for Chiang to chop off."

  I had my answer, and a few days later, I extracted an even more specific one from a staff officer in headquarters. "Look," he said, "this is only a tactic. When the time comes, we will say: 'Down with Chiang Kai-shek' and we will overthrow him."

  然而,共产党根据什么认为他们能够打败蒋介石呢?从表面上看,他们未免不自量力。蒋介石的兵力比八路军多两倍半,拥有飞机大炮、炮舰及摩托化运输,共产党却没有。但我很快就发现,共产党是完全相信他们能够打败蒋介石的,不管蒋介石有没有美国的武器装备。原因何在呢?

  就这个问题我与八路军的军官有过多次交谈。很快,我发现他们的必胜信念是基于对内战的性质的分析上面。他们的全部观点,在一九四七年圣诞节广播的毛泽东的一篇讲话里可以说作了最好的概括。

  毛泽东说:“这场战争的根本性质,就是武装起来的中国人民反对封建主义和独裁专制、争取独立和民主的斗争。在这种情况下,蒋介石军事力量的优势和美国的援助,只是临时起作用的因素,蒋介石政权的反人民的性质,人心的向背,则是经常起作用的因素。”

  But what gave the Communists the belief that they could beat Chiang Kai-shek in the first place? On the face of it such ideas appeared presumptuous. Chiang had an army three and a half times that of the 8th Route Army, with a correspondingly greater fire power in artillery, machine guns and rifles. Moreover, while he had an air force, railways, gunboats and motor transport, the Reds had none. Yet, as I soon discovered, the Communists were supremely confident of their ability to beat Chiang's - American arms or no American arms. Why?

  I had many conversations with 8th Route Army officers on this subject and I soon found out that their belief in victory lay in their analysis of the character of the civil war itself. Their whole viewpoint was perhaps best summed up by Mao Tze-tung in a broadcast on Christmas Day 1947.

  "The basic nature of the war," said Mao, "lies in the struggle of the armed Chinese people against feudalism and dictatorship and toward independence and democracy. Under these conditions, Chiang Kai-shek's military superiority and American aid are factors that can play only temporary roles. The unpopular nature of the Chiang regime and the support or opposition of the people, however, will play constant roles."

 

  刘伯承总部的军官给我解释说:“处于劣势物质基础的一方,将战胜有着优势物质基础的一方。农村将要征服城市,没有外国援助的一方将战胜有外国援助的一方。”他们相信,在战争过程中,蒋介石将脱离中国人民的大多数,在他的政权和军队内部也将陷于众叛亲离,从而为他自己的覆灭和联合政府的诞生开辟道路。这就是胜利的政治基础。

  毫无疑问,共产党希望在联合政府里取得支配地位。然而,他们毫不隐瞒他们的这种纲领。恰恰相反,他们公开宣布他们的纲领。所以说这是一个极高明的策略。而蒋介石呢,他先是驱逐中共驻南京的代表,继而宣布不让中共参加政府。于是他就在举国要求和平的情况下把自己放到了继续打内战的站不住脚的地位。后来,他又取缔左翼的民主同盟,排除其成员参政的资格,甚至还逮捕了它的一些成员。结果,他的地位更不妙了。与此同时,共产党则不断鼓吹成立联合政府,把门开得大大的,把全国不同政治派别的人都争取到自己周围。这样的策略,无论其真诚与否,肯定是大得人心的。

  Officers in Liu Po-cheng's headquarters put it to me this way: "The side with inferior material will overcome the side with superior material; the country will conquer the city; the side without foreign assistance will conquer the side with foreign assistance."

  During the war, they believed, China's dictator would alienate most of the Chinese people, most of the officials in his government and a great many officers in his army, so that the road would be open to get rid of him and form a coalition government. That was the political basis for victory.

