第十一章 内战

CHAPTER XI

CIVIL WAR

第五十节 共产党转入反攻
50. The Communists' Counteroffensive
  

  一九四七年春,蒋介石的军心已经动摇,蒋军军官的士气低落,全国后备力量日趋枯竭,而后方人民纷纷起来反抗,使得蒋军穷于应付。蒋介石的前线部队已经陷入人民战争的重围,马歇尔将军已返回美国,并明确表示对蒋介石爱莫能助。然而,蒋介石坐在南京的总统府里,未从其困境中学得谨慎一些,竟然铤而走险,干了一件极其伤天害理的事情。

  他利用了黄河变化莫测的特点来达到自己的目的。黄河不断地改道,有时经过山东有时经过江苏北部流入太平样。要使黄河改道,就像要改变中国本身一样,在中国人看来是违抗天意的。一九三八年,蒋介石扒开大堤,放黄河水南灌企图切断日本侵略军的道路,把他们挡在郑州城外。虽然他挡住了日本人,但是,十一个城市和四千个村庄惨遭淹没,两百万农民无家可归。

IN IHE spring of 1947, though the loyalty of his troops was shaky and the morale of his officers low, though his reserves throughout the country were getting closer to the bone, though rebellions were springing up in his rear and devouring troops that he could ill spare, though a people's war was spreading around his front line troops and though General George Marshall had returned to the United States and given every indication of abandoning him to his fate, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, instead of learning caution from his straitened circumstances, at his headquarters in Nanking, rashly gave sanction to a plan of grandiose proportions, yet of a dangerous and terrible nature.

  To his cause he summoned the treacherous nature of the Yellow River. The Yellow River over several thousand years has shifted its course from time to time, flowing now into the Pacific Ocean through Shantung, now through north Kiangsu. To tamper with the river is like tampering with China itself and, to Chinese, almost like defying God. In 1938, Chiang had cut its massive dikes and diverted the river south across the path of the invading Japanese to halt them before the town of Chengchow. In doing this he submerged eleven cities and four thousand villages and made two million peasants homeless, but he stopped the Japanese.

  现在,蒋介石又想把他当年所决的堤堵起来,使黄河回归北面的故道——即流进现在共产党占据的地区。不管这个行动的真正意图是什么,但它在军事上的作用将是在华北两支共产党大军——陈毅部和刘伯承部之间立起一堵水墙,将他们分割开来。要是刘伯承将军的部队被水拦阻不能前进了,蒋介石就可以抽调大量军队去攻打共产党的都城——延安。最后,改变黄河河道还可给山东省共产党的经济以沉重的打击,并造成一场悲惨的洪水灾难。

  一九四六年,联合国善后救济总署完全从为了治愈中国的战争创伤,必须使黄河回归故道考虑出发,在修复决堤的必要工程方面与蒋介石进行了合作。甚至连共产党也同意在工程上合作。但是,由联合国善后救济总署、共产党、蒋介石三方达成的协议是;在对那些在干涸的河床上耕种土地的农民做出安排以前,不能将黄河改回故道。这干涸的河床就是一九三八年以前黄河流经的地方。约有四十万山东农民在这里耕种着八十万英亩曾经是黄河河底的土地。他们中间的大多数人住在共产党的地区里。

  一九四六年,河堤本来是可以堵口的,但是,国民党的将军们要利用经过河南境内黄河故道上面的铁路往华北运兵,于是,他们干涉了联合国善后救济总署的工程计划。可是,到了一九四七年,战线已向东移,政府军不再需要用这段铁路了,他们就向“联总”施加压力要求堵口。

  Now Chiang wished to repair the breach he had made in the dikes and to send the river back once again to the north - that is, into Communist-held areas. No matter what was the real intention of such a move, its military effect would be to place a wall of water between the two main Communist armies in North China - those of General Chen-Yi and Liu Po-cheng - and split them apart. If Liu Po-cheng's raiders were immobilized with water, Chiang could also release enough troops for an attack on the Communist capital at Yenan. Finally, the switching of the course of the Yellow River at this time would deal a heavy blow to Communist economy in Shantung Province and might create an environment of flood and misery.

  UNRRA had been co-operating with Chiang Kai-shek in 1946 in the engineering work necessary to repair the broken dikes on the completely valid understanding that the. restoration of the old channel was necessary to heal China's war wounds. Even the Communists had agreed to cooperate in the work. But all three groups - UNRRA, Communists and Chiang's - were parties to an agreement that the river would not be diverted back to its old channel till provision had been made for the peasants who were tilling the dry bed where the river had flowed before 1938. There were some four hundred thousand of these Shantung farmers cultivating eight hundred thousand acres of land in what had once been river bottom - and most of them lived in Communist areas.

