第十二章 独夫单挑人民

CHAPTER XII

DICTATOR VS. PEOPLE

第五十一节 共和党与蒋介石
51. The Republican Party and Chiang Kai-shek

  我离开解放区回到南京和上海以后,看到一种现像:由于蒋介石未能迅速打赢战争,他的政府内部的关系越来越紧张。南京和上海是蒋介石的统治中心,无论在地理上还是在精神上,都远离农村和前线,感受不到农村的激烈动乱和前方军队日益增长的不满情绪。然而,战争的种种麻烦问题,还是在蒋家官僚统治机构内部,造成了心理上和物质上的紧张。

  不过,表面上一切还是几乎同往常一个样。一九四七年夏天,国民党的将领们和宣传部门的人员宣称华北境内的共军已经基本剿灭,只消进行一些扫尾的战斗。大学教授和胆子较大的一些民主人士,对政府的腐败无能进行激烈抨击。学生们示威游行,要求和平。美国人在进行幕后活动,竭力劝说蒋介石撤换一些不称职的将领,起用美国所瞩目的人选。但是,腐败的风气依然如故,毫无改变,最高当局的内战叫嚣比以前更响:那些无能的将领照旧在前方高踞要职。

  我刚到中国的时候,一美元可兑换蒋介石的法币七千元,现在涨到了三十万元。贫民露宿街头,每天都有冻死骨。黄包车夫串通一气,夜间在大马路上抢乘客的东西,遭殃的既有中国人也有外国人。物价飞涨,城市里无家可归、到处流浪的人不断增多。而富贵人家却仍然是朱门酒肉臭,奢侈不减当年。

I EMERGED from the Liberated Areas and returned to Nanking and Shanghai to find a sharpening tension in government circles over Chiang Kai-shek's failure to bring the war to a successful and speedy conclusion. These strongholds of the generalissimo were far removed, both physically and spiritually, from the passionate disturbances in the countryside and the growing discontent in the army on the front. Nevertheless, the troubles of the war had produced psychological and material strains within Chiang's governing bureaucracy.

  On the surface, however, everything remained much as before. Generals and propagandists in the summer of 1947 were proclaiming that the Communists had been all but wiped out in North China and only mopping-up operations remained. The professors and some of the more daring liberals were raging against corruption and inefficiency. The students were parading for peace. The Americans were conducting behind-the-scenes activities trying to persuade Chiang to remove some of his less-talented generals in favor of men the Americans preferred. But the corruption continued unabated, the voices for war in the highest circles shouted louder than ever and the same inefficient generals held on to their positions at the front.

  The exchange which had been seven thousand of Chiang Kai-shek's dollars to one American dollar when I arrived in China was now up to three hundred thousand. People were sleeping in the streets and dying every day. Ricksha boys were operating in gangs, robbing both Chinese and foreigners on the main str~eets at night. Everything was growing more dear and the homeless in the cities were increasing all the time. But the leavings of the old feast were still plentiful.

  官老爷们坐着价值七千美元的小轿车,招摇过市。经销这些汽车的美国进口商人,坐在美侨俱乐部里,喝着苏格兰威士忌酒,为降临中国的艰难岁月唉声叹气。豪华的饭馆酒楼里,大摆丰盛的宴席。乡下的农民正在吃糠咽菜:而上海那些达官富商,却是吃不尽的山珍海味,骂不完的共产党和蒋介石。他们一餐吃五大碗,什么清蒸桂鱼、金钱鸡、北京烤鸭,应有尽有。他们一边喝着烫热的黄酒,一边对菜肴的鲜美赞不绝口。农村燎原的战火并没有妨碍人们寻欢作乐,百老汇大厦十八层楼上的外国记者俱乐部里,人们在五光十色的彩灯下翩翩起舞,白俄交际花同美国太太们在一起厮混,异口同声地辱骂中国人。战争没有妨碍美军人员在中国名义上享有主权的领土上举行家庭式聚会,也未能制止猖獗的黑市投机。人们照样关起门来赌博,上海每家中国人开的大旅馆里都可以公开吸食鸦片。