  No doubt the Communists hoped to gain a dominating position in that government. However, there was nothing underhanded in advocating such a program. Quite the contrary, it was wide open to everybody's view and that is why it was such a beautiful strategy. Chiang Kai-shek, in dismissing Red representatives from his capital at Nanking, then declaring that he would not take them in the government at all, put himself in the untenable position of continuing the war when the country wanted peace. Later, he made his position even worse by outlawing the left-wing Democratic League, denying their members positions in the government and even arresting some of them. The Communists, on the other hand, by continuing to advocate coalition government, left the door wide open for all the diverse political elements of China to come over to their side. Such a strategy - whether sincere or not - was definitely appealing.

  刘伯承部下的大部分参谋人员虽然认为中国的内战是革命战争,但他们指出这次战争与其他革命战争不同。他们关于这个问题的言论很有意思,我把其精神介绍如下。

  他们说:中国的内战不同于俄国的内战,它主要是一场农民战争,工人参加的人数极少。所以决定的因素是实行土地改革,而不是搞工人起义。中国内战的目的是解放受地主压迫的农民,这和从南方地主压迫下解放黑奴的美国南北战争是相似的;但是它不是那种工业北方反对农业南方的内战。按照共产党的说法,这是中国人民反对国民党头子,即蒋介石、宋子文、孔祥熙、陈立夫和陈果夫兄弟四大家族的战争。

  就反独裁、反封建、反外来干涉而言,它和西斑牙内战相似;但西班牙人民反佛朗哥的斗争是在人民阵线领导下进行的,而中国人民的斗争,尽管有很多的党派参加,却是在共产党政策指导下、在共产党领导下进行的。因此,中国人民的斗争具有共同的方向和利益,而这是西班牙共和派所没有的。

  最后,共产党人认为他们现在所进行的战争,同一九二七年至一九三七年他们反抗蒋介石的战争的情况是很不相同的。相同之处也有,那就是仍然以运动战为主,游击战为辅,仍然是把农民武装起来斗地主;但是不同之处更多。

  While they considered China's civil war revolutionary, most of Liu's staff officers believed it was different from other revolutionary wars. Their remarks on this subject are perhaps not without interest and I paraphrase them here.

  China's civil war, said staff officers, was not like the Russian civil war because it was primarily a war of farmers with few workers involved. Therefore, land reform and not proletarian support was the decisive factor.

  The civil war in China was similar to the American Civil War as it aimed to free the peasants from the landlords as Negro slaves were freed from southern landowners. But it was not a war of an industrial north against an agrarian south, but, according to the Communists, a war of the Chinese people against the "Four big families - Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and the Chen brothers, Kuomintang party bosses."

  In its opposition to dictatorship, feudalism and foreign intervention, it was like the Spanish Civil War. But the Spanish people fought Franco under the leadership of a popular front, while the Chinese people, though of many parties and groups, were fighting under Communist policies and Communist leadership. Thus, there was a unity of direction and interest that the Spanish Republicans lacked.

  Finally, the Communists believed they were fighting quite a different war than they fought against Chiang from 1927 to 1937. There were similarities - the major type of warfare was still mobile war, with guerrilla war to help, and the farmers were still armed to fight the landlords -
but the differences were greater.

  在一九二七年的时候,共产党作战的目的是实行无产阶级专政和一党统治;而现在的斗争目标则是建立共产党领导的“新民主主义”社会和联合政府。一九二七年的时候,世界帝国主义还在扩张,但是到了一九四五年,日本、意大利和德国的帝国主义阴谋被粉碎了。法、英帝国主义已全面后退。只有美国还有能力对中国进行干涉,但由于它在全世界都插手,因而就不可能对中国内战施加决定性的影响。许多中国人认为蒋介石为了外国的利益而出卖中国人民,这一事实使这场战争具有独立战争的性质。

  概括起来,共产党就是根据这些政治和战略因素相信他们能取得胜利,并在联合政府中取得公认的、也许是占统治的地位。那么他们打算怎样打这场战争呢?与他们以前的打法是有所不同的。

 

  In 1927, the aim of Red warfare had been the dictatorship of the proletariat and one-party rule; now it was a "New democracy" and coalition government under leadership of the Communists. In 1927, world imperialism was still marching forward. By 1945, however, the imperialist designs of Japan, Italy and Germany had been routed. French and British imperialism were in full retreat. Only America could interfere in China, but being occupied throughout the whole world, she could not play a decisive role in China's war. The fact, however, that many Chinese looked upon Chiang as the man who was selling them out to foreign interests gave the war the character of a war of independence.