  During 1946, the dike might have been closed, but Nationalist generals were transporting troops north through Honan on a railway over the dried-up river bed and they interfered with UNRRA's work.(1) By 1947, however, the front had shifted to the east, the government troops no longer had need of the railway, and they brought heavy pressure on UNRRA to close the gap.
原注一:联合国善后救济总署1946年11月报告:"今年春季,由于国军要通过原黄河河道上的铁路向新乡运兵,黄河归故被迫推迟。现在,他们又跳出来,急吼吼地要求赶快堵口归故。"黄河归故必然牵扯到土地复垦,这一点报告中没有提到。 (1) Cf. UNRRA monthly report for November 1946. "Military objections which had hampered the work in the spring [1946] because of the danger to the Nationalist military supply line to Hsien Hsiang by rail across the dry bed, were withdrawn and replaced by demands for rapid closure." What military demands had to do with a land reclamation project the report does not disclose.

  共产党获悉蒋介石的意图之后;就要求“联总”履行三方协议。“联总”还在犹豫的时候,蒋介石的将军们立即动手堵口。同时,蒋介石的空军轰炸往山东运送筑堤和救济物资的“联总”船只,美制蒋机还扫射那些在自己村庄附近修筑河堤的农民们。

  每轰炸一次,运输工作就得停顿数周。山东人民面临着洪水的威胁,却被有意地剥夺了抗洪的手段。“联总”虽然也对蒋介石的轰炸提出抗议,但并末与蒋断绝关系。蒋介石本人是否考虑过他这个行动的政治后果,我们不得而知。

  这位中国独裁者作战一意孤行,从不计算这些悲惨的细节。他对自己的行动可能导致的后果似乎不以为意。他像一个神仙摆弄花园里的水管似的摆弄黄河。他居然下令黄河堵口。

  多少世纪以来,农民们都把黄河叫做“中国的忧患”。一点也不错。有近五百个村庄被淹没,十多万人民无家可归。据共产党称,大约五百万亩庄稼地被毁。

  Informed of Chiang's intentions, the Communists requested UNRRA to stick to the tripartite agreement. UNRRA wavered. Chiang's generals immediately moved to close the breach. At the same time, his pilots bombed UNRRA ships carrying dike-repair and relief materials to Shantung and his American fighter planes strafed farmers erecting dikes near their native villages.

  Each time a bombing occurred, shipping was paralyzed for weeks. The people of Shantung, under the threat of flood, were deliberately deprived of means to fight that flood. Though protesting Chiang's bombings, UNRRA did not break off relations with the generalissimo.

  Whether Chiang himself meditated on the political effects of what he was to undertake is something we do not know. China's dictator was accustomed to gaze steadily at war, he never added up the sorrowful details. He seems to have suffered no alarm at the possible consequences of his act. He played with the Yellow River as if he were a god playing with a garden hose. He gave the order for the breach to be closed. (2)

  "China's Sorrow," the peasants of many centuries have called the Yellow River, and China's Sorrow, indeed, it is. Within a short time of the closure of the breach, nearly five hundred villages were inundated, over one hundred thousand people were rendered homeless and, according to the Communists, almost five million mow of crop land were destroyed.

原注二:1947年三月,联合国善后救济总署农业部提交了一个更加冷血的报告。报告中说,整个黄河堵口归故是在“(国民党)黄河水利委员会主持下、联合国善后救济总署装备、粮食、建材、工程设计人员的大力支持下完成的。……最后的堵口在国民党要求下提前,违背了同共产党边区代表达成的协议。……黄河归故最直接的效果是分隔了共军的运动,而同时国军正在大举进攻。此时水位很高,回归故道后直接冲毁了农田。联合国善后救济总署、国民党行政院善后救济总署、边区代表共同制定的减轻黄河归故破坏的计划完全放弃。黄河故道的河堤修筑进行得十分困难,因为国民党军用飞机反复轰炸扫射筑堤工人。” (2) March 1947 report of UNRRA's Agricultural Division gives a more cold-blooded account of this whole affair. In part it declares that the closing of the breach "was carried out by the Yellow River Commission with UNRRA equipment, foodstuffs and construction materials and with the assistance of UNRRA engineering and mechanical personnel. . . . The final closure operations had been rushed under strong Nationalist military pressure and in disregard of agreements previously made with UNRRA and Border Region representatives. . . . Its immediate effect would be to divide the movements of their armies Concurrently with Nationalist military drives in that province, and in the high-water season would flood the agricultural lands in the river bed. Plans which UNRRA, CNRRA and Border Region personnel had made to alleviate the adverse economic effects of the river diversion . . . had not been carried out. Dike work was made difficult by frequent Nationalist air attacks upon the dike workers."

  灾难不是到此结束了。洪水除了立即淹没大片土地以外,还威胁着一千三百个座落在干涸河床上的村庄及其四十万人口。更惨的是,正值收割小麦的季节,农民们不得不抛弃他们的麦收而去抗洪。

  华北已经奋起反抗蒋介石军队,但现在似乎无法对付黄河了。这里有两件事情是很重要的:一是共产党的组织能力,二是山东人民的感情。下面是“联总”的一位官员对当时他旅行住过的一个地方,在解放区政府领导下进行抗洪战斗的描写:

