第十三章 蒋家王朝的覆灭
 

CHAPTER XIII

COLLAPSE OF A DYNASTY

第五十五节 军事崩溃
55. Military Collapse
  人心向背的急剧改变,乃是共产党在中国取得胜利的最直接原因。但是,人民转而拥护共产党,还不足以确保在短期内就能推翻蒋介石。因为共产党不单是开展推翻中国旧社会的革命,而且也在进行打败蒋介石军队的战争。其所使用的策略是革命和战争策略两者的结合。进行战争一般是用军事手段克敌制胜。进行革命则通常是用政治手段把大部分敌人争取过来。中国共产党人对战争和革命的艺术作出的贡献,主要是把政治和战争这两种斗争形式空前密切地结合起来使用,简直把两者完全融为一体了。

  但是,革命并不受战争的战略方针支配,而战争的策略却要由革命的战略方针决定。当中国内战和中国革命发展到最紧要阶段的时候,情况尤其如此。一切革命的命运都是在一定关头由军队情绪的转变所决定的。中国的革命战争最初是在敌强我弱的情况下开始的,当然就更其如此了。内战开始的时候,蒋介石的军队兵力雄厚,装备精良,而共产党的军队却装备很差,简直没有可能取胜。要不是后来大批蒋军起义,倒向革命,共军根本不可能在短期内取得决定性的胜利。整师整师的蒋军倒向共产党,这不是偶然的事变,也不单纯是中共鼓动之功。它是一种漫长的逐步变化过程的结果,这种过程就像发酵一样,在军队内部发生作用,使军心起了变化。

SWIFT changes in the political allegiances of a decisive portion of the Chinese people were the most immediate cause of Communist success in China. Transformation of civilian psychology, however, was not enough to guarantee that Chiang Kai-shek could be overthrown in a short period of time. For the Reds were not only waging revolution against the old Chinese society, they were also waging war against the army of Chiang Kai-shek. This war was a revolutionary war and, as such, it partook of the nature of both war and revolution. Its tactics therefore were an amalgam of both of these activities. The usual method of waging war is to vanquish the enemy by military means. The common method of waging revolution is to win over a good portion of the enemy by political means. The chief contribution of the Chinese Communists to the arts of war and revolution was that they combined both politics and combat to a degree never before observed in so complete a form, wielding both almost as a single instrument.

  It was not, however, the strategy of the war which controlled the revolution, but the strategy of the revolution which dictated the tactics of the war. This was particularly so when the Chinese civil war and the Chinese Revolution reached their most critical periods. The fate of every revolution at a certain point is decided by a shift in the feelings of the army. This is of necessity also true of a revolutionary war which originally deploys weaker forces than its foes. Against the numerous and well-armed troops of Chiang Kai-shek, the poorly armed forces of the Communists at the start of the civil war could not possibly gain a victory. Nor could they ever have gained a decisive victory within a short time had not a large share of Chiang's army come over to the forces of the revolution. The going over of many of Chiang's divisions to the Communists did not happen of itself nor as a result of mere agitation. Rather was it the result of a long molecular process which worked like a ferment within the army, producing a change in its psychology.
  战争初期,国民党军队内部的矛盾最突出地表现为官兵对立,因为共产党的土地改革大大激发了农民出身的士兵对本身处境的不满情绪。然而到一九四八年的时候,前线作战部队的将官们也都风纪败坏、内心动摇。由于经济情况一团糟,特务横行,加上最高当局指挥无方,犯了严重的战略性错误,各级军官普遍厌战。南京各派系之间的明争暗斗使前方部队也出现了同样激烈的内部倾轧。内阁频频改组,使将领们无所适从。最后,由于蒋介石完全投靠美国,镇压反美示威,由于美国在中国驻军,在中国领土上建立海军基地,由于蒋介石同美国签订了许多不平等条约,这一切不仅使中国的知识界群情鼎沸,民族主义情绪高涨,而且也使军队内部产生严重的不满情绪,因为这一切伤害了军官们的民族自尊心,并为共产党提供了反蒋宣传的材料。

  如果把所有的蒋军部队都说成是一模一样,那就不对了。各种部队的情况还是大不相同的。旧军阀和杂牌军的将领在前线搞着各式各样的阴谋勾当,而蒋介石嫡系的黄埔军校毕业生则严厉镇压对于“领袖”的任何批评。在不同部队之间,甚至在同一部队内部,常有这种各持截然不同态度的情况。然而官兵的政治态度都朝一个方向发展——大家都希望无论如何别再打仗了。

  In the early part of the war, contradictions within Nationalist forces had revealed themselves most sharply in the conflicts between officers and soldiers, with the Communist land reform playing a large part in whipping up the discontent of the peasant privates and noncoms. Through 1948, however, the discipline and loyalty of the field officers and the generals in the combat areas was badly shaken. Economic chaos, gestapo terror, terrible blunders in strategy at the highest levels had all served to disgust the officers' corps with the way the war was being conducted. The rivalries of different cliques in Nanking produced the same bitter contentions on the front. Numerous cabinet reshuffies left the loyalties of the generals hanging in mid-air. Finally, Chiang's utter dependence on America, his suppression of anti-American demonstrations, the presence of American military men in China, the maintenance of a naval base on China's soil, special treaties signed with the United States - all of which exacerbated the nationalistic feelings of the literate Chinese public - also produced a great discontent in army circles, wounding the officers' patriotic vanity and making him a target for Communist propaganda.

