第十一章 内战

CHAPTER XI

CIVIL WAR

第四十八节 革命与八路军
48. Revolution and the 8th Route Army

  在任何一场象中国革命这样广泛、剧烈的社会大变动中,旧的军事组织和战略概念也如同旧的政治机构和社会阶级一样,被无情地冲走了。正如法国大革命废弃波旁王朝的旧贵族军队,俄国革命废除士气低落的沙皇军队那样,中国革命也摧毁了蒋介石的半封建军队体制。不过这里存在着一个重大的不同。法国人和俄国人是在夺取政权后才建立一支新型军队的,而中国人则是在夺取政权斗争过程中建立起这样一文新型军队的。

  正是由于这个原因,中国的革命军队必然比较弱,然而情况使得他们比当年的法国和俄国革命军队都更加民主、更与革命进程紧密联系着。

IN ANY social upheaval as vast and violent as the Chinese Revolution, military organizations and concepts of strategy were swept aside as ruthlessly as political institutions and social classes. Just as the French Revolution scrapped the old aristocratic army of the Bourbons and the Russian Revolution abolished the tlemoralized army of the czars, so the Chinese Revolution destroyed the semifeudal army system of Chiang Kai-shek. There was, however, this significant difference. The French and Russians did not establish a new army until they had seized power; the Chinese established a new army while struggling for state power.

  This fact alone guaranteed that the revolutionary Chinese army would be much weaker, yet, by force of circumstances, more democratic and more intimately associated with the processes of revolution than either of its earlier counterparts.

  为了推进俄国革命,布尔什维克党人有意识地破坏旧军队的士气。因此,当士兵们被迫打内战时,军官不得不采取包括处决在内的极不民主的纪律措施来重新振作士气。当法国用战争的手段向欧洲的其他地区传播自由、平等、博爱的时候,曾经取消了许多革命成果,采取了义务兵役制。中国既没有法国那样的“第三等级”,也没有俄国那样的无产阶级,于是共产党只好运用自己的军队来进行革命。因此,在我当时所到的华北,为了争取农民拥护革命,为了尊重其人格,不能去征召他们当兵。否则,共产党和蒋介石,他们的两种军队之间也就毫无区别了。由于这个原因,八路军几乎全是由志愿兵所组成的。

  八路军采取宣传、说服和利用地方上社会压力的办法,动员人参军。军属受到优待。村里给战士代耕土地,并照顾其亲属。在蒋管区,农民认为当兵是件丢人和悲惨的事情,而在解放区,共产党使参军成为一件光荣的事情。志愿参加八路军的青年,不是被抓壮丁的人从家里绑走,而是由全村设酒席欢送,授以锦旗,骑着骡马甚至坐着花轿,敲锣打鼓,吹吹打打,由全村小伙子和姑娘们簇拥着送走。这就使得每一个新兵感到自己参军绝不是个人的荣誉,而是代表着全村。
In order to promote revolution in Russia, the Bolsheviks had deliberately broken down the morale of the old army, so that when they were forced to fight a civil war they had to re-create this morale by some very undemocratic disciplinary measures, including execution. The French, in carrying Liberty, Equality and Fraternity to the rest of Europe by means of war, also stamped out many gains of the revolution and instituted a levee en masse - that is, universal conscription. The Chinese Communists having neither a Third Estate nor a proletariat had to use their army for revolution. Therefore, in North China where I was, in order to win the peasant to revolution, and to give him the dignity of a personality, they could not conscript him. To do so would have put the Communists on a par with Chiang Kai-shek and given their army no distinction from his. For this reason the 8th Route Army was composed almost entirely of volunteers.

  Soldiers were obtained by persuasion, propaganda and local social pressure. Preferential treatment was given to soldier families, the villages guaranteeing to plow a warrior s land and care for his relatives. In Kuomintang areas, peasants considered it a disgrace and a tragedy to be drafted into the army, but in the Liberated Areas, the Communists tried to make it appear an honor to join the army. Instead of being kidnaped from his home by draft agents, the volunteer for the 8th Route Army was given a feast by his whole village, decorated with a banner, set upon a caparisoned mule or even in a flower-decked sedan chair, serenaded by gongs, cymbals and flutes and escorted from the village by all the peasant boys and girls. In this way, the newly enlisted man got the idea that joining the army was not entirely a personal affair, but one in which he represented the whole village.