  尽管一切都还是老样子,但是谁的心里也不踏实。农村的暴风骤雨虽然离得还远,但是南京政府的衙门里已经可以听到它的震响。军事部门的人全都知道,连稍有见识的文职官员也是心里有数的。

  华北的大势已去,却对长江流域的公众隐瞒了事情的真相和严重的程度。人们对于共产党地区的情况毫无所知,真使我感到吃惊。我对一些外国官员说,共产党已经开始反攻,他们听了直瞪我,以为我是疯了似的。有一个高级军官说,“算了吧,共产党没有什么武器,根本没有能力反攻。”许多观察家听信了国民党的宣传,也以为共军渡过黄河只是溃逃,或者不过是袭扰一下。美国《时代》杂志驻南京记者声称,刘伯承将军率部渡过黄河是毫无意义的,因为军队没有根据地不能打仗。我说农民正纷纷加入独眼龙刘伯承的军队,反对南京政府。驻南京某使馆的一个外交官说,这完全是共产党的“一派胡言”。在这伙专门家眼里,只有美国的外交政策了不起,好像它是存在于真空之中的什么法宝似的,农民算得了什么?

  Officials rode around in cars bought up at seven thousand dollars American money from American importers who moaned in their Scotch and water at the American Club about the hard times that had come to China. Sumptuous parties were in progress in the dining rooms of expensive restaurants. Out in the country the peasants were eating millet husks. But here in Shanghai, officials and businessmen, their mouths full of food and curses for both the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek, were eating five bowls of rice at one sitting and complimenting one another on the tastiness of the Mandarin Fish, the Gold Coin Chicken, the fatted Peiping Duck and the specially warmed yellow wine. The war raging in the countryside did not prevent the parties in the foreign correspondents' club atop the eighteen-story Broadway Mansions, where dancing went on under gaily colored lights and where White Russian mistresses mingled with American wives and both cursed the Chinese; it did not prevent the horny gatherings of American Army personnel on China's supposedly sovereign soil, nor did it put a halt to the wild black market speculation or the gambling behind closed doors or the open smoking of opium in every maj or Chinese hotel in Shanghai.

  All remained as before yet nobody felt sure of himself. The storm in the countryside, though distant, nevertheless reverberated in the yamens of the Nanking government. All the Chinese army was aware of it and even the more discerning civilian officials.

  The nature and the scope of the dissolution in North China, however, was at this time well concealed from the general public in the Yangtze Valley. The ignorance of people about events that were transpiring in Communist areas surprised me. When I told foreign officials that an offensive had begun, they looked at me as if I were crazy. "Forget it," said one high-ranking Army officer, "the Communists have no weapons and will never be able to launch an offensive." The crossing of the Yellow River to many observers was just a flight, in accordance with Kuomintang propaganda, or merely a raid. The Nanking correspondent of Time Magazine declared that the movement of General Liu Po-cheng across the Yellow River was of no significance because an army couldn't fight without bases. A member of a foreign embassy in Nanking told me that my statement that the peasants were joining One-Eyed Liu against Nanking was a lot of Communist "trap." What did the peasants care about the war? American foreign policy - as if that were a magic entity that existed in a vacuum - was all that mattered to some of these specialists and seemingly all they understood.

  我觉得这些人十分顽固不化,他们硬是不愿意了解,中国革命是这场战争的决定因素,不愿意让自己的思想受到革命的震动。每当我想给美国军事人员介绍农民起义的情况时,他们就把话岔开,打听八路军的士兵拿多少军饷,穿什么样的制服,奖章的规格和形状,或者问起革命战士阵亡处的出入口两边种的是什么树。他们既然不愿意接触新思想,也就必然只注意那些无关紧要的事情了。