  It would be incorrect to represent conditions in the army as being the same throughout the country in all troops and regiments. The variation was considerable. While former warlords and provincial generals were carrying on all sorts of intrigues on the front, Chiang Kai-shek's Whampoa cadets were viciously suppressing any criticism of the "leader." There were many such contrasts between and within units. Nevertheless, the political mood of the officers, as well as the soldiers, was moving toward a single level - peace at any cost.
  共产党要夺取政权,最重要的是必须在战争中打败蒋介石的军队。如果不充分认识到这一点,就不可能懂得中国国内斗争的奥秘。这一任务早在一九四八年年中,在满洲、华北和华中的三大决定性战役开始以前,就已经由革命完成了一半。余留的一半任务是:策动蒋军土兵从不满到公开举行起义或至少拒绝作战,同时在实战中歼灭负隅顽抗的蒋军。

  要争取士兵支持革命事业,传统的作法是发动大罢工,游行示威,上街闹事,进行街垒战。这些做法能使革命分子与军心动摇的部队直接接触,使士兵受到革命情绪的感染。在革命的关键时刻,这种活动有可能导致起义和夺取国家政权。至少俄国的二月革命和十月革命就是这样进入高潮的。然而作为一场革命,中国共产主义运动却有其自己的特点。它不是通过在首都举行起义推翻国家最高政权,而是通过战场上的武装斗争获得最后胜利的。在军事上,中国共产主义运动也有其特点,它不单通过作战,而且还通过策动蒋军内部起义而在战场上取得胜利。

  由于共产党在城市中力量十分薄弱,缺乏强大的工人组织,因此中共不可能通过发动大罢工来触发蒋军士兵起义。其实,他们直接接触蒋军的最好办法是在战场上对阵。共产党主要是通过打仗中的接触来策动国民党的官兵起义的。这不能不说是中国内战的一大奇观。

  It is impossible to understand the mechanics of China's civil conflict without fully realizing that the most important task of the war - defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's army - had already been half accomplished by the revolution before the beginning of the conclusive battles in Manchuria and North and Central China in the middle of 1948. The last half of the Communists' quest for power consisted of two parts: to bring Chiang's soldiers from a state of discontent to open revolt, or at least refusal to fight, and to liquidate the remainder in actual combat.

  The classic way of winning troops to the cause of revolution is by mass strikes, demonstrations, street encounters, fights at the barricades. This enables revolutionary elements to get in direct contact with wavering troops and infect them with their own mood. If such activities come at a critical moment of the revolution, an insurrection may occur and the state power be seized. At least that is the way the February and October revolutions in Russia reached their climaxes. The unique thing about the mechanics of the Chinese Communist movement as a revolution, however, was that it reached its crisis and gained its greatest victories not by an insurrection in the capital of the country against the summit of state power, but by success on the battlefield. The unique feature of this movement as a war was that it triumphed on the battlefield not only through combat but through insurrections within Chiang's army.

  Since they were so weak in the cities and since the Chinese proletariat was such an ineffective force, the Communists could not stimulate Chiang's troops to revolt by mass strikes. In fact, their best method of directly contacting Chiang's troops was on the field of battle. It was principally through contact in combat that the Kuomintang soldiers and officers were aroused to turn over to the Communists. This must be accounted one of the more ludicrous phenomena of the Chinese war.

  为了打败共产党,蒋必须向他们进攻,但是每次进攻却都使他的士兵受到八路军战士革命精神的感染。看来八路军的第一个缺口是在“基督将军”冯玉祥旧部一类的杂牌军中间打开的。当时冯已经来到美国,并公开宣布反蒋。倒并不是说,杂牌军一定比蒋的嫡系部队更革命。相反,杂牌军旧习气较重,保守色彩较浓。但是,正是由于这个原因,战争所引起的变化使他们感受更深。此外,杂牌军老是被东调西遣,受到蒋记特务的监视,装备又比蒋的嫡系部队差。因此他们心怀不满,愿意同共军媾和。