  Such were the broad outlines of the political and strategic considerations which the Reds believed would bring them victory and a recognized, perhaps dominant position in a coalition government. How did they plan to fight that war? Somewhat differently than before.

  当我来到解放区的时候,刘伯承已经把他以前的游击队合编成相当于军、师建制的部队,准备运用他的部队对蒋介石开展大规模的运动战(虽然他仍然以游击战为辅)。这种作战方式,他在抗日战争中是未能采取的。

  不仅刘伯承是这样做,所有八路军将领那是这样做的。这些作战原则也没有什么特别保密的。毛泽东本人在一九四七年圣诞节讲话里公开对之作过以下的概述:

(1)先打孤立之敌,后打集中之敌。

(2)先取小城市,后取大城市。

(3)以歼灭敌人有生力量为主要目标,不以夺取城市为主要目标。

(4)每战集中绝对优势兵力(两倍、四倍、有时甚至是五六倍于敌之兵力),力求全歼,不打那种得不偿失的消耗战。

(5)只打有胜利把握之仗。

(6)发扬不休息地接连打几仗的作风。

(7)力求在运动中歼灭敌人。

(8)夺取一切敌人守备薄弱的城市,待条件成熟后再夺取守备强固的城市。

(9)以俘获敌人的全部武器和大部人员补充自己。我军人力物力的来源,主要在前线。

(10)利用两个战役之间的间隙,休息和整训部队。休整的时间不要过长,不使敌人获得喘息的时间。

 

  Already, on my arrival, Liu Po-cheng had amalgamated his former guerrilla outfits into units analogous to divisions and corps. Though he was still relying on a guerrilla struggle for aid, he planned to use his army in broad-scale mobile maneuvers against Chiang which he had not been able to do against the Japanese.

  This was true, not only of Liu Po-cheng, but of all 8th Route cornmanders. There was nothing particularly secret about these tactics, and they were publicly outlined by Mao Tze-tung, himself, in a Christmas ay speech in 1947 as follows:

1. First strike isolated enemies; later strike concentrated enemies.

2. First take small towns, later cities.

3. Destruction of the enemy's forces and not the capture of cities is the most important objective.

4. In every battle concentrate absolutely superior forces: double, quadruple and sometimes even five or six times those of the enemy. Try for complete annihilation. But don't fight a battle of attrition where the gains cannot equal the losses.

5. Fight only when there is assurance of victory.

6. Fight several engagements in succession without respite.

7. Destroy the enemy while in movement.

8. Wrest all weakly defended cities from the enemy. Wait until conditions mature and then capture powerfully defended cities.

9. Replenish ourselves by the capture of all enemy arms and most of his personnel. Sources of the men and materiel for our army are mainly at the front.

10. Utilize intervals between campaigns in resting, grouping and training troops, but don't let intervals be long or allow the enemy a breathing spell.

  毛泽东说:“这些方法,蒋介石和他的美国顾问都是熟知的。蒋介石曾多次集训他的将校,将我们的军事书籍发给他们研究,企图寻找对付的方法。美国军事人员曾提出这样那样的战略战术……但是我们的战略战术是建立在人民战争这个基础上的,任何反人民的军队都不能利用我们的战略战术。”

  毛泽东的这个为取得胜利而制订的纲要,在他讲话之后的一年里将以惊人的精确性得到实现。八路军先是夺取小城市,继而攻打象济南、保定那样的省城,然后占领沈阳、天津那样的大城市,最后终于夺取南京、北平、上海等最大的都市中心。正如跟我谈话者所说的,农村逐步征服城市。在其他方面也一样,时间证明毛泽东是一个很灵验的预言家。国民党军队,先是一小股一小股孤立的部队、继而整师整军的部队被共军所消灭。

  "These methods," said Mao Tze-tung, "are well known to Chiang Kai-shek and his American advisers. Many times Chiang has called together his generals and his field officers, issued them our books and sought countermeasures. The American military personnel suggest this and that strategy. .. but our strategy is based on a people's war and no antipopular army can utilize our strategy and tactics."