  不管是有意或者无意,他们中间有些人是害怕被扣上红帽子的。美国国内正在掀起反共浪潮,国会议员一再攻击国务院藏匿“赤色分子”。这种情况使一些识时务的现察家变得小心谨慎起来了,这也是可以理解的。美国外交官和军事观察员,对于蒋介石政府内部腐败、将领无能、众叛亲离等情况,倒还愿意报回国内;但是,对于共产党所占的农村地区进行革命的情况,不是有意回避,就是含糊其词,报告里总要加上种种保留和贬语。一位美国官员很坦率地对我说:“我可不怨惹这个是非!”另一位说,“你在国外呆久啦,不了解现在国内是什么状况。红帽子满天飞呢。你对我讲的,可能全都是事实,但是我可不愿上报。”

  写到这里,我也许应该说明一下,我并不想非难我国驻华代表们的业务能力。总的说来他们是正直和有头脑的,是我国能干的驻外工作人员,同我国驻任何地方的人员相比恐怕也毫无逊色。美国的外交官、武官、商人、记者和传教士如实地揭露了蒋政权腐败无能、暴虐专制的情况,值得嘉奖。但是,他们不能毫不受到美国国内思想和信仰不自由的影响。尽管他们还没有像美国国内许多普通公民那样,在最近的大规模检举揭发、捕风捉影、造谣中伤、一片恐怖的浪潮中不断受到迫害,但是,这种情况足以使他们感到惶惶不安,以致有些人再也没有心思去探究中国革命的内部发展情况了。结果,一些人就投国内上司之所好,而不再像过去那样提出自己的观点了。报道中国消息的美国人受到的压力,虽然是间接的,但有时也是够大的。例如,我从共产党地区一出来,就给美国一家全国性杂志投了两篇稿。这两篇东西现已被入本书,用的标题是“锄霸”和“石壁村”。编者买下了这两篇稿子,还来信说:“写得好极了”、“堪称足下最佳作品”。但是在美国国内人为地煽起的歇斯底里气氛中,该杂志的发行人横加干预,不许刊登这两篇文章,而且还指责我赞同“暴乱行为”。艾格尼丝·史沫特莱女土曾经写过好几部介绍中国革命的书。一九四九年初,麦克阿瑟将军司令部竟在一份内部通报中诬陷她与第二次世界大战期间一个亲俄的日本间谍组织有联系。这种诬告如此荒诞无知,以致美国军方不得不予以撤销。但是,此中的厉害足以吓住胆小怕事之辈。

  当共军过长江时,纽约某报竟要求联邦调查局对凡是说过中国的赤色分子不是真正共产党人的记者一律进行调查。这无异是企图用美国秘密警察的幽灵来吓唬那些观察中国局势的人们。

  这种对美国作家(还有美国外交官和传教士)施加远距离间接恐吓的结果,多少掩盖了中国内战的真相。这样的事发生在一九四七年,恰好适应了蒋介石当时的政治需要。由于蒋介石不信任本国人民,而他又需要美援,所以他不敢承认自己在华北所处的劣境。但是,为了获得美援,他又不得不承认某些方面的失败,并为这些失败寻找借口,使他本人及其整个统治集团的威信不致受损害。

  That no one cared to understand that the Chinese Revolution was the decisive factor in the war seemed to me somewhat obstinate. These men would not expose their minds to the shock of revolution. Whenever I tried to tell US military men about the rising of the peasantry, they interrupted me to inquire about the pay of soldiers in the 8th Route Army, the kind of uniform they wore, the size and shape of their medals or the kind of trees that grew along highways where revolutionists fell. Not willing to expose themselves to new ideas, they could not help but concern themselves with unessentials.

  Consciously and unconsciously, some of these men were afraid of becoming tainted with a politically pink tinge. The Communist witch hunt in America and the fact that congressmen were at periodic intervals sounding off about the "Reds" in the State Department made some of the more intelligent observers cautious and understandably so. American diplomats and military observers were willing to report the corruption in the Chiang government, the inefficiency of his generals, the dissidence of various factions in the government, but anything about the revolution in the Communist-held countryside many of them either deliberately side-stepped or hedged about, with all sorts of qualifications, and denunciations. One American official quite frankly told me: "I'm not sticking my neck out." Another one said: "You've been away so long, you don't know what it's like in the States. You either is [a Red] or you isn't. What you tell me may all be true, but I'm not going to report it."