  参军是志愿的,但服役没有具体的期限,而是决定于战争延续时间。如果一个战士开小差,他不会被关进监狱或挨打,只是给他那个村寄去一份通知,村里就会去说服他归队。如果他不回去,大家以后就不理他了。他在社会上感到孤立,往往就自动归队了。如果他接连开了三次小差,就招他送到区里劳动改造。

  征兵制度经过这番改革,对军事和革命都产生了好效果,因为,不仅志愿参军的共产党士兵比国民党抓来的壮丁更英勇善战。而且蒋管区的很多农民知道解放区是安全的,往往为躲避国民党抓壮丁而逃过来。因此,这种志愿兵制度使得共军的士气高昂,同时对国民党军队的士气起了瓦解的作用。

  Though men volunteered for the army, their period of service was not limited to any length of time, but to the duration of the war. Yet, if an enlisted man ran away, he was not put in jail or beaten. A notice was merely sent to his village which would then try to persuade him to go back to the army. If he would not, he was generally shunned. Such social ostracism was generally sufficient to send him back of his own accord. Should he desert three times, he was turned over to the district magistrate for hard labor.

  The reform of the draft apparatus had both military and revolutionary effects. For not only did the Communist volunteer fight more spiritedly than the Kuomintang conscript, but many peasants, knowing they would be safe, used to flee over from Chiang Kai-shek's side to the Liberated Areas in order to avoid Kuomintang conscription. Thus the volunteer system built up morale on the Communist side and. destroyed it on the Kuomintang side.

  但也不要以为一个农民能轻易地逃避参军。压力是巨大的。首先是宣传,往往是和土改紧密联系进行的。比如在群众大会上、日常的谈话中、讨论会和演戏时,募兵的干部说:

  “穷人是靠共产党、八路军斗争才得到翻身的。

  “为了保卫斗争的果实(农民从土改中得到的土地和粮食)必须打垮反动派,保卫家乡。

  “要为祖祖辈辈受贪官污吏和恶霸地主的剥削报仇。

  “我们要用自己的血汗来创造自由和幸福生活。大家要踊跃参军。”

  除了上述宣传外,还做工作让家庭成员动员子弟参军。如果这样还不行,就发动全村的人做工作,使人无法抗拒,只好参军。

  新兵入伍时,区长亲自为他牵马送行。到达部队,经过体格检查后,人们就向他介绍部队的历史、沿革和光荣的战绩,使他感到参加这样一支优秀部队很光荣。新兵一到达,老战士争着向他问寒问暖。有的帮他穿上军装,有的给他理发,或送他毛巾、肥皂之类的礼物。大家明显地是要使新兵感到如同在家里和在朋友中间那样温暖。

  It should not be thought, however, that it was easy for a villager to avoid joining the army. The pressures were terrific. In the first place, there was the matter of propaganda. This was usually intimately associated with the land reform. For example, in mass meetings, day-to-day gossip and in discussions and plays, recruiting officers would say:

  "The rise of the poor is the result of the struggle of the Communist party and the 8th Route Army.

  "In order to protect the fruits of the struggle [land and food received in land reform] the reactionaries must be smashed and our villages defended.

  "Let us avenge for our ancestors the exploitation they suffered from corrupt officials and rascal landlords.

  "We must create our own freedom and welfare with our own sweat and blood. Everyone join the regular army."

  Besides propaganda, family members were mobilized to convince a prospective recruit he should enlist. If this did not work, then the whole people of the village might be mobilized to break down the recruit's resistance and force him to join up.

  When a man went off to join the army, the district magistrate served as a groom for the horse of the recruit. When he arrived in a new unit, after a physical examination, he was told the history, reforms and glorious accomplishments of his unit, so that he would feel happy on joining such a distinguished outfit.

  As soon as he arrived, old soldiers rushed to pay their respects to the new soldier. Some helped him put on his uniform. Some gave him a haircut, or made him presents of hand towels and soap. A distinct effort was made to make the new soldier feel at home and among friends.