  一九四八年九月,冯玉祥旧部第九十四军军长吴化文将军起义,致使山东省省会济南迅即易手。尤为惊人的是,美国军方人士十分赏识的山东省主席王耀武将军被共军俘虏后,竟立即在电台上发表讲话,号召山东蒋军残部在阵前起义,集体投诚,至少不要顽抗,并相机放下武器。与此同时,山西军阀阎锡山手下的三个师长在太原城下不战而降。可能有人会认为这些起义完全是策反的结果;然而,在整个辽阔的中国战场上所发生的许多其他事件清楚地表明,蒋军最后溃败不仅是共军策反的结果,而且是蒋军在革命的影响下分崩离析的结果。在这方面,满洲的情形是很好的例子。

  To beat the Communists, Chiang had to attack them, but every time he did so, his troops became infected with the revolutionary mood of the 8th Route soldiers. It seems that the first break in the army appeared among the provincial forces and former subordinates of the Christian General Feng Yu-hsiang, who had come to America and denounced Chiang Kai-shek. This does not mean that these troops were necessarily more revolutionary than the others. On the contrary, the regiments, close to the old China, had many elements of conservatism. But just for this reason the changes caused by the war were more noticeable in them. Besides, they were always being shifted around, watched by Chiang's spies, given worse equipment than Chiang's favored forces. They were sick of it, and wanted to make peace.

  In September 1948, the fall of Tsinan, the capital of Shantung Province, was precipitated by the revolt of General Wu Hwa-wen, commander of the 94th Army and a former follower of Feng Yu-hsiang. More striking still, however, was the fact that General Wang Yao-wu, governor of Shantung Province and a favorite of American military men, when captured by the Communists immediately got on the radio and urged the rest of the Shantung troops to mutiny right at the front or surrender en masse or else not to offer any strong resistance and to lay down their arms at the proper moment. Simultaneously, far to the west, three division commanders of Yen Hsi-shan surrendered outside of Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi Province, without fighting. It is possible to see behind such revolts mere conspiracies. However, other events along the whole length and breadth of the tremendous Chinese front clearly indicate that Chiang's army collapsed in the end, not only as the result of conspiratorial intrigue, but also as a result of revolutionary disintegration. An almost perfect example of this is offered by events in Manchuria.

  一九四八年下半年,满洲的国民党部队退入城市,据说是奉命困守,以待杜威当选美国总统后美国倾全力援助蒋介石。在美国总统选举的几个星期之前,国民党第六十军和第七军带着他们的重型美式装备退守长春市区,林彪将军的人民解放军的一支小部队包围了该市。于是共产党就有了极好的机会用各种方式进行革命宣传以瓦解蒋军。

  解放军的每个班都成立“敌工组”,研究对阵的国民党部队中所存在的各种思想顾虑,然后制订宣传提纲,开始“喊话战”。

  喊话的声音越过无人地带:“蒋军弟兄们!放下你们的武器吧!你们本来就并不想当兵扛枪的。能说你们是自愿参加国民党军队的吗?不,你们是被用绳子捆着抓去的壮丁。到我们这边来吧!你们要回家的话,我们就送你们回去。你们还可以参加我们的队伍,像我们一样为解放自己的家乡而战斗。”

  喊话招来了一阵密集的射击。但是这种喊话的内容却是枪炮所无法抵挡的炽热的革命宣传.它很好地阐述了共产党的各种观点和主张。很快,前线某些阵地的国民党士兵就不再打枪了。后来有一个名叫唐国华的士兵带领全班七人跑到解放军那边去。这下可把国民党的指挥官吓坏了,他们对下属说,这些叛逃的士兵已经被共产党缴械活埋了。但是这种欺骗宣传很快就露了马脚。因为这个姓唐的班长本人不久就从相隔只有七十五码的解放军阵地上向这边喊话,呼吁他的老战友跟着他投奔新中国。叛逃的人起先屈指可数,后来越来越多,汇成了一股源源不断的人流。

  国民党想了一些办法进行反击。它在长春市内到处搜罗妓女和军官太大,把她们送到前沿阵地去唱黄色歌曲,想引诱人民解放军的战士跑过来找她们。解放军通过喊话回答说:“蒋军弟兄们,你们那些当官的连你们都骗不了,又怎么可能骗得了我们呢?”

  双方部队不久就互相写起信来。国民党方面的一个班在信里写道, 他们的班长得了病,正在长春市内休养,等他一回来,全班马上就起义过来。还有一个班在信里写道:“谢谢你们送来的烙饼,可我们是南方人,爱吃大米饭。我们也听不懂你们的口音。请找个南方人给我们喊话吧。”

  解放军还把传单装在宣传弹里面发射到蒋军阵地上去,甚至还在河上把宣传小船顺水放到市内去。在市内房屋的墙上,甚至在蒋军的碉堡上,都出现了张贴的或用白灰浆刷写的标语。这说明满洲人民也在参加斗争,表明了他们的人心所向。短短几个星期内,就有一万三千名官兵——占被围在长春的蒋军总数十分之一以上——偷偷跑到共军方面去了。其中有十六名上校和二百八十二名少尉以上的军官。他们全都带着枪,有的甚至带着无线电收发报机,并且大都掉转枪口向他们原先所属的部队开火了。

  During the latter half of 1948, Kuomintang commanders in Manchuria drew back into the cities, with orders, it was said, to hold on until Dewey was elected president of the United States and America poured forth her might in aid of Chiang Kai-shek. Some weeks before the presidential election, the 60th and the 7th Kuomintang armies retired on the city of Changchun with their heavy American equipment while a small force of the People's Liberation Army of General Lin Piao took up positions of siege around the city. Here the Communists had an extraordinary opportunity to apply their methods of disintegrating Chiang's army by revolutionary propaganda.