  Before going any further I should perhaps state that I do not wish to criticize the professional qualifications of our representatives in China. On the whole, they were decent, forthright and intelligent men, probably as capable agents of this country as could be found anywhere abroad. American diplomats, military attaches, businessmen, correspondents and missionaries must be given full credit for honestly exposing the inefficient, corrupt and despotic nature of the Chiang regime. However, it was impossible for these men entirely to avoid the effects of the proscription of freedom of thought and conscience in the United States itself. It is true that they were not hunted down as many ordinary American citizens have recently been hunted down in the United States in an orgy of denunciation, suspicion, rumor and fear, but they were made to feel uneasy to a point where some of them were inclined to lose their curiosity about the inner workings of the Chinese Revolution. This led a few men to hold up mirrors to the viewpoints of their superiors in America instead of reflecting their own viewpoints as in the past.

  Though indirect, the pressures on Americans dealing with Chinese public affairs was sometimes real enough. For example, when I emerged from Communist areas I sent an American national magazine two articles which appear in this book under the titles "Mission Murder" and "Stone Wall Village." These articles were bought by the editors with the words "Excellent," "Your best." However, in the midst of the artificially created atmosphere of hysteria in the United States, the publisher stepped in, canceled the articles and declared that I identified myself with "mob violence." In early 1949, an intelligence report issued by General MacArthur's headquarters attempted to link Miss Agnes Smedley, a writer who had produced many books about the Chinese Revolution, with a pro-Russian Japanese spy ring which had operated during World War II. The charges were so fantastic that the Army had to back down, but the bared fangs were clear enough to anyone who tended to scare easily.

  When the Communists crossed the Yangtze River, a New York newspaper suggested that the FBI investigate all writers who had ever said that China's Reds were not Communists. In other words, an attempt was being made to frighten observers of the China scene with the specter of an American gestapo.

  This kind of long-distance and indirect bulldozing of American writers (also American diplomats and missionaries), which was partially instrumental in blurring the picture of the China war, happened in the year 1947 to fit in with a definite political need of Chiang Kai-shek. Because he did not trust his own people and because he needed American help, Chiang did not dare admit how bad his situation was in North China. Yet, in order to get American help, he had to admit defeats somewhere and also find a reason for these defeats that would not discredit him or his ruling group.

  一切革命和内战的历史都表明,统治阶级在受到威胁的时候,总是认为祸根并不在自己身上,而把一切归咎于什么外因或其代理人。中国的统治集团也袭用了历史上一切垂危政权的故伎,它自欺期人地想把自己的全部麻烦都归咎于苏联。蒋介石集团的想象力真可谓丰富矣,却也感到难以自圆其说。而且这种作法也使这个官僚集团陷于严重的矛盾之中。首先,蒋的许多将领和主要部长都明白,他们打不赢解放军,并非因为中共得到俄国的什么援助。事实上,有许多将领都认为,蒋介石自己的错误和官府的腐败,才是军队在战场上打败仗的原因。他们强烈要求对军队和政府本身进行改革。因此,这些将领们觉得,企图怪罪苏联就是想为官僚机构文过饰非,阻挠改革,从而加强蒋的统治,而他们却正想削弱他的统治。其次蒋的许多部下,并不希望疏远苏联而靠拢美国,而是想在美苏之间搞平衡。第三,凡是到过华北的人,包括外国人在内,都很清楚,那里并没有什么俄国人或者俄国武器,因为华北同西伯利亚边境之间隔着一千多英里的丛林和峻岭,且不说中间还有蒋介石的部队驻防呢。