  “无论走到哪里,给我的印象是都把修复黄河堤坝作为最重要的任务,仅渤海地区就动员了十万民工。在河北南部和山东西部,三十万人在二十五天内修筑了一座堤坝。由于遭到飞机扫射和大炮的轰击,死亡了九十六个民工。所以,白天人们只好隐蔽起来,晚上再回来修。政府官员们决不允许谈论万一修堤工程失败了该怎么办。工程非完成不可。要不是民工缺乏粮食,堤坝本来还会筑得更高一些。严重的问题是修筑工程占用太多农业劳动力,这样就必须尽可能地组织妇女和小孩来弥补。”

  至于洪水对老百姓的情绪方面的影响,我本人有充分的机会进行现实。真是无巧不成书,一九三八年蒋介石决堤的时候,我正和他的部队在一起,一九四七年“黄河归故”的时候,我恰好在共产党的地区。不同的是,头一次水灾给农民们带来悲哀,这一次水灾却激起了农民们的愤怒。中国农民是世界上待人最和气的,可是见了我甚至拒绝同我交谈,因为他们知道在他们修筑河堤的时候,轰炸他们的是美制飞机。

  有一位妇女,她的一个九岁的儿子被洪水淹死了。当我请她谈谈她的遭遇时,她答道:“俺恨你们,为啥要把俺的苦难对你们说呀?”

  在黄河口开垦土地达八年的另一些农民们,他们较为友好较为世故一些。他们对我说,“这是老蒋造的孽。你说俺们会咋想?”

  The tale of disaster was not finished at one blow. Besides those districts immediately flooded, the rising waters threatened to engulf twelve hundred river-bed villages and the four hundred thousand people living in them. Worse, still, it was just the time of the wheat harvest and the people had to abandon their fields and turn to halting the flood.

  North China had stood up against Chiang's armies, but now it seemed about to fall to the Yellow River. Two things, however, were of importance here: the Communists' organizing ability and the feelings of the Chinese people in Shantung Province.

  A picture of the fight the Liberated Area governments waged against the flood is given by an UNRRA official traveling through the region at the time.

  "Everywhere, I had the impression that dike repair was by far the most important concern. . . . One hundred thousand workers were employed in the Po Hai region alone. In south Hopei and west Shantung, three hundred thousand men built a dike within twenty-five days. Ninety-six workers were killed by planes and artillery, but the people, chased away in the daytime, came back at night to build the dikes. Government officials would never allow discussion in terms of what the situation would be if the dike repair were unsuccessful. It simply had to be successful. They would have built the dikes higher but for lack of food for the workers. . . . A major problem has been that the enormous amount of dike work has been a drain on their manpower for agricultural work and it has been necessary to organize women and children to fill the gap as much as possible."

  As for the effects of the flood on civilian morale, I myself had ample opportunity to observe them. By a curious coincidence, I was with Chiang's troops when he broke the dikes in 1938 and I was in Communist territory when the river was sent back again in 1947. But whereas the first flood had been for the peasants a cause of sorrow, this last flood was a cause of rage. Chinese peasants, who are among the most friendly people in the world, even refused to talk to me because they knew it was American planes that had bombed them while they were repairing the dikes.

  One woman, whose nine-year-old boy had been drowned in the flood, when I asked her to tell me her story, answered: "I hate you. Why should I tell you my bitterness?"

  Other farmers, more friendly and more worldly, who had labored eight years to reclaim the land around the river mouth, said to me: "Old Chiang did this. How do you think we feel?"

  人们的愤怒以及政治后果,恐怕蒋介石是不加以考虑的。但是,更严重的是他那些军事策划反而对他自己更不利。蒋介石引来黄河水把东面的陈毅将军部和居中的刘伯承将军部隔开时,也许想到也许没有想到牵制刘伯承将军。不管怎样,他把对付这位独眼将军的中部前线的部队全部调去攻打远在西边的荒凉的陕西省里的共产党首都延安。

  我们不免要问:他为什么要这样做?这实在叫人迷惑不解。拿下敌人的首都往往对一场战争具有决定性的作用。攻下巴黎,就得到了法国;拿下柏林,就征服了德国。但是,如果说拿下首都就是摧毁了敌人的抵抗能力的话,那么,这个首都不仅应该是国家政权的中心,而且至少也是政治集会和党派活动的场所。然而,延安却不是这样。它根本不是国家的中心,因为当时共产党还没有建立国家。七个边区都各有自己的政府和部队其中任何一个都比延安强大。再说延安只不过是个窑洞村子,也不是在重要的交通线上,而是共产党大本营驻地,随时都准备撤走。抗蒋的中心地点不在延安,而是在从满洲到黄河的平原上的八千万农民、民兵和军队中间。蒋介石要拿下延安,就象一个人花了他的大部分金钱去买一串闪烁发光的金刚钻项链,结果却发现是假的一样。

  那么,他为什么还要去攻打延安呢?理由看来主要是和他的威信有关。因为好几个月以来他未能向他自己的人或向外界显示他取得了任何决定性的胜利。人民对战争已厌倦了,而且国内外也给他施加了压力,要求他实现和平。这个时候,四大国正在莫斯科举行会议。美国总统杜鲁门作了反共演说。希腊已得到或正在得到美国的援助。蒋介石想向国内人民和外部世界露一手,以争取美国的援助来打共产党。唯一能露一手的就是去打延安。

  蒋介石把中共代表从他的首都南京驱逐之后,就向中国共产党的首都进军了。在他的兵马扬起的尘土后面,如果蒋介石有眼光的话,理应看出一场风暴即将来临的隐隐约约的迹象。

  The people's anger and its political consequence perhaps had not entered into Chiang's calculations; but, even worse, those military calculations he had made were to betray him yet further.