  Every squad in Lin Piao's forces organized an "enemy work group." They discussed the misconceptions of the Kuomintang troops facing them. Then a program of propaganda was decided upon and a "shouting war" began.

  "Brothers!" the voices called across no man's land, "lay down your arms which you never wanted to take up. Did you join the Kuomintang army? No, you were dragged into it at the end of a rope. Come over to us. If you want, we will send you home. Better still, you can join us and fight to free your homes as we have ours."

  A barrage of fire greeted these words. But the words themselves were a red-hot revolutionary medium, a high conductor of ideas, that the rifles could not still. Pretty soon, at scattered places along the front, the rifles ceased firing. At last a squad of seven men led by a soldier named Tang Kuo-hua crossed the lines. The Kuomintang commanders were frightened. They told their troops that the deserters had been disarmed by the Communists and buried alive. This lie was shortlived. For Squad Commander Tang, himself, soon called across the seventy-five yards separating the two forces, and begged his old comrades to follow him into the New China. From a handful, the number of desertions grew to a steady stream.

  The Kuomintang tried countermeasures. It scoured Changchun for prostitutes and officers' wives and sent them into the front lines to sing obscene songs and invite the soldiers of the People's Liberation Army to cross over to them. "Brother," called back Lin Piao's soldiers, "how can your officers deceive us, when they can't even deceive you?"

  Soon letters were exchanged between the opposing forces. One Kuomintang squad wrote saying its commander was sick and resting inside Changchun, but as soon as he came back, they would come over. Another wrote: "Thanks for the cakes, but we are southerners and would like rice. We also can't understand your dialect, find a southerner to shout to us."

  Propaganda bombs with leaflets inside them were thrown across the lines. Even small propaganda boats were set loose on the river and floated down into the city. Inside the city itself, posters and whitewashed slogans appeared on the walls and even on the pillboxes of the Kuomintang soldiers. The Manchurian people were joining in the struggle and showing where their hearts lay.

  Within a few weeks thirteen thousand officers and men - over one-tenth of Chiang's forces in the encircled city - crept over to the Communist side. Among them were sixteen colonels and 282 officers of the rank of lieutenant or above. All brought rifles and some even brought radio sets. Most of them turned around to fight against their former comrades.

  在长春发生的这些戏剧性事件意味深长。它们揭示了革命如何在中国军队内部逐步发展,中国的全部历史早已为这种革命打下了基础。满洲地区的蒋军士兵已经不愿意再在旧中国生活下去了。他们找不到别的出路,所以就投奔了保证建立一个新中国的解放军。军心的这种变化是蒋介石在军事上崩溃的一个最直接的原因。

  各地的情况大同小异。甚至连某些国民党将领们也不想打下去了。一九四八年九、十月间,开封、济南、烟台、临沂等地几乎未经战斗就相继落人共军手中。蒋在一夜之间就丢了三十万军队,其中包括第九十三军、第六十军和第七十军。这些部队的司令官一个也没有遵照委员长的命令杀身成仁。有五十来名将官起义、投降或乖乖当了俘虏,保住了自己的性命。短短两个月内就有十八个整师、九个旅和十五个团被歼。这些部队伤亡甚微,往往都是扯起白旗投降。

  蒋介石的末日来临了。共军看到国民党土兵受到革命的影响,便充分利用这种有利形势神速进击。在满洲地区,正当长春的国民党士兵纷纷向解放军前线部队投诚的时候,解放军的主力已在南满一带集结,切断了辽西走廊。蒋军将领原先指望在局势危急时可以取道辽西走廊逃进关内。

  These dramatic events at Changchun are significant; they reveal the workings of the inner processes of the revolution in the Chinese army, the foundation of which had been laid by the whole past history of the country. The soldiers in Manchuria did not want to live any longer in the Old China. Because they saw no other way out, they joined forces that promised them a New China. This change in the state of mind of the soldiers was one of the most immediate causes of Chiang Kai-shek's military collapse.