  这些情况国民党军官不是不知道。上文所引用的那份国民党情报中无可奈何地承认:“我方征兵时,不向人们解释,不进行教育工作,不打通人的思想,一味强迫。结果,十年来这种征兵制度弊病深重,与匪(共产党)相比,我们的情况真不堪设想。”

  无庸赘述,八路军对待士兵与国民党截然不同。但也不存在俄国红军初期就坚决废除了的那种极端民主化的做法。军官不是选举产生而是任命的。尽管如此,士兵们受到悉心爱护,没有一个人挨过打。指挥员不许骂士兵,甚至在批评士兵时,也不允许发脾气。

  This was not unknown to the officers of Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuomintang intelligence report, which we have previously quoted, sadly noted: "The conscription of our side does not aim to make the people understand, does not carry out educational work, does not convince them ideologically, but only tries to enforce the law. As a result, for ten years the conscription system has been corrupt. To compare our situation with that of the bandits [Communists] is indeed terrifying."

  It is almost superfluous to remark that the 8th Route Army treated its soldiers much differently than did the Kuomintang. There were none of those ultrademocratic reforms which were ruthlessly abolished from the early Russian Red Army. Officers were not elected, but appointed. Nevertheless, soldiers were treated with studied kindness. No one was ever beaten. A commander was forbidden to curse his soldiers or even lose his temper when reprimanding them.

  这些方法被一再证明行之有效,原因之一是八路军的兵源是华北农民。这些农民勤劳、朴素、爽直、单纯、吃苦耐劳、对人诚恳热情,但谁要是伤害他们,他们就要坚决报复。他们自尊心强,受到鼓励时,会很卖力,但如怠慢了他们,也会躺倒不干。俗话说:“宁受苦,不受气”。这样的人你越骂,他越不听你的。蒋介石的军官对这些农民只知道打,他们当然不愿为蒋介石卖命。八路军指挥员爱护这些农民,他们就成了很好的战士。这就是为什么八路军不存在什么派系的原因。

  八路军薪饷平等,伙食平等,待遇平等,志愿入伍,这些都是提高士气的重要因素。另一重要因素是政治教育。八路军部队从连、排到野战军都有政治指导员或政治委员,负责政治教育,提高部队士气。如果一支部队的指挥员牺牲了,政委就接替指挥,直到派来新的指挥员为止。这些政工人员的任务决不象外人所以为的那样,是为了监视军事指挥员。据我观察,八路军的政工人员和军事指挥员之间确实没有任何摩擦,不象蒋介石的军官和特务机关派出的暗探之间那样勾心斗角。八路军的做法是,司令员发布命令,政委作阵前鼓动并身先士卒冲入敌阵。

  The success of these methods, which proved their worth time and again, can be explained in part by the character of the North China peasantry from whose ranks the soldiers were drawn. Thrifty, frugal, frank, single minded, capable of bearing great hardship, the farmer was sympathetic and honest with other people, but extremely vengeful against anyone who did him harm. Self-respecting, he would work hard if encouraged, but would lie down on the job if given bad treatment. "Bear hardship, but not blame," said a proverb. Such a man would not respond to curses. Officers of Chiang's armies beat this peasant and they got a bad instrument. Commanders of the 8th Route Army buttered him up and got a good instrument. For this reason there were few cliques in the 8th Route Army.

  Equal pay, equal food, equal treatment, voluntary enlistment - these were all big factors in developing morale in the 8th Route Army. Another factor of great importance was political training. Every unit from the platoon up to the commander in chief of a war zone had a political director or a commissar whose duty it was to raise the morale of troops through political education. If a unit commander was killed, these men took command until another officer was appointed. The duties of these political directors were not, as might be supposed, to spy on military commanders and certainly, as far as I saw, there was no friction between them and purely military officers as there was friction between Chiang's officers and the spies of his secret service. The commanders gave the orders, but the comtnissars gave the pep talks and led the soldiers into battle.