  This outline for victory was to be fulfilled with amazing accuracy in the year following Mao's speech. For the 8th Route Army, having captured small towns, moved against provincial capitals such as Tsinan and Paoting then took great cities, like Mukden, and Tientsin until they finally seized the biggest metropolitan centers at Nanking, Peiping and Shanghai. The country, as my informants had put it, was conquering the city. In other ways, too, time showed Mao to be a sure prophet. Small isolated units, then divisions and finally whole Kuomintang armies were to fall to the Red forces.
  这些势如破竹的胜利,并不单是依靠军力取得的。此中也离不开共产党高级将领们对政治策略的妙用。一天,在与独眼刘将军谈话时,我问他,在四分之一世纪的戎马生涯中,他的最重要的策略心得是什么?他想了很有一会儿然后回答说:

  “利用敌人的矛盾。比方说,当我面临三支敌军时,我就仔细研究每支部队司令官的历史,设法了解这些司令官之间是否存在不和,看哪一个司令官是最不得志的,哪一部分敌军最弱,哪一部分敌人士气最低,然后我就先挑它打。”不妨指出,这也是共产党十分拿手的政治策略。

  在整个内战过程中,几乎每一个共产党高级将领都运用了这种策略,有时取得惊人的战果。共产党将领们在利用国民党军队内部的矛盾方面从不懈怠。一切都是经过细心策划的。

链接:刘伯承论《鄄城大捷后的战争形势》

  Such sudden and sweeping victories, however, were not achieved by force of arms alone. Behind such victories lay some very subtle political stratagems of high-ranking Red commanders. One day, when talking to one-eyed General Liu, I asked him what was the greatest tactical lesson he had learned from a quarter of a century of war.

  He thought a long while, then answered: "To utilize the contradictions of the enemy. For example, when I have three enemy units before me, I study the history of each commander carefully, try to find out if the commanders have any disagreements among themselves, which commander is the most dissatisfied, which unit the weakest and which soldiers the most depressed. I then try to isolate that unit and attack it." It might be added here that this was also one of the Communists?favorite political tactics. This tactic was utilized by nearly every high Communist commander throughout the course of the civil war with sometimes astounding results.

  There was nothing haphazard about the way Red commanders turned the contradictions within the Kuomintang army to their own advantage. Preparations were very detailed.

  例如,我在解放区期间,陈毅将军部下的一支共军决定进攻白塔城,目的不在于拿下该城,而是要消灭郝鹏举将军所统帅的国民党第四十二军。郝将军曾经是日本人手下的伪军指挥官。他投降了共产党,共产党仍让他指挥他原来的人马,后来,跟三国时代的情形相仿,他突然又倒向蒋介石。在共产党准备进攻郝的过程中,八路军政治指导员把所有这些情况向战士作了说明。蒋介石军队的情报人员保存了这种临战前政治教育方法的材料,这里我引录其中的一个文件:

  向所有攻坚部队的全体战土详细解说以下各点:

(1)郝鹏举的部队先前是伪军,他们投降过解放军,解放军支持他们,对他们表示欢迎;去年当他们还同解放军在一起的时候,花了多少钱,吃了多少小麦和面粉,领了多少套军装,等等。每一项都详尽地列举出来,使每一个战士对郝鹏举的特点及其部队的本质有一个清楚的了解。

(2)去年中国共产党的华东局是怎样派人教育郝的部队的;郝是怎样加以抵制的;郝又是怎样暗中同南京勾结的。列举了郝部队中最反动的分子,最进步的分子和那些没有定见的分子的情况。