  在这种情况下,蒋介石政府硬把它的厄运归咎于苏联,这不但难以使人信服,而且也是一种很危险的作法。但是,各种因素加在一起,使一些国民党官员采取了冒险的方针。首先是政府领导人自己的心理状态:华北农民起义使国民党统治集团惊慌失措;将领们的离心离德更使他们惶惶不安;知识分子、学生和破产商人坚决要求和平的呼声日益高涨,成了他们严重的后顾之忧。于是他们大大丧失了自信心,很多人开始怀疑蒋介石能打赢战争。这些官员不再相信他们自己,也不再相信他们的领袖,他们认为,唯有美援才能让他们得救。但他们心里很明白,他们这帮人的贪污腐化和蒋介石的专制独裁早已臭名远扬,因此,争取美援的唯一办法,就是把他们反对本国共产党的二十年内战,同美国在全球范围内反对苏联的斗争联系起来。可是,光在意识形态方面把两者联系起来还是不够的,因此,国民党必须找到一种借口,来指控苏联干涉中国内战,方能得到美国的援助,借以自保。

  The history of all revolutions and civil wars invariably shows that a threatened ruling class finds the cause of its misfortune not in itself, but in foreign agents or powers. The ruling class of China being no more original than other endangered regimes in history now tried to convince itself and the outside world that the cause of its troubles lay in the Soviet Union. Such an attempt, however, strained even the fertile imaginations of Chiang's ruling clique and involved the bureaucracy in serious contradictions. In the first place, Chiang's generals and many of his top ministers knew their lack of success against the 8th Route Army was not due to Russian help given the Communists. In fact, many of these generals blamed Chiang Kai-shek's mistakes and the corruption of the bureaucracy for their own defeats in the field and they had strong desires to reform the army and the government itself. Therefore, any attempts to blame the Soviet Union seemed to these generals like an attempt to whitewash the bureaucracy, to prevent reforms and to strengthen Chiang's hands which they wanted to weaken. In the second place, many of Chiang's supporters had no wish to alienate the Soviet Union in favor of the United States, rather preferring to balance themselves between the two. Thirdly, it was obvious to everyone, including foreigners who had been in the areas, that no Russians or Russian arms were in North China which was separated from the borders of Siberia by over a thousand miles of forests and mountains, not to mention Chiang's troops themselves.

  Under these circumstances, for the Chiang Kai-shek government to seek to blame its misfortunes on the Soviet Union was not only difficult but dangerous. A combination of factors, however, led a few party officials to adopt a risky course. In the first place, there was the psychology of the government leaders themselves. Aghast at the peasant uprisings in the north, shaken by the disaffection of generals and oppressed by the insistent and insidiously growing demands for peace on the part of the intellectuals, students and impoverished merchants, the Kuoniintang ruling clique had suffered a tremendous loss of self-confidence and had begun to doubt the ability of Chiang Kai-shek to win the war. No longer believing in themselves or their leader, these officials saw their only means of salvation in getting help from the United States. But the corruption in their own ranks and the oppressive nature of the Chiang dictatorship had been so widely publicized that these men also clearly recognized that their only way to get such help was to identify their twenty-year civil war against their own Communists with America's worldwide struggle against the Soviet Union. Ideological identification, however, was not enough, and it became necessary for the Kuomintang to find a formula whereby they could accuse the Soviet Union of interfering in China's civil war in order that they might get American help and save their own skins.
  但是这种借口却并不好找。当时杜鲁门政府的国务卿马歇尔已经公开说过,并没有什么证据表明俄国干涉了中国的内战。因此,美国政府显然无意帮助蒋来捏造这样一种借口。但是这时美国却有一个强有力的集团主张进行干涉,他们认为蒋的困境正好符合他们自己大做文章的需要,所以就赶紧出来帮蒋介石的忙。

  这时美国对华干涉派的主要合柱有:在中国出生的亨利·卢斯为首的“时代——生活——幸福”杂志出版集团、斯克里普斯—霍华德报系、共和党的某些头面人物,以及名气不如他们显赫的人物,如众议员周以德、魏德迈将军和陈纳德将军等。而其中最重要的人物是蒲立特,此人曾任驻莫斯科和巴黎的大使,是共和党对外政策重要发言人,也是亨利·卢斯的至交。