  共产党认为,政治教育的目的是使士兵对胜利充满信心,通过组织各种活动来保证胜利和贯彻执行上级制定的政治路线。政治指导员日常和士兵在一起时,给大家读报,报告全国各战场打败蒋介石的消息和解释战争的意义。士兵一般不爱听军官的训斥,所以共产党就让部队以班为单位成立互助组,对班里的缺点进行批评。当一个班撤离一个村庄时,互助组检查从老百姓那儿借来的东西是否退还了。这些事不需要指挥员的监督,因此更有效。互助组每天还用三、五分钟作公开的自我批评。比如,这个战士可能说;“今天我挖战壕没挖好。”那个战士可能说:“我没有打好机枪。”

  还通过政治教育使新战士不怕死。由参加过八年抗日战争的老战士传授经验,他们的结语总是说;“打仗时谁怕死就活不了,勇敢的人死不了,只有猛扑上去,在敌人还来不及打你之前于掉他。”这时,政委就插进来做政治工作:“蒋管区的人民被苛捐杂税压榨,正面临死亡的威胁。不打倒蒋介石,我们就活不成,要生存只有战斗!”

  每次作战之前,由政工干部向部队讲解这一仗与整个战局以至于整个中国革命有何关系,分析敌我双方的总形势,强调国民党军队士气低落,蒋管区物价暴涨,蒋管区后方暴动频起等等。

  The purpose of political education, according to the Communists, was to make the soldier believe in victory, to guarantee that victory by the organization of every kind of activity and to carry cut the political line handed down from above. In informal meetings, political directors read newspapers to the soldiers, told of the defeats of Chiang Kai-shek in other parts of the country and explained the meaning of the war. Because soldiers do not like to be rebuked by officers, the Communists got each squad to organize a mutual self-help group which criticized the shortcomings of squad members. When a squad moved out of a village, the self-help groups checked to see that everything borrowed from the people had been returned. This was done without the supervision of the commander and for this reason was more effective. Three to five minutes each day were also used by such groups for public self-criticism. Thus one soldier might say: "Today, I dug a ditch poorly." Or another: "I did not fire the machine gun well."

  Political education was also used to rid the new soldiers of the fear, of death. Old soldiers who had fought the Japanese for eight years would tell their experiences, ending up with a statement something like this: "Towards die in battle, but brave men live. So run forward quickly and get on top of the enemy before he has a chance to hit you." The commissar would then chime in with a political maxim: "People in Chiang's areas are starving to death because of high taxes. Unless we fight Chiang, we shall die. To fight is to live."

  Prior to every battle, the political workers explained to the troops the relation of the battle to the over-all situation, the meaning of this particular battle in the entire Chinese Revolution and the general situation on both sides, with emphasis on the low morale of Kuomintang forces, high prices, revolts in Chiang's rear and so on.

  八路军一切政治教育的目的,实际上是向士兵注入阶级觉悟的精神。据八路军领导人说,这是提高士气的最可靠方法。因为人们对这件事还有不少疑问,我不妨在这里介绍一下我在山西时和某军政治部主任专门就士气问题进行过的一次谈话。

  他告诉我说:“在我们看来,战争是通过政治觉悟进行的情感的斗争。士气包含着恨与爱,报仇和对胜利的信心。士气作为一种社会现象而存在, 不由个人力量而由社会力量所决定。它决定一次战斗的胜负,也决定整个战争的胜负。

  “士气来源于人民的情感。我们的战士是穿着军装的农民,他们怀着农民的心愿。他们的这种社会存在决定他们作战的士气。这些战士的士气比抗日战争时期更高,因为人们恨蒋介石胜于恨日本人,因为他们经历了土地改革,因为他们把解放区看做是自己的乡土,觉得有理由来保卫自己的家乡。

  “领导工作和教育工作在提高士兵气方面起着重要作用。领导工作依靠领导人的政治教育。领导人必须对自己为之而战的事业充满信心,首先他必须爱护战士,处处关心战士的生活、伙食和睡眠。你如问,是食物、装备对士气更重要呢,还是政委更重要。搞好物质条件是领导工作的一部分。如果战士没有饭吃,政治指导员当然只能是说空话。