  By hurling the Yellow River between General Chen Yi in the east and General Liu Po-cheng in the center, the generalissimo may or may not have thought to immobilize Liu. Anyway he denuded his own central front before the one-eyed general and transported his troops far to the west for an attack on Yenan, the Communist capital in desolate Shensi Province.

  Again, we must ask: Why? And this time our puzzlement is great. To take an enemy's capital can often be of decisive importance in war. Capture Paris and you have France. Take Berlin and you conquer Germany. But if the capture of a capital city is to ruin the power of an adversary to resist, that capital should not only be the center of the power of the state but, in addition, at least the seat of political assemblies and factions. But Yenan was none of these things. It certainly was not the center of a state, for no Communist state as such existed, and any one of seven Border Regions, with their own governments and their own military forces, was stronger than Yenan. Moreover, Yenan, a mere cave village, lay on no important communication route, and was a headquarters camp, ready to be struck at a moment's notice. The heart of the resistance to Chiang Kai-shek did not lie here, but down on the plains among eighty million peasants, militia and troops from Manchuria to the Yellow River.

  For Chiang to take Yenan was like a man spending a great part of his fortune on a diamond necklace that glitters, but turns out to be paste.

  Why then did he attack it? His reasons seem to have been those mostly connected with prestige. For many months he had not been able to present either his own people or the outside world with any decisive victory. His people were tired of the war and there was still pressure from abroad and from within for him to make peace. At this time, the Big Four was holding a conference in Moscow. President Truman's anti-Communist speech was in the making. Greece was to be given or had been given American help. Chiang wanted to impress his own people, impress the world and get American help to fight Communism. The only thing impressive within reach was Yenan.

  Having dismissed his enemy's representatives from his own capital at Nanking, Chiang marched on the capital of Chinese Communism. Behind the dust raised by his soldiers?feet, had he the eyes to see, the generalissimo might have discerned the faint signs of a threatening storm.

  延安已是一座空城。共产党早就把他们的军校、医院、甚至军队都转移了。他们没有为保卫自己珍爱的首都而战。共产党主席毛泽东、军队总司令朱德将军以及党的其他高级领导人悄悄地离开了这座城市。即使在其他地方也没有为延安的丢失而感到惊慌。共产党人和农民们对此都只是耸耸肩,不以为意。

  共产党人几乎没有在延安后面的山上停留,而是继续向北、显然是急速地逃走了。他们越深入山区,离开黄河平原的主要战场就越远。蒋军紧追不舍。

  战争的转折点来到了。

  Yenan was empty. Long before, the Communists had sent their schools, their hospitals, even their troops elsewhere. For their precious capital they put up no fight. Mao Tze-tung, chairman of the Communist party, and General Chu Teh, commander in chief of the army, and other high party leaders left the city without a murmur. Even elsewhere the loss of Yenan created no great stir. Communists and peasants, alike, both shrugged their shoulders.

  The Communists hardly paused in the hills behind Yenan, but continued north, apparently in precipitate flight. Ever deeper they went into the mountains, ever further they got away from the main battleground of the Yellow River Plain. Chiang's troops followed.

  The turning point in the war had come.
  

  共产党人跟乔.路易斯一样,都是杀回马枪的能手。他们只要一发现敌人的破绽就猛打。象当年的垒球名手威利,基勒一样,“专找对方的空子打”。

  在山东和陕西之间,蒋介石把自己的中路河南暴露出来,好象把长江流域自己的老巢大开门户,邀请共产党进去似的。我们甚至可以说,即将到来的这场灾难完全是蒋介石自作自受。共产党往河南这个缺口灌的不是黄河水,而是独眼龙刘伯承的大军。这一下子可把蒋介石打蒙过去了。蒋介石没有想到共产党能发起进攻。他的美国顾问也没有料到。早在战争初期,曾有位较有见识的美国军人告诉华盛顿,如果没有外界的干预,中国的内战将会进行二十年、三十年、甚至五十年。这种观点曾被认为是过激的,因为大多数人都认为蒋介石至少能打开铁路交通和名义上统一中国。而就连那些最激进的观察家们,看到共产党没有补给基地,没有现代化运输部队,没有重武器,也断言共产党不可能发动一场进攻。甚至在我亲眼看到这场进攻打响数个月之后,一些美国军事家还嘲笑我说:“别胡扯啦,共产党决无能力发动进攻的。”

  然而,共产党持有不同的观点。他们说:“这场战争是革命战争,它受特殊条件的制约。抗日战争要经历三个阶段,这场战争则将只有两个阶段,它不会出现长期相持的局面。”

  The Communists, like Joe Louis, are counterfighters. When they see an opening they strike. Like the old-time baseball player, Willie Keeler, they "hit 'em where they ain't."