  蒲立特和卢斯屡屡表示钦佩蒋介石,托马斯·杜威州长竞选美国总统的时候也表示同情蒋介石政府。他们之所以这样做,当然都是受了反共情绪的支配。但是,共和党和中国独裁者在一些重要问题上利益一致,这一点也是起了作用的。蒋介石必须找到一头替罪羊来推卸失败的责任。唯一能当替罪羊的只有俄国人,唯一能有俄国人的地方就是满洲。共和党则面临总统选举,它非得把杜鲁门总统的民主党政府在国内外都搞臭不可。蒋介石的失利,为共和党头面人物提供了口实,使他们可以把共产主义在中国的蔓延归罪于罗斯福总统,因为他在雅尔塔同斯大林搞了一笔交易,让俄国军队进入满洲参加对日作战。

  Such a formula was difficult to find. George Marshall, then Secretary of State in President Truman's administration, had publicly stated that there was no evidence of Russian interference in China's civil war. It was obvious, therefore, that the government of the United States had no intention of helping Chiang invent such a formula. There was, however, at this time a powerful group of American interventionists who saw in Chiang's dilemma an identity of interests with their own needs and they quickly came to Chiang's assistance.

  The chief proponents of American intervention in China at this time were the Time-Life-Fortune publishing group, headed by China-born Henry Luce, the Scripps-Howard newspapers, certain high members of the Republican party, a few lesser lights such as Congressman Walter Judd, Generals Albert Wedemeyer and Claire Chennault and most important of all, Mr. William C. Bullitt, former US ambassador to Moscow and Paris and an important foreign policy spokesman for the Republican party with whom Henry Luce was intimately associated.

  Although Bullitt and Luce at various times expressed admiration for Chiang Kai-shek, though Governor Thomas Dewey in his campaign for the presidency of the United States also indicated his sympathy for the generalissimo's government and though all these men were undoubtedly moved by anti-Communist feelings, there is also the fact that the interests of the Republican party and China's dictator coincided at important points. Chiang Kai-shek had to find a scapegoat for his defeats. The only scapegoat could be the Russians and the only place there could be any Russians was Manchuria. The Republican party, facing a presidential election, was under the compelling necessity of discrediting the Democratic administration of President Truman not only at home but abroad. The misfortunes of Chiang Kai-shek furnished influential party members with ammunition to blame the spread of Communism in China on President Roosevelt because of the deal he made at Yalta with Stalin to get Russian troops into the war against Japan in Manchuria.
  由于蒋没有能打开华北平原的通道,他的战略失败了。然而蒋的宣传部门人员还是继续谎报在华北地区打了胜仗,而对满洲却采取了完全相反的宣传手法。于是记者们看到了这样一个怪现像;本来满洲的局势已经够糟糕,政府却故意把它渲染得比实际情况更坏。他们向记者们透露种种“权威方面”的内部消息,包括虚构的战斗失利和满洲即将弃守等等。这类新闻听起来煞有介事,可就是一点也不可靠。

  大多数外国记者已经看出,这一整套宣传的目的是要把满洲描绘为中国内战的中心战场和唯一重要的战场,以便把军事上的失利归咎于俄国人。然而这些驻华记者却无法向美国公众揭穿远东局势的真相。

  等到杜威州长、范登堡参议员以及艾尔弗雷德·兰登等一帮共和党头面人物开始大声疾呼要求援助蒋介石时,情况就更其如此了。当时鼓吹援蒋的还有亨利·卢斯的《时代》和《生活》杂志,这两家杂志常常把自家记者发回的报导丢在一边不用,却特派蒲立特去中国采访。这时,所有拒绝为蒋介石撑腰的人都受到诋毁,非难之声一浪高过一浪,汇成了喧嚣一时的大合唱。乔治·马歇尔由于没给蒋帮忙而遭到恶意中伤。生前鄙视蒋介石的史迪成将军被骂成是没有头脑的自由主义分子,罗斯福总统更是备受非议,说他把美国的切身利益“出卖”给苏联。

  Although Chiang's strategy had collapsed because he had been unable to beat his way across the North China Plain, Chiang's propagandists continued to maintain the fiction that they were victorious in this area. They adopted just the opposite propaganda tactic in relation to Manchuria. Correspondents were now treated to the spectacle of a government trying to make an admittedly bad situation even worse than it was. All of us were fed inside stories from "Authoritative sources" about the imminent evacuation of Manchuria, about lost battles that never took place and many other tales, as interesting as they were unreliable.