  Everywhere the story was the same. Even the commanders no longer wanted to fight. In September and October 1948, the provincial cities of Kaifeng, Tsinan, Chefoo and Linyi fell to the Communists almost without a struggle. Overnight Chiang lost three hundred thousand troops, including the 93rd Army, the 6oth Army and the 70th Army. Not a single one of these commanders fought to the death as the generalissimo had ordered. Some fifty generals preserved their lives by mutinying, surrendering or allowing themselves to be captured. Eighteen full divisions, nine brigades and fifteen regiments within the space of two months were wiped out. Casualties were few. Everywhere white flags were hoisted.

  The darkest hour for Chiang Kai-shek was at hand. With the Kuomintang soldiers facing them in a revolutionary mood, the Communists struck swiftly to take full advantage of the situation. In Manchuria, while the soldiers in Changchun were running out to join his besieging forces, General Lin Piao concentrated his main forces in the south and cut the Liaoning corridor through which Chiang's commanders had hoped, in the event of an emergency, to escape through the Great Wall into North China.

  现在局势确很危急,蒋介石亲自飞来满洲督战。大势本已不妙,中国的这位独裁者最后却把事情搞得更加不可收拾。当时解放军已经包围了国民党的主要运输和供应基地锦州。蒋命今廖耀湘兵团十二个师驰援,以解锦州之围。但是,廖兵团刚开出沈阳不远,锦州便告失守,防守该城的十二万蒋军全军覆没。

  蒋气急败坏,电令长春的国民党第六十军和第七军突围与沈阳地区的蒋军会合。这是他早该在一年以前采取的行动。现在为时已晚。第六十军的军长并未执行他的命令,而是率军起义,调转枪口对准第七军。共军不费吹灰之力就拿下了长春。

  与此同时,廖耀湘兵团开出了坚固设防的沈阳,正走在路上。这正是共军施展其围城打援拿手好戏的时机。解放军从南北两面风驰电掣地夹击廖兵团,几乎把该兵团的十二个师全部围歼。十月三十日沈阳失守。几天后,内蒙地区通往华北的门户热河省会承德也告失守。

  就在沈阳失守几天以后,杜鲁门当选美国总统。杜威州长的落选使蒋寄托于美国的最后一点希望落空,蒋本人跟着也完蛋了。

  That emergency was now on them and the generalissimo, himself, flew to Manchuria. Into an already disintegrating situation, China's dictator introduced a last element of chaos. Lin Piao had surrounded the city of Chinchow, main Kuomintang supply and transport base. Chiang ordered an army group of twelve divisions under General Liao Yao-hsiang to the relief of the beleaguered city. Chinchow, however, fell and with it 120,000 troops while the Liao Army Group was just a little way out of Mukden.

  In desperation, Chiang cabled an order to the 60th and 7th Kuomintang armies in Changchun to leave that city and join his other forces in the Mukden areas. This was a move he should have made a year before. Now, it was too late. Instead of obeying this order, the commander of the 6oth Army revolted and turned his guns on the 7th Army. Changchun immediately fell to the Communists without a struggle.

  The Liao Army Group, which had come out from behind the fortifications of Mukden, was meanwhile on the road where the Communists liked to fight best. Lin Piao, wheeling up from the south and down from the north caught nearly the whole twelve divisions in a pincer and wiped them out. On October 30, Mukden itself fell and a few days ater Changteh, the capital of Jehol and gateway through Inner Mongolia to North China.

  A few days after the fall of Mukden, Harry Truman was elected president of the United States. Governor Dewey, the last white hope of Chiang Kai-shek, was defeated. And with him the generalissimo.

  一旦全面胜利在望,共产党行事毫不迟疑。满洲地区的解放军并没有坐等好几个星期,修复铁路,筹办军需,而是立即徒步行军,南下进关。各路纵队以每天行军五、六十英里的速度,二十天挺进八百英里,于一九四八年十二月初抵达北平附近的铁路枢纽丰台。这支部队的出现,使曾经统治内蒙地区多年、被认为是中国优秀将领之一的傅作义将军从睡梦中惊醒,他原以为共军离他还远着呢。虽然只有解放军的少数先头部队,傅却惊慌失措,急忙把自己的部队撤进北平城内,并开始同共产党进行谈判,争取从“战犯”名单中删去他自己的名字。

  这时,林彪的部队源源进关,同来自山西、山东和河北的共产党部队会师。在短短几天内,华北最大的港口天津就落入来自满洲的头戴大皮帽的解放军战士手中。古都北平也迅即易手。蒋介石早先不肯退出东北,结果却落得个不单丢了满洲,而且还把整个华北地区都赔上了。

  可是,在八百英里以南的地方,更加严重的灾难正在等待着中国的独裁者。共军的铁锤和智囊陈毅将军和独眼龙刘伯承将军已在华中部署就绪,即将对长江流域的蒋政权根基发动进攻,直捣国都南京。

  The Communists, with all-out victory in sight, never hesitated. Instead of waiting many weeks to repair the railways and amass supplies, General Lin Piao immediately dispatched his soldiers on foot through the Great Wall and south into China proper. Advancing as much as fifty and sixty miles a day, columns of Lin Piao covered eight hundred miles within twenty days and in early December 1948 reached the railway junction of Fengtai near Peiping. General Fu Tso-yi, who had ruled Inner Mongolia for many years and who was considered one of China's better generals, was shaken from his slumbers by the advent of this force which he thought was many miles distant. Although only a few patrols had arrived, Fu was so badly upset that he hastily withdrew behind the walls of Peiping where he started bargaining with the Communists to have his name taken off the list of "war criminals."