  “士气也会有起伏的。一般说,对于没有战斗经验的战士,打一次败仗,或疲劳、疾病都会使士气低落。在这种情况下,要提高士气还是要依靠领导工作。暂时的挫折对老战士不会有太大的影响,但他们对领导有更高的要求,所以对他们来说,做好领导工作也很重要。

  “战友的阵亡会削弱新建部队的士气,对老的部队则会更激励其斗志。我们所有的纵队全是由老战士组成。本地参军的编入新部队中,逐步提高其士气。

  “士气远比经济条件更重要。如果我们把经济作为胜利的基础,那么我们就会失去信心,因为蒋介石的经济力量更强嘛。

  “我们提高士气的方法在美国军队中就行不通,因为你们的社会制度和我们不同。我们提高士气的方法是靠阶级觉悟,这种方法只在革命战争中才可以运用。“

  As a matter of fact the aim of all political education in the 8th Route Army was to instill a spirit of class consciousness in the soldier. According to 8th Route Army leaders, this was the surest way of building up morale. Since this is rather a questionable subject, it is perhaps well to insert at this point some words of a conversation I had with the political director of the army in Shansi Province on the whole question of morale.

  "To us," said my informant, "war is an emotional struggle carried on through political consciousness. Morale is composed of hatred, love, revenge and confidence in victory. It exists as a social phenomenon and does not lie in the strength of individuals, but in the strength of society. It is decisive in combat and decisive in war.

  "The origins of morale lie in the emotions of the people. Our soldiers are farmers in uniform and they bring with them the hearts of farmers. Their social condition therefore determines their morale in fighting. Morale with these soldiers is higher than it was during the Japanese war, because the people hate Chiang Kai-shek more than they did the Japanese, because they have gone through the land reform and because they look on the Liberated Areas as their own nation and feel they have a reason to defend their homes.

  "Leadership and education play an important part in raising morale. Leadership depends on the political education of the leader. He must believe in what he is fighting for and he must first of all love his soldiers, attending to their daily wants, their food and their sleeping before anything else. You ask is food, equipment or a political commissar more important for morales The care of material conditions is a part of leadership. Of course, if troops had no food, a political director would speak empty words.

  "Morale can go in waves. In general, with inexperienced troops, a lost battle, fatigue, sickness have bad effects. Raising morale under such circumstances again depends on leadership. Old soldiers are not so influenced by passing circumstances, but they demand more from leadership and so it is important with them too.

  "In new outfits, killed friends weakens morale; in old, it toughens morale. All our columns are composed solely of old soldiers. Local regulars are placed in new outfits where they can gradually develop morale.

  "Morale is far more important than economic conditions. If we should take economy as a basis for victory, we would have no confidence, as Chiang Kai-shek has a superior economy.

  "Our methods of building morale would be of no use in the American army because you have a different kind of society than we do. Our way of building morale depends on class consciousness and hardly could be used except in a revolutionary war.

  军队政工领导人把这些理论运用于实践的例子很多。战士被告诉说,他们来自被压迫阶级,他们所进行的战争就是为了消灭剥削。还向他们解释,这场内战是为他们自己,为了他们的解放,也是为了保护他们每个人。因此战士必学的第一课就是搞好军民关系。部队反复地教育战士,不可欺压老百姓,买东西一定要付钱,不许抢劫,住过的民房必须给人打扫干净,特别是不得使老百姓感到军队在侵犯他们的利益。自然,这样做是极端重要的,因为中国老百姓通常是憎恨丘八的。

  共产党这类政治教育所取得的成功,使任何对中国有所了解的人都感到惊奇。村干部和本地民兵对老百姓常常是很凶的,但很少听说八路军有这种事。八路军战士以自己的严明纪律及军民良好关系而自豪。军民关系的融洽,从战士对老乡亲热地称呼“大嫂”、“小兄弟”等等,也表现出来。然而比这些更能说明问题的是,人们看到靠近作战地区的农民带了猪、鸡走一、 二十里路到前线慰问战士,妇女们不给自己丈夫做鞋而给亲人八路军做鞋。这些妇女还把家中唯一的炕头腾出来给过路的战士休息,把自己的衣裳剪开做绷带,并参加庆祝部队打胜仗的活动。与美国为美军在物质上所做的比起来,这是微不足道的,但比起蒋管区来,八路军和农民之间的这种合作却是了不起的。请读者不要以为上面所说的言过其实。