  Most foreign correspondents saw that the object of all this propaganda was to try to portray Manchuria as the central battleground - the only important battleground - of the China civil war in order that military reverses could be blamed on the Russians. Correspondents in China, however, formed a very ineffective force in getting the facts about the Far East home to the American public.

  This was particularly true when Governor Dewey, Senator Vandenberg, Alfred Landon and a host of other prominent Republicans began thundering about the need of aiding Chiang Kai-shek. In the meantime Henry Luce's Time and Life magazines, while often disregarding their own correspondents?dispatches, also demanded aid to Chiang and dispatched Bullitt to China. The denunciation of all those who had refused to play Chiang's game swelled to a mighty chorus. George Marshall was bitterly assailed for not helping Chiang; the deceased General Stilwell, who despised the generalissimo, was attacked as a gullible liberal, and President Roosevelt was roundly assaulted for "betraying" his country's vital interest to the Soviet Union.

  大约就在这个时候,蒲立特以《生活》杂志记者身份来到中国。这位前大使先生在中国几个城市转了一圈,很快就返回美国,在《生活》杂志上发表了一篇长达十二页的文章,标题是《向美国人民报告中国见闻》。实际上,这与其说是一篇报道,还不如说是鼓吹美国进行公开而直接的军事干涉来援助蒋介石,“使中国免于落入斯大林之手”。文章还宣称,应当由麦克阿瑟将军掌管援蒋事宜,他的时间应该一半用于中国,一半用于日本。

  为了大肆宣扬这篇文章,卢斯在美国全国各地十来家报纸上登了整版篇幅的广告。中国政府发言人也对蒲立特的主张大加捧场。因此,这篇文章对中国内战产生了一定的影响。蒲立特的论点很简单:历史上的政治家很少有人比得上蒋介石这个人的“远见和明智”。他的唯一雄心壮志就是“领导中国人民用和平方式建立民主制度,使他们古老的文明实现现代化”。要不是被人在雅尔塔“出卖”给斯大林的话,他本来是可以成其大业的。雅尔塔的叛卖,使俄国得以威胁中国的领土完整,以至它的“独立”。因此美国必须立即采取行动,保卫蒋介石免受苏联的侵犯,并且把所有武装的中国共产党人全部赶出中国,一个也不剩。要实现这样一个计划,花费并不大,美国纳税人只需拿出区区十亿美元而已。

  蒲立特的文章在中国引起了意想不到的反应。首先,他所提美国干涉中国内战的主张,伤害了许多中国知识分子的民族自尊心。其次,他对蒋介石的颂扬伤害了人们渴望民主的情绪。第三,他建议美国继续援华,直到把所有武装的中国共产党人消灭得一个也不剩,这种主张违背了中国中间派的和平愿望。最后,他认为只要送十亿美元给国民党政府就可以决定中国内战的结局,这种观点是稍有常识的中国人民都无法接受的。

  蒲立特文章中所讲的具体情况也并不准确。他把注意力集中在满州,竟宣称华北的共军无非是游击队而已。然而,明摆着的事实是,国共双方在关内华北和华中地区部署的正规部队,都比在关外的满洲地区多。换句话说,共产党的主力部队是在既没有俄国人、也同俄国人没有接触的地区组织起来的,并在这些地区打败蒋介石的。蒲立特说,蒋介石之所以节节败退主要是吃了雅尔塔协定的亏,却根本不提这样一个事实;魏德迈将军早在一九四五年就劝告过蒋介石不要进入满洲,而在一九四七年又私下表示,蒋在关外的局面是毫无希望的。简言之,蒲立特所鼓吹的方案是以错误的设想开始,以站不住的结论收尾的。

  About this time, Bullitt came to China as a correspondent of Life Magazine. The former ambassador spent a short time in several Chinese cities and then went home and published a twelve-page article in Life entitled "Report to the American People on China." Actually, this piece was not so much a report as an incitement to direct and open military intervention on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek to "Keep China out of the hands of Stalin." It declared that General MacArthur should take charge of the program for aiding Chiang, dividing his time equally between China and Japan.