  In the meantime, the rest of Lin Piao's army poured down through the Great Wall and joined forces with the Communist detachments from Shansi, Shantung and Hopei. Within the space of a few days, North China's greatest port, Tientsin, fell to Lin Piao's fur-hatted Manchurians. Peiping, the ancient capital of the empire, soon followed suit.

  Thus, by not retreating from the northeast Chiang Kai-shek had lost not only Manchuria, but all of North China, too.

  Eight hundred miles to the south, however, even worse catastrophes were in store for China's dictator. For Generals Chen Yi and one-eyed Liu Po-cheng - the Hammer and the Brain of the Communist armies -
had now organized Central China and were about to strike against the bases of Chiang's power in the Yangtze Valley and against the capital of the nation - Nanking.

  

  一九四八年,中国军事形势急转直下,其深度和广度是共产党和蒋介石双方都未充分预见到的。看来共产党当时严重地低估了蒋军士气崩溃的程度。蒋管区里积极参加政治活动的群众——包括知识分子、学生、军官和政府低级官员一常常比共产党更左。共产党还在谈论战争要打五年,而大批蒋军却已准备举行起义以立即结束战争。共产党虽然并未预见蒋会如此迅速垮台,但是总的说来他们对于局势要比国民党政府看得清楚得多。由于这个缘故,他们得以因势利导,而国民党的头头却在形势面前目瞪口呆、一筹莫展。

  这种情况在一定程度上是由于蒋对战争的精神领导无方。当时,共产党采取类似邱吉尔的办法,除了“血、汗、泪”以外,不向人民乱许愿。可是蒋却向他的追随者许愿,保证迅速获胜。一九四六年召开国民大会的时候,他向全国宣称将在三个月以内实现和平。一年以后,他把这个限期延长到六个月。到了一九四八年四月,蒋政权濒临破产的局面已经昭然若揭,有些观察家已预言,蒋政府将在半年内垮台,可是蒋却宣称:“我可以向你们保证,我们中华民国决不会垮台,六个月不会垮,六年不会垮,六十年也不会垮!”他在一次总结军事形势时宣称,将在三至六个月内剿灭华中全境的共军。

  这完全是一派胡言乱语。中国的独裁者已经完全同周围现实脱离接触,而陷入主观臆想之中。但是蒋介石的这种态度多少也是为了骗人。由于华北和满洲地区的将领纷纷叛离,蒋不能不看到灾难就要临头。他从满洲回来后立即召开会议,以图“绝处求生”。据说沈阳失守后,蒋就吐过血,接着又几次吐血。后来吴化文将军倒戈,致使济南失守,据说蒋介石于惊恐震怒之中,冲着他的部下喊道:“让这些家伙都叛变吧!”蒋再也不相信他的高级将领了。就像希特勒最后只相信他的党卫军一样,蒋企图把前线的烂摊子都推给同他有嫌隙的将领,而把自己的嫡系部队抽回来。他把华北的指挥权交给傅作义将军,把华中的指挥权交给白崇禧将军,而打算把他的嫡系部队撤到长江以南,可惜为时已晚。

  蒋的这些部署并非出于军事上的深谋远虑,而只是为了在日暮途穷的国民党统治集团里保住自己的权力。这时,内阁一个接着一个提出辞呈,谁也不敢在他的政府里当行政院长了。李宗仁、白崇禧和何应钦等将军极力想逼蒋介石下野。就是蒋介石嫡系中的某些人物为了夺取反蒋的旗帜,替自己留条后路,也都纷纷参与这种阴谋活动。

  但是这个中国独裁者却拒不下台。他在一九四八年十一月八日的一次演说中宣称:“余一生宗旨,凡事必坚持到成功。”蒋介石还安抚他的部下说:“虽有东北之失,但关内其他地区之政治、军事、经济根基均毫无动摇。比诸共匪,我方实力仍占优势。”

  这纯属欺人之谈。蒋的根基已经崩溃,他的优势不复存在。然而满洲和华北还离得太远,单是那边发生的情况尚不足以使蒋介石彻底垮台。必须在离他的老巢南京更近的地方再施以打击。这个任务是在一九四八年十一月至十二月间由共军将领刘伯承和陈毅完成的,地点是南京以北一百八十英里的徐州周围。这次打击对蒋介石来说是灾难性的。

  The depth and extent of the military crisis which overcame China in 1948 was fully foreseen neither by the Communists nor by Chiang Kai-shek. It would seem that the Communists seriously underestimated the collapse of morale on their opponent's side. The politically active masses in Chiang's territory - the intellectuals, the students, the army officers and the lower government officials - were often to the left of even the Communists. While the party was still talking of a five-year war, a large share of Chiang's army was ready to end the war immediately by revolts. Nevertheless, though they did not foresee the speed of Chiang's collapse, the Communists observed events on the whole much more ably than did the national government. For this reason they were able to take advantage of a situation which left Kuomintang leaders gaping with surprise and helplessness.