  我或许应该说明,我在战时见过美国、英国、缅甸、印度、法国、德国、俄国和中国国民党的军队,却从来没有见过象中国共产党领导下的八路军这种类型的军队。在许多方面,八路军是与世界各国军队完全不同的。我想这主要是由于它不是从旧常备军产生的,而是从人民中产生的。极端危急的处境迫使共产党要建立一支民主的军队。附带说一句,就我所知,铁托元帅的南斯拉夫游击队是用这种方式组成的唯一的另一支军队。但你在中国共产党地区找不到任何人自称为元帅,也看不到任何穿着漂亮军装、胸前挂满勋章的人。当然,由于共产党很快就要取得全国政权,这种情况也许会改变。

  Examples of the way army political leaders put these theories into practice come readily to mind. Soldiers were told they came from an oppressed class and that the nature of the war they were fighting was to end exploitation. It was explained that the civil war was a war for themselves, for their emancipation and for their protection as individuals. The first lesson the soldier had to learn, therefore, was to cultivate good relations with the people. Incessantly the army dinned into the soldier's head that he could not molest the people, that he had to pay for everything he bought, that he could not loot, that he had to clean up rooms that he had used, that above all he must not make the people feel that the army was crushing their privileges. Naturally, this was of extreme importance, as the people of China have commonly hated all soldiers.

  The success of the Communists in this type of political training was amazing to anyone who knew anything about China. Village cadres and local militiamen were often extremely cruel to the people, but rarely could the same thing be said of the 8th Route Army whose soldiers were characterized by an extraordinary pride in their discipline and close relations with the people. Exterior signs of this friendliness could be seen in the special language they adopted toward the peasantry, such as "my big sister," "my younger brother" and so on. Far more revealing than any of these things, however, was to see peasants near the fighting areas carrying pigs and chickens ten and fifteen miles to the front to give the soldiers, to see women sewing shoes for their lovers in the army instead of for their husbands, to see these same women set aside their only beds as rest stations for traveling soldiers, cut up their skirts into bandages and join in celebrations of army victories. Pitiful efforts compared to what America does for her soldiers, but magnificent co-operation of peasantry and army when compared to Chiang Kai-shek's areas.

  Lest all the above sound starry-eyed, I should perhaps mention that I have seen the American, British, Burmese, Indian, French, German, Russian and Chinese Kucmintang armies in action, but I have never seen an army quite like the 8th Route Army led by the Chinese Communists. In many ways, it was absolutely unique among the armies of the world. I think this was principally due to the fact that much of it was not created from an old standing army, but out of the people themselves. The very desperateness of their position forced the Communists to form a democratic army. Offhand, the only other army that I know of that was formed in the same way was the Yugoslav partisans of Marshal Tito. But you will not find anyone in Chinese Communist territory who calls himself marshal nor will you find, anyone who dresses himself in a fancy uniform and besplatters himself with medals. This, of course, may change now that the Communists are moving toward total power.

  我想在这里介绍一下八路军的一种政治战术,这种战术可能是世界上任何其他军队从未采用过的。这就是八路军的诉苦会。

  今天,八路军(现在改称为人民解放军)是由三种战士组成的:老战士、共产党地区参军的农民新战士和俘虏兵。每打一仗,捉到俘虏后,部队就找一块空地开大会。一个老战士站起来讲他如何参加八路军,如何打仗,以及现在的生活。一个新战士讲他先是如何在村里受苦,如何打倒地主闹“翻身”以及从土改中得到什么果实。然后一个俘虏经过动员,也站起来讲他在蒋介石军队中的经历,讲他如何在村里被抓壮丁,如何在军队中挨打、挨饿等等。有些人诉的苦是如此悲惨可怕,以致铁石心肠的人听了也要哭起来。每个人都有自己的苦情,没有亲身经历,就讲父母受的苦。不消说,战士能向这么多充满同情的听众畅诉自己的苦楚,产生了非同小可的影响。