  Luce announced this article by placing full-page advertisements in dozens of papers throughout the country. The Bullitt thesis was plugged by Chinese government spokesmen and it had some influence on the Chinese civil war.

  Bullitt's argument was very simple. Chiang Kai-shek was a man whose "foresight and wisdom have rarely been surpassed in the annals of statesmanship" and whose only ambition was "to lead the Chinese to the peaceful establishment of democratic institutions and modernization of their ancient civilization." He would have succeeded in his self-appointed mission if not "betrayed" to Stalin at Yalta which made it possible for Russia to threaten the territorial integrity and the "very independence" of China. Therefore the United States had to take immediate action to defend Chiang Kai-shek from the encroachment of the Soviet Union and drive every last armed Chinese Communist out of China. Such a program could be achieved very cheaply at the cost of only a billion dollars to the American taxpayer.

  Bullitt's thesis produced a curious reaction in China. In the first place, his proposal that the United States intervene in China's civil war offended the nationalist sentiments of many Chinese intellectuals. Secondly, his praise of Chiang Kai-shek offended democratic sentiments. Thirdly, his suggestion that the United States continue to help China until every last armed Communist had been liquidated offended the peace hopes of middle-of-the-road Chinese. Finally, his idea that China's civil conflict could be decided merely by sending a billion dollars to the national government offended the common sense of the Chinese people.

  Nor was Bullitt's thesis accurate in any detail. In concentrating his attention on Manchuria, Bullitt declared that Communist forces in North China were guerrillas. But the plain fact was that both the Communists and the national government had greater regular forces deployedin North and Central China below the Great Wall than they had in Manchuria, outside the Great Wall. In other words, the main Communistarmies had come into being and had defeated Chiang Kai-shek in areas where there were no Russians and where there was no contact withthem. When Bullitt indicated that Chiang Kai-shek was being defeatedprimarily because of the Yalta deal, he made no allusion to the fact that General Wedemeyer had advised the generalissimo in 1945 not to go into Manchuria and was now, in 1947, privately saying that Chiang's position beyond the Great Wall was hopeless. In short, Bullitt was advocating a program that was based on wrong assumptions to begin with and on questionable conclusions to end with.

  以后我还会有机会说明,美国干涉派的所作所为怎样在一定程度上促成了蒋介石政权的垮台。但是必须承认,关于苏联干涉中国内战的源源不断的谣言,确实一度对这场战争产生了影响。这种影响主要倒不是在中国国内,而是在国外。首先,由于反俄宣传甚嚣尘上,使得记者无法指明蒋介石连连吃败仗的根本原因之所在。其次,经过这么一再渲染,满洲的重要性被过于夸大了,以至于完全抹煞了农民在这场战争中所起的作用,最后,这些谣言连我们这些身在中国的人也给蒙骗了,使我们也不由得想了解究竟俄国人真的给了中共多少帮助。

  于是我决定亲身去满洲观察一番。

  I shall have occasion later to show how the actions of American interventionists played some role in bringing about the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's power. Here, however, it is necessary to admit that the ceaseless stream of stories about the Soviet Union's interference in China's civil war did for a time have an effect on that war, not so much in China, but abroad. For one thing the constant barrage of anti-Russian propaganda made it difficult for any correspondent to point out the major reasons why Chiang Kai-shek was being defeated. For another thing, the piling up of stories made Manchuria much more important than it was and completely hid the role of the peasants in the war. Finally, the stories affected even us who were there and made us wonder just how much the Russians were really helping the Chinese Communists.

  I decided to go to Manchuria and see for myself.