  Part of this was due to the inadequate moral leadership Chiang gave to the war. Where the Communists had adopted a Churchillian strategy of promising their people nothing but "Blood, sweat and tears," Chiang had promised his followers immediate victory. At the convening of the national assembly in 1946, he had told the country that he would bring about peace within three months. A year later he lengthened the period to six months. In April 1948 when the revealed bankruptcy of the regime was causing some observers to predict that the government would collapse within six months, Chiang announced: "I can assure you that our Nationalist China will not collapse in six months, six years or sixty years." Concluding a review of the military situation, he declared that he would exterminate the Communists in all of Central China within three to six months. There was a great deal of madness in such statements. China's dictator had lost touch with his environment and was drifting in a dream world of his own. However, there was also some deceit in the generalissimo's attitude. Suddenly deserted in the north and in Manchuria by his generals, Chiang could not help but be aware that danger was pressing closer on him. When he returned from Manchuria, he called a conference "to seek life in the face of death." After the loss of Mukden, Chiang was said to have had a hemorrhage and continued to have hemorrhages. When General Wu Hwan-wen went over to the Communists and precipitated the fall of Tsinan, the generalissimo in a fit of astonished rage is said to have turned to his subordinates and said: "Let them all desert me." Chiang no longer had faith in his top military men. Like Hitler, who at the last put his faith in his SS troops, Chiang tried to give the dirty end of the military stick to generals unfriendly to him while he pulled out his own personally loyal divisions. He presented the command authority to General Fu Tso-yi in the north and to General Pal Chung-hsi in Central China, planning to withdraw his own troops south of the Yangtze. But it was too late.

  Chiang's moves were not based on military calculations, but on a desire to preserve his own power within his collapsing camp. No one dared now to become premier of his government and cabinet after cabinet resigned. Generals Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi and Ho Ying-chin became active in trying to force the generalissimo's resignation. In order to prepare the next move and seize the anti-Chiang leadership, certain elements from Chiang's own personal clique began participating in these intrigues.

  But China's dictator refused to step down. In a speech on November 8, 1948, he declared: "I have all my life done things with the attitude that once anything is begun it must be carried through to success." The generalissimo comforted his subordinates by saying: "Despite military failures in Manchuria our political military and economic foundations in the rest of China have not been shaken in the slightest. Compared with the Communist bandits our strength is superior."

  This statement was a simple lie. Chiang's foundations had collapsed. His superiority no longer existed. Events in Manchuria, and North China, however, were so far away that a blow closer to his power in Nanking was needed to complete the downfall of the generalissimo. This blow was delivered by Communist Generals Liu Po-cheng and Chen Yi around the town of Suchow, 180 miles north of Nanking in November and December 1948. It was to prove catastrophic.

  徐州位于横亘东西的陇海铁路和纵贯南北的津浦铁路的交叉点,它也许是现代中国战略地位最重要的城市。它位于华北平原的南线,扼中国南方与北方之间的要冲。如果有一支部队由南而北攻占徐州,也许并不足以决定战局,因为还必须拿下整个华北平原,才能统一全中国。但是如果有一支部队由北而南攻克徐州,并将守军就地歼灭,就会使战局急转直下,因为在这种情况下,徐州失守就会使南京、上海和汉口门户洞开。共军正是由北而南攻克徐州的。

  徐州一带的地形非常平坦,但是在它南面的首都南京附近分布着许多大小河流和低矮的丘陵,直到长江边上。由于地势平坦,徐州地区是进行运动战的一个理想战场。如果让部队驻守城镇据点和铁路沿线,进行消极防御,就无异坐待敌军实行各个击破,自取灭亡。可是蒋介石却正是这样干的。在战术上这是一个错误,但是在战略上蒋还犯了更为严重的错误。当徐州以北的山东省失守,刘伯承将军已在徐州西、南两侧开始行动时,蒋本应把部队后撤至长江沿岸地区集中,这样既可掩护主力撤过长江退往南方,也可以从南方调来援军渡过长江向北挺进,以求扭转战局。然而,蒋却重犯当年希特勒所犯的错误。当年德国的独裁者在莱茵河西岸背水而战,现在蒋在长江以北背水而战,致使自己最精锐的部队被围就歼。