  Between Shantung and Shensi, Chiang had denuded his own center in Honan. It was as if he had opened the door to his own house in the Yangtze Valley and invited the Communists in. We might almost say that the coming disaster originated in Chiang Kai-shek's own brain. The Communists poured, not the waters of the Yellow River into the gap in Honan, but the columns of the One-Eyed Dragon, Liu Po-cheng.

  This move caught Chiang Kai-shek off balance. Chiang did not believe the Communists could launch an offensive. Nor did his American advisers. Early in the war, a few of the wiser American military men had told Washington that if there were no outside intervention, the civil war in China would go on for twenty, thirty and even fifty years. These views were considered radical, for most Americans thought Chiang could at least open the railways and nominally unify the country. But even the most radical observers, noting that the Communists had no supply bases, no modern transportation corps and no heavy equipment, flatly declared that Communists could not launch an offensive. Even months later, after I had seen this offensive launched, some American military men laughed at me. "Forget it," they said, "the Communists will never be able to attack."

  The Communists, however, had reached a different view. "This war has a revolutionary nature," they said, "and is governed by a special set of conditions. The Japanese war had three stages, but this war will have only two stages. There will be no long period of stalemate."

  共产党现正沿着黄河一线把他们的这种理论付诸实践。他们发起了进攻。他们采取的第一步是,进行准备和隐蔽。这一步由民兵和游击队执行(他们在安阳的行动我已描写过了)。袭击的目的是掩护更大的正规军的行动。这支正规军现已插入晋南和豫北,并开始夺取蒋介石因调兵攻打延安而留下的守备虚弱的城市。突然,刘伯承停止了进攻似乎是打了败仗的样子。其实他并没有被打败,而是达到了自己的主要目的,那就是在山中开辟一条走廊,让陈毅将军的部队开到黄河附近的阵地。

  与此同时,在东面靠近山东省的地方也在进行同样的准备。刘伯承的一支游击队已经过了黄河,插到陇海线以南国民党战线的背后。当蒋介石搞“黄河归故”的时候,刘伯承沉着地命令这支游击队留在原地,呆在河南境内,在荒无人烟的老洪区,忍饥挨饿,进行游击,收集情报,待机而动。

  同时,刘伯承挥师过黄河他的主力部队约有五万人,拉开了一条一百英里长的战线。部队分成好多个纵队,每个纵队约五千人,随军还有大批男女干部,他们是政府官员、地方负责人以及土改工作者等。只有身强力壮的青年才允许首批渡河,因为刘伯承打算深入敌后,他不希望放慢行军速度。战士们聚集在黄河边上的村庄里,他们身穿灰军装,头戴灰制帽,和初夏炎热阳光烘烤下的平原扬起的尘土的颜色很一致。六月,刘伯承向各纵队发表讲话,告诉他们,等待已久的反攻就要开始了。留在河岸附近的士兵们观看战地文工队的演出,并领取了比以往任何一次都要多的弹药。这一带农舍土墙上粉刷的旧标语脱落了。一夜之间,在原地方出现了“打倒蒋介石”、“打到南京去,活捉蒋介石“等口号。

  Along the Yellow River, the Communists now put this theory to the test. They attacked.

  Their first step was one of preparation and concealment. This was carried out by the militiamen and the guerrilla forces (whose actions in Anyang I have already described). The purpose of these raids was to screen the movement of a larger regular armed force which now moved into southern Shansi and northern Honan, and began to take over the ill-garrisoned towns which Chiang had abandoned to make his attack on Yenan. Abruptly Liu halted his attack, and it seemed as if he had been beaten. But Liu had not been beaten, he had achieved his main purpose of opening a mountain corridor for the passage of the troops of General Chen Kang, into position near the Yellow River.

  At the same time, over on the east near Shantung Province, similar preparations went on. Liu already had a force of guerrillas across the Yellow River and south of the Lunghai Railway behind Kuomintang lines. When Chiang had changed the course of the Yellow River, Liu had calmly ordered these guerrillas to stay where they were, and they had remained in Honan, wandering around, half starving, in the deserted areas of the old flooded regions, gathering information and lying low until they were needed.

  In the meantime, Liu collected his main force for the crossing of the Yellow River. There were about fifty thousand of them. They formed a front a hundred miles in length. They were divided into many columns perhaps five thousand men each and they had behind and with them a number of men and women - government officials, district magistrates, land reform workers. Only the most healthy young people were allowed to go on this first crossing, for Liu was going far through enemy country and he did not wish to be slowed up. The men gathered in the mud villages near the river wore gray uniforms and gray peaked caps that matched the ancient dust rising from the plain baking under an early summer heat. In June, Liu addressed his columns, telling them that the long-awaited counterattack was about to begin. The soldiers remained near the bank of the river watching plays performed by their regimental combat teams and drawing the biggest supply of ammunition they had ever been issued. At the same time, behind them the old whitewashed slogans began to come off the mud walls of peasant homes. In their places, overnight, appeared the words: "Strike down Chiang Kai-shek. Get to Nanking and capture Chiang Kai-shek alive!"