(3)郝的部队的战斗力:分别列举了装备最精良的营、人数最多的营、指挥官最进步的以及最反动的营的番号。

  连排单位就下列问题进行讨论:一、郝鹏举及其部队是不是背叛了人民?二、郝鹏举及其部队是不是背叛了共产党?三、对他们应采取什么态度?四、他们对人民和党犯下了错误,应作何惩处?在每个排和连队里进行三、四天的讨论,对必须消灭郝鹏举及其部队一事取得一致意见之后,指挥员号召每一个战士订立个人作战计划。每支步枪上都写有“坚决消灭郝鹏举”、“只能前进一尺,绝不后退一寸”之类的标语口号。

  注释一:以上引自《与赤匪作战要诀》,国民党军官训练团出版,南京

  几乎用不着多加赘述,可怜的郝将军无法抵挡强大的政治宣传攻势,几天之内他和他的部队大部被俘了。

链接:关于郝鹏举

  For example, when I was in the Liberated Areas, a Communist force under General Chen Yi decided to attack the City of the White Pagoda. The aim of this operation was not the capture of the city, but the elimination of the Kuomintang 42nd Army Group under General Ho Peng-chu. Now, General Ho once had been a puppet commander under the Japanese. He had surrendered to the Communists and was allowed to keep his army. Then suddenly, in the fashion of the Three Kingdoms, Ho turned over to Chiang Kai-shek. As the Reds prepared to attack Ho, their political directors explained all this to the soldiers of the 8th Route Army. The manner of this precombat political education has been preserved by intelligence agents of Chiang Kai-shek's army itself and I quote from one of its documents.

  All troops serving as the spearhead in the attack were given detailed explanations:

a) Of how Ho Peng-chu's troops were puppets; how they had surrendered to the Liberated Army; how the people in the Liberated Army had supported them; how they had been welcomed; how much money they had spent during the last year when they were with the Liberated Army; how many pounds of wheat and flour the army had consumed; how many uniforms they had used; etc. Every item was listed in detail, so that every soldier had a clear understanding of Ho Peng-chu's character and the nature of his army.

b) How during the last year the East China Bureau [of the Chinese Communist party] had sent people to educate Ho's troops; how they had been rejected; how Ho had maintained secret liaison with Nanking. A description was given of the most reactionary elements in Ho's army; the most progressive; and those who did not have much idea one way or the other.

c) Of the combat strength of Ho's army: including the listings of the best equipped battalions, those with the most men, those with the most progressive commanders and those with the most reactionary ones.

  Discussions were held in the platoons and companies on the following subjects: a) Are Ho Peng-chu and his army traitors to the people? b) Are Ho Peng-chu and his army traitors to the Communist party? c) How to deal with them? d) How to avenge their wrongs to the people and the party?

  After more than three days' discussion in every platoon and company, and after 100 percent agreement had been reached that Ho Peng-chu and his army must be crushed, the commanders encouraged every soldier to make his personal plan for battle. Every rifle was decorated with some slogan such as:

"We are determined to crush Ho Peng-chu." "We advance a foot but never retreat an inch." (1)

  (1) Important Rules of Communist Bandit Combat, published by The Kuomintang Military Officers Training Corps, Nanking.

  It is almost superfluous to remark that poor General Ho could not stand up before this avalanche of politkal propaganda and was captured within a few days with most of his army intact.

  随着战争的继续,共产党的这些政治策略收到了丰硕的成果。敌人方面,不仅整团、而且整师、有时整军的对蒋介石不满的部队,在作了象征性抵抗之后便倒向共产党。实际上,当时就有一个叫高树勋的国民党将军在总部里,他刚率领整整一个军投诚共产党。我决定去采访他。
  As the war went on, these political tactics of the Reds were to pay huge dividends. For time after time, not only regiments, but divisions and sometimes dissatisfied armies, turned over to the Reds after making only a token resistance.

  As a matter of fact, there was in headquarters right at this moment a Kuomintang general named Kao Hsu-hsun who had turned over to the Reds with his whole army. I decided to go see him.