  中国人是有哲理的民族,而中国士兵是最有哲理的。同农民一样,单个的士兵总以为自己的命苦,但当他看到人人都有一本苦情帐时,就得出天下穷人是一家的结论。

  这种诉苦会在士兵心灵中造成的强烈反响,比指挥员或政治指导员言教的作用更大。这种教育的作用根本无法抵消。别的军队也无法仿效。因为如果蒋介石允许他的士兵诉苦的话,那么士兵们就可能起来反抗他们自己的长官。

  Here, I would like to tell about a political tactic that possibly has never been tried before by any army in the world. I refer to the use of the Speak Bitterness Meetings by the army.

  Today, the 8th Route Army - or as they are now calling it, the People's Revolutionary Army's composed of three kinds of soldiers: old soldiers, newly enlisted farmers from the Communist areas and prisoners of war. When a battle takes place and prisoners are captured, the army retires to an open field and holds a vast public meeting. An old soldier gets up and tells how he joined the 8th Route Army, how he fought and what kind of a life he leads. A new soldier tells of his bitterness on the land and how they "turned over" against the landlords and what results they got from the land reform. A prisoner then is persuaded to get up and talk about his life in Chiang Kai-shek's army. He tells how he was dragged from his farm, how he was beaten in the army, how he starved and so on. Some of these tales are so horrible and so filled with suffering that even the most hardened soldiers weep at hearing them. Each one has a different story. If he has not personally suffered, the soldier tells the sufferings of his parents. Needless to say, it is a tremendous experience for the soldier to be able to cry out his sorrows to a host of sympathetic listeners.

  Chinese are philosophical people, and a Chinese soldier is the most philosophical of them all. Like the peasant, the individual soldier thought it was his fate to suffer. But when he saw that everyone had his own store of bitterness, he reached the conclusion that all the poor were from the same family.

  These mass confessionals spoke far more forcibly to the heart of the soldiers than did the commanders or the political directors. There was absolutely no way to undermine such teaching. Nor could the method be copied. For had Chiang Kai-shek allowed his soldiers to reveal their bitterness, they might well have risen up against their own officers.

  当然,政委们利用这种诉苦会来给国民党俘虏兵上政治课。他们对国民党军官和士兵进行离间。他们对俘虏说:国民党的军官是地主和贪官污吏的子弟,他们的上辈剥削过你们的先人,而现在你们又当这些官老爷的奴隶。你们在前线打仗受罪,被打死了,压根儿也不会有人来给你们收尸,而那些有钱有势的人却在后方享福。当一个俘虏兵联系个人的苦情而控诉坏村长时,政委就把这件事联系到县长、省长、一直追到蒋介石头上。很快这个士兵就相信自己不共戴天的仇人不是县长而是中国的独裁者。政委就是这样引导俘虏兵从政治上来归纳问题的。

  这些新方法具有如此奇效大验,以致到了一九四七年年中,国民党的士兵白天被俘,晚上参加了一次诉苦会,第二天就参加八路军一边打仗了。在一九四七年以前,共产党总是把俘虏送到训练营去,后来由于对蒋军的政治瓦解工作成效这样显著,他们在许多地方不再觉得需要这种训练营了。

  Commissars, of course, took advantage of these meetings to point political lessons to Kuomintang prisoners. They tried to sow dissension between officers and men. They told captives that Kuomintang officers were the sons and brothers of landlords and corrupt officials, that their ancestors had exploited the soldiers?ancestors and that now they had become the slaves of superior officers. "You fight and suffer at the front," political directors told captives, "but nobody even picks up your corpse after you die, while the rich who have authority have a good time in the rear." When a captured soldier blamed an evil village chief for his troubles, the commissar would trace the action up to the magistrate and then to the governor and finally to Chiang Kai-shek. Pretty soon, the soldier came to the belief that his worst personal enemy was not the county chief, but the dictator of China. Thus the commissars taught captured soldiers to generalize politically.

  So effective were these new methods that even by the middle of 1947 Kuomintang soldiers captured one day would attend a political meeting the same night, and be fighting in the 8th Route Army the next day. Before 1947, the Communists used to send prisoners to training camps, but the political disintegration in Chiang's armies became so marked that in many places, they no longer felt the need of these camps.