  六月三十日夜里,独眼刘突破一百英里长的防线,乘船渡过了黄河。与此同时,陈庚将军也从山西出击,在西边若干英里的地方渡河,并攻占了陇海路西半段。这一军事行动把蒋介石在西北的四十万军队全部围困在潼关以西,切断了他们和中国其他地方一切铁路交通联系,使蒋失掉了一旦南京告急时可以迅速调来的援兵。这个惊人之举是刘亲自筹划部署的。

  我阅历过多次战争,但却从未见过比共产党这次和以后抢渡黄河更为高明出色的军事行动。说它高明出色,倒不在于这次军事行动本身,尽管没有行动一切都将是空的,而主要在于对这一军事行动的构思——它的胆识、气魄、特别是它的创造性的想象力。中国共产党的军事领导人在以下这一件事上堪称为大师:他们善于抛弃不重要的方面,而紧紧抓住主要环节。例如,刘伯承离开华北老根据地时,他的后方还留下一些国民党军队驻守的城镇。他不去触动它们已有两年,尽管他的部下经常不赞同他的做法,而主张拔掉那些国民党防守较弱的据点。他向我解释说,留下那些据点对他毫无妨害,而攻打它们则自己也要伤亡,得不偿失。

链接:刘伯承《鲁西南大捷的重要意义》

  On the night of June 30th, One-Eyed Liu broke open a front a hundred miles long and slid across the river in boats. At the same time, many miles to the west, General Chen Kang, coming out of Shansi, crossed the river and seized the western half of the Lunghai Railway. This move bottled up four hundred thousand troops of Chiang Kai-shek's army of the northwest behind Tungkwan Pass, deprived them of all rail communications with the rest of China and deprived Chiang of a source of quick help should he ever need it in Nanking. The spectacular move, however, was made by Liu himself.

  I have seen a great deal of war, but I don't think I have ever seen anything more brilliant than these and subsequent moves the Communists made across the Yellow River. The brilliance lay not so much in the execution, even though all would have been in vain without it, but in the conception - the daring, the single-mindedness, and above all the creative imagination of it. Chinese Communist military leaders are great masters of one thing: they know how to discard what is not essential and strike directly for what is essential. Liu Po-cheng, for example, as he departed from his old bases in North China left a number of towns garrisoned by Kuomintang troops in his rear. He had been doing this for almost two years, often with the disapproval of his subordinates who wanted to wipe out the weaker of these garrisons, because, as he explained to me, they could do him no harm and the men they might lose in such attacks would not be worth the possible gains.

  刘渡过黄河后,尽量不恋战,因为他的任务是直插蒋介石的老窝长江流域。他到达那里之后,就要拖住尽可能多的蒋军,以便共军其他部队也可以跟在他的后面渡过黄河,在华中站稳脚跟。这项计划的全部意图是要开辟一个新的战场,直捣蒋介石的老窝。

  在汉口和南京之间,沿长江有一条山脉叫大别山。抗日战争时期,一支和共产党新四军有联系的小股游击队在这里建立过根据地。可是他们后来被蒋介石赶跑了,临走时,留下了地下工作人员。这些人现在开始准备迎接刘的到来。

  刘的任务不是在一个地方停下来作战,而是要长驱二百多英里,把部队开到深入长江流域的地方去。他的进攻,既无后续部队的支援,又得不到后方的补给,多少带有空投作战或骑兵孤军深入突袭敌区的性质,但又不仅仅是一次突袭,因为刘打算在他所去的地方建立一个新的社会。

  Now Liu, as he crossed the Yellow River, fought as few battles as he could, for it was his mission to head toward the Yangtze Valley, Chiang Kai-shek's stronghold. Once there, he was to attract as many of Chiang's troops as he could so that other Communist forces, following behind him, might also cross the river and establish themselves in Central China. The whole idea behind this plan was to open up a new theater of war and strike directly against Chiang's bases of power.

  Down along the Yangtze River, between Nanking and Hankow, lies a range of hills known as the Ta Pieh Mountains. During the Japanese war a small band of guerrillas who had allied themselves with the Communist New Fourth Army had established bases here. Later they had been driven out by Chiang Kai-shek, but on their departure, they had left underground workers behind, who now began to prepare for Liu's arrival.

  Liu's mission being not to stop and fight, but to get into the Yangtze Valley some 200 miles away, his attack, unsupported by follow-up columns and unsupplied from the rear, had somewhat the character of a parachute drop or a cavalry raid deep into enemy territory. It was, however, more than a raid, for Liu planned to build up a new society where he was going.

  刘渡过黄河后,进行了一连串迷惑敌人的迂回行动。在他先前留下的游击队的向导下,他在徐州以西跨过陇海路,进入防守薄弱的睢县,补充了武器弹药,招募了一些新兵,然后又向西向南进军。除了遭遇一些地方武装外,他一路畅行无阻,飞速前进。

  他在一片不见树木庄稼的荒凉地区一连行军好几天,那里整个整个的村庄都被一九三八年的洪水冲没了。然后他进入安徽绿色的山区,跨山进入湖北省,就这样走出了华北的谷子地,进入了长江流域的水稻田。

  刘的部队每到一个城镇,都打开国民党宫家的粮仓,补充自己的军需后,把剩下的粮食救济穷人以收民心。地方武装的枪支,未经任何抵抗都被他们收缴了。贫农、雇农以及想出去见世面的青年踊跃要求参军。刘的部队增加了数千名新兵,继续向南挺进。

  国民党的报纸说:“刘伯承部过黄河后陷入重围,现正向南逃窜。”

  After Liu had crossed the Yellow River, he made a series of distracting maneuvers. Guided by the guerrillas he had left behind, he crossed the Lunghai Railway east of Hsuchow, entered the lightly held town of Suiteh, stocked up on arms, gathered a few recruits and then turned west and south. He was in the clear with nothing but local troops in his way and he moved fast.

  For several days he marched across a barren desolate area where whole villages had been wiped out during the flood of 1938; then he entered the green hills of Anhui, crossed over into Hupeh Province and came out of the millet lands of North China into the rice fields of the Yangtze Valley.

  In town after town, Liu's troops broke open the official grain stores of the Kuomintang, replenished their own stocks and distributed the remainder to the poor as a propaganda measure. Local rifles fell into his hands without a struggle. Pauperized tenants, landless peasants, adventure-seeking boys flocked to join him. With his forces increased by many thousands Liu pressed south.

  "General Liu Po-cheng," said Kuomintang papers, "is trapped below the Yellow River and is fleeing south."

  刘继续“逃窜”。

  刘到了大别山,在那里设立起他的指挥部,但他的先头部队继续前进。在离汉口六十英里的地方,他的侦察部队和一个团的四川军队遭遇。据说一个共产党士兵喊了一声“打倒蒋介石!”他是否真的喊了这个口号,我们不得而知,但不管怎样,蒋军听了就放下武器,向刘投诚了。

  九月,刘的部队到达长江边上。他派出几批干部化装为普通旅客模样渡江潜入江西。江西是红军十三年前进行著名的长征时离开的省份。这些干部开始在山区发动农民群众。这些农民是因为逃避抓壮丁而弃家上山变成“土匪”的。刘的部队在几天之内用炮火封锁了江面, 使中国最重要的水路交通一时中断。

  国民党再也不能把这样大规模的进军唤做“逃窜”了。海军被从海上调进了长江,为取得刘的首级而悬赏了几十亿元法币。最后,为了防备刘“逃窜”到首都南京,蒋介石被迫设立华中剿总,开辟了一条新战线。

  Liu fled on.

  Liu reached the Ta Pieh Mountains and set up his headquarters. His advance columns, however, continued forward. Sixty miles from Hankow, a Szechuan regiment came out to attack his scouts. A Communist soldier is said to have shouted the words: "Down With Chiang Kai-shek!" Whether he actually shouted out these words or not, we don't know; but at any rate, Chiang's troops downed their arms and came over to Liu's side.

  In September, Liu's forces reached the Yangtze River. Small bands of his cadres, disguised as ordinary travelers, crossed into Kiangsi, the province the Reds had left thirteen years before to undertake their famous Long March, and there in the hills began to stir up peasants who had fled from their homes to escape conscription and had become bandits. Within a few days, Liu's forces had interdicted the river with fire so that for a time traffic ceased on China'S most important waterway.

  No longer could the Kuomintang call this tremendous advance a flight. The navy was summoned from the ocean and sent up the Yangtze. Several billion dollars' reward was offered for Liu'S head. Finally, lest Liu flee into the capital of Nanking itself, Chiang was forced to organize a Central China Command and open up a new front.

  国民党对刘开辟新战场的计划已告成功的这种默认,和共产党想继续把其部队由华北转移到华中来的更远大的意图正相吻合。正是为了这个目的,刘的部队才远离他们的老根据地,在暂时得不到任何支援的情况下艰苦奋战,尽可能多地吸引蒋军。原来共产党在这次打进国民党统治区的大攻势中还有一支异军突起。陈毅将军派出一支部队跟在刘的后面,杀出山东,和留在苏北东部沿海的游击队会合。陈、刘两支大军在陇海路上一东一西互相配合,最后把开封、兰封和郑州都包围起来。而这些都是蒋为了保卫南京必须加以固守的城市。

  在刘之后,至少又有六位共军高级将领渡过黄河进入华中。他们的部队逐渐连成一片,同时派人去同汉口、南京、上海的地下工作者取得联系,开始准备一九四八年春对蒋发起又一次攻势。

  This confession on the part of the Kuomintang that Liu had succeeded in his plans to open a new front fell in with larger Communist designs to bring other armies out of North China into Central China. Because of this, Liu'S troops far from their old bases and without any chance of quick help, fought hard to attract as many of Chiang'S soldiers as they could. For the Communists had another shot in their great offensive to establish themselves in Kuomintang territory.

  In Liu'S path, General Chen Yi sent a number of his troops out of Shantung to link up with guerrillas on the east who had remained in north Kiangsu near the sea. At the same time both Liu and Chen worked east and west along the Lunghai Railway, until they had isolated Kaifeng, Lanfeng and Chengchow, all cities that Chiang had to hold if he was to hold Nanking.