  共产党在欢迎蒋军士兵参加八路军的同时,也释放那些愿意回到蒋介石地区去的俘虏。事实上,他们甚至还给俘虏发回家的路费。

  对于共产党的这种政策已经有如此众多的中外目睹者,其真实性是无可怀疑的。一个曾在满洲被共军俘虏的美国军官,谈到蒋军第八十八师的六千士兵如何被当作贵宾请去参加大会。在山东的一个美国姑娘谈到她参观过五十名被俘的国民党将官所在的俘虏营,看到他们的伙食和居住条件比八路军自己军官的待遇还好得多。最后,我自己在国民党地区时也亲眼见过被共产党释放的数以百计的俘虏涌过防线的情形。

  起初,国民党对于共产党瓦解蒋军的政治战术估计不足。他们不以为意地说:“纯系宣传!”但随着开小差的士兵日渐增多,并且在国民党军官领略了共产党政治战术的厉害后,他们开始感到惊慌起来。一位蒋军军官写道:“一听到此类事情(即诉苦会),怎教人能不伤心呢。如果我们想不出对付的办法,后果真不堪设想!”

  然而蒋军的颓势已成,再也想不出任何对付的办法了。就在我写这篇文字的时候,我看到美联社从中国发出的一则电讯,描述蒋军第八十二师参谋长马文庭将军如何下令屠杀共产党将军彭德怀部下被俘的五百名士兵的情景。美联社报导说:

  “面色冷酷无情的马文庭这样描述大批屠杀俘虏的场面,‘我们用大砍刀将他们的头一个挨一个地砍下来,用手榴弹将其余的俘虏炸死。’”

李根注:这些士兵是在西府陇东战役中被俘的。此役我军先胜后败,虽一度攻占宝鸡,歼敌2.1万,但出击过远,遭到胡宗南、马步芳夹击,撤退时受到较大损失。此役为彭德怀生平恨事之一。

  这些就是蒋介石的将军们的业绩。国民党和共产党对于俘虏的处理如此明显不同,以致不再需要参加评论了。这种不同之处,或许在一定程度上也是两军在战场上取得不同战果的原因之一。现在让我们看一看战场上的情形吧。

  While the Communists welcomed any soldier of Chiang's into the 8th Route Army, at the same time they also released any prisoner who wanted to go back to Chiang's side. As a matter of fact, they even gave prisoners traveling expenses to get home.

  There have been too many witnesses to this Communist policy, both Chinese and foreign, to doubt its authenticity. An American Army officer who was captured by the Communists in Manchuria tells how six thousand men of Chiang's 88th Division were brought to a mass meeting and treated as honored guests. An American girl in Shantung tells how she visited a camp for fifty captured Kuomintang generals and saw them getting far better food and living under better conditions than 8th Route officers. Finally, I myself, when in Kuomintang areas have seen hundreds of prisoners released by the Communists pouring across the lines.

  Originally, the Kuomintang had not paid much attention to the political tactics used by the Reds to break down their army. "Just propaganda" was their comment. But as more soldiers began to desert and as the Kuomintang officers learned about Red political undermining, they became terrified. "Upon hearing such things," (Speak Bitterness Meetings), wrote one of Chiang's officers, "how can one help but being heart-broken. Unless we can devise methods of counteraction, it will be simply horrible."

  But the army of Chiang Kai-shek was too far gone in dissolution to devise any methods of counteraction. As I was writing these words, there came to hand an Associated Press story out of China describing how General Ma Wen-ting, chief of staff of the 82nd Division, ordered the massacre of five hundred of the soldiers of Communist General Peng Teh-huai.

  "Without emotion," says the Associated Press, "the grim-visaged Ma described the mass killing of prisoners. 'We chopped off one head after another with our big broadswords. We finished the others off with hand grenades.'"

  Such were the exploits of Chiang Kai-shek's generals. The difference between Kuomintang and Communist treatment of prisoners is too striking to need comment.

  Perhaps the difference also accounts in some measure for the different results obtained on the field of battle. Let us look at this battlefield.