  Following Liu, at least six top-ranking Communist generals crossed the Yellow River into Central China. Slowly joining forces, they made connections with agents in Hankow, Nanking and Shanghai and began preparations for another offensive which was to strike Chiang in the spring of 1948.

  在共产党进入国民党统治区后,那里一片慌乱。

  蒋的政权机构顿时从四面八方一齐垮了下来。“共产党已经打到长江流域”的惊呼声过后,一些人开始指责蒋介石。这种众叛亲离之势虽然还不快,还不全面,但却是空前的。当时旅居美国的基督将军冯玉祥不但拒绝回国,反而号召他的旧部起来反蒋。从前蒋介石行辕的主任李济深从香港再度鼓动华南起义。天府之国四川省的军阀感到农民不满的压力,也叫嚷要削减由长江水路运给陷于困境的蒋军的大米供应。共产党的钞票第一次在上海的浦东一带出现。在其他地区,共产党钞票的币值猛涨为国民党钞票币值的三、四十倍。在后方,骚乱蜂起。在远离战线的华南,游击队和“土匪”占领了广东省大片地方。农民面临苛捐重税,为了逃避抓壮丁要付三、四百万元法币,他们走投无路,只好上山为“匪”。学生们骚动起来,商人们自愿捐款充当共产党的军费,男女青年纷纷逃往共产党地区。

  蒋介石为了阻止崩溃之势,在国民党内进行清洗,宣布取缔民主同盟,加强还剩在他身边的秘密警察,逮捕了北平战区司令官孙连仲将军下属作战部的一些军官。他提醒国民党员说他们是一个革命党,但一切努力统归无效。现在国民党的组成人员部是一些老年人,他们对革命己感到厌倦。中国内战就这样到了一个转折点。

  The atmosphere after the Communists came into Kuomintang territory was melancholy.

  Chiang'S political structure yielded suddenly on all sides simultaneously. The cry, "The Communists are in the Yangtze Valley," is followed by a number of denunciations of Chiang Kai-shek. The disintegration is not rapid, nor complete, but it is unprecedented. Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian general who had come to America, refuses to return to China and exhorts his former subordinates to rebel. Li Chi-sen, former head of the generalissimo's headquarters, from Hongkong issues a new call for South China to revolt. The warlords of fabulously rich Szechuan, feeling the pressure of peasant discontent, cry out for a decrease of their rice shipments along the Yangtze to Chiang's hard-pressed armies. Communist money appears for the first time in Pootung, the Brooklyn of Shanghai. In other areas, the value of Communist money skyrockets to thirty and forty times the value of Kuomintang money. Everywhere in the rear, unrest spreads. Guerrillas and bandits take over great areas of Kwangtung in South China far from the fighting fronts. Farmers in desperation, before brutal taxation and conscription that demands they pay three to four million dollars to avoid being kidnaped into the army, take to the hills as bandits. Students grow uneasy, shopkeepers contribute voluntarily to Communist war funds. Boys and girls flee to the Communist areas.

  Chiang tries to halt the disintegration, he purges the Kuomintang, he outlaws the Democratic League, he erects walls from what is left him of his gestapo, he arrests officers of the operation department of General Sun Lien-chung, head of his war area in Peiping; in vain does he recall to the members of the Kuomintang that they are a revolutionary party; the Kuomintang is now composed of old men and they are tired of revolutions. Such was the turnabout that came in China's civil war.

  共产党是如何迎接这个新局面呢?他们立即表明决不妥协,而且抛弃了与蒋介石言和的一切伪装。他们现在的口号是:“必须打倒蒋介石”。八路军总司令朱德宣布他的军队的目标是推翻蒋介石,组织联合政府。关于这次攻势,毛泽东在一九四七年圣诞节宣布,“这是一个历史的转折点。这是蒋介石的二十年反革命统治由发展到消灭的转折点。这是一百多年以来帝国主义在中国的统治由发展到消灭的转折点。”这位共产党领袖的预言会实现吗?这个问题当时还不能回答。

  到山东看了水灾地区情况,又折回河南看了反攻的开始,我确信战争的转折点已经到来,于是立即动身穿过华北平原踏上归途,打算回到北平把这事件向外部世界报导。

  How did the Communists greet this new situation? They immediately burned all their bridges behind them and abandoned any pretense of making a peace with Chiang Kai-shek. The cry now is: "Chiang must go."
Chu Teh, commander in chief of the 8th Route Army, declares the objective of his army is to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and organize a coalition government. On Christmas Day 1947, Mao Tze-tung announces: the offensive is "a turning point in history. It signals the end of the counterrevolutionary role of Chiang Kai-shek and the end of more than a hundred years of rule of imperialism in China."

  Was this Communist leader right? For the moment that question would have to remain unanswered.

  After going to Shantung to see the flooded areas, then returning to Honan to see the counteroffensive get underway, I was convinced that a turning point in the war had come, and I immediately started back across the North China Plain, intent on getting to Peiping and telling these events to the outside world.