  共产党清楚地知道徐州在中国战局中所占的重要地位。早在一九四七年一月,他们就对笔者说,中国的战局将取决于徐州战役的结果。一九四七年一月,笔者曾预言蒋如不立即改变计划,就将在徐州一败涂地。但是我对这一地区战局的报导发到美国国内后,又是只字未登。我现在讲这些,并不是想炫耀自己是个怀才不遇的预言家,而只是为了说明,美国国内的反共思潮当时已经发展到这种地步,胆小怕事的编辑甚至连关于形势的冷静客观的报导部不敢刊登。这种驼鸟式的态度,当然只能最后导致灭亡。蒋介石就是这样自取灭亡的。

链接:《粟裕战争回忆录》第十九章《真正的铜墙铁壁》

  The city of Suchow, which lies at the junction of the east-west Lunghia Railway and the north-south Tientsin-Nanking Railway, is perhaps the most strategic city in modern-day China. Situated at the southern boundaries of the North China Plain, this town and the area adjacent to it form a kind of gateway between the north and the south. Possession of Suchow by a force operating from the south may not be decisive in war, as the rest of the North China Plain must be conquered in order to unify the country. Capture of the town and destruction of its defenders by a force coming from the north - as the Communists came -
however, may be crucial, as the loss of Suchow in this event makes Nanking, Shanghai and Hankow almost indefendable.

  The terrain in this region is flat as a pavement, but approaching the capital at Nanking, the land is broken up by rivers and creeks and low-lying hills which come down almost to the shores of the Yangtze. The flat nature of the terrain makes it an ideal battleground for a war of maneuver. To fight a static warfare with troops garrisoned in towns, strong points and along rail lines is to invite the enemy to attack you piecemeal and to court disaster. Nevertheless, this was how Chiang Kai-shek tried to fight the Communists. This was a mistake in tactics, but Chiang made an even graver mistake in strategy. When he lost the province of Shantung north of Suchow and when General Liu Po-cheng began operating on his flanks west and south of Suchow, Chiang should have pulled back and concentrated his forces closer to the Yangtze River so that he might cover a retreat across the river to the south or be able to bring up reserves from the south across the river to the north and so influence any battle. Chiang, however, made the same mistake Hitler did in Germany and fought before the Yangtze as Germany's dictator fought before the Rhine until the best part of his army was trapped and wiped out.

  The importance of Suchow in the scheme of China's war was clearly recognized by the Communists. As early as January 1947, they told this writer that the war in China would be decided by the outcome of the battle for Suchow. In January 1948, this writer predicted that Chiang was facing a great military catastrophe at Suchow unless he immediately altered his plans. Not a word of mine about this front was printed in the United States either. I say this now not with any desire to play the role of unhonored prophet, but merely to show that anti-Communism has reached such a state in this country that even coldly objective facts about military events will not be printed by scared editors. This ostrich attitude, of course, can only lead to suicide as it led Chiang to suicide.

  蒋介石调集四十万大军防守徐州,包括第二、第十二、第十三和第十六兵团。其中以邱清泉将军指挥的、由美国训练和装备起来的第二兵团战斗力最强。当时蒋认为,共军陈毅部将从西北方面向徐州发动攻击,因此他令第二兵团集中防守这一方向。

  但是陈毅却选择了另一条路线。他从北、东两面向黄伯韬将军指挥的战斗力较差的第七兵团发动突袭。第七兵团里有两个军是“基督将军”冯玉样的旧部,他们不战而降,致使黄伯韬兵团全线崩溃。这两个军的投降,使陈毅将军得以势如破竹地前进。他迅速分兵两路:一路包围第七兵团残部,终于歼灭了这个已经丧失战斗力的兵团,另一路插入被围的第七兵团和徐州市内的蒋军第十三兵团之间。陈毅首战告捷的时候,蒋调集去防守徐州的四十万大军中已有十八万人伤亡、投降或溃散。

  Chiang Kai-shek had concentrated four hundred thousand men of the 2nd, 12th, 13th, and 16th armies for the defense of Suchow. The strongest of these was the American-trained and equipped Second Army under General Chiu Ching-chuan which w~s concentrated northwest of the city where Chiang Kai-shek expected Communist General Chen Yi to attack.

  Chen Yi, however, chose another road. From the north and east, he launched a surprise attack against the much weaker 7th Army Group under General Huang Po-tao. This force began to crumble when two armies formerly organized by the Christian General Feng Yu-hsiang surrendered without fighting. These surrenders gave Chen Yi's offensive a continuity which might not otherwise have been possible. Quickly the Communist general divided his forces into two columns. With one column he encircled the remainder of the 7th Army Group, which was unable to take any further part in the battle and was thereafter destroyed. The other column he interposed between the isolated army group and Chiang's 13th Army inside of Suchow. When Chen Yi's initial operation had been completed, 18o0,000 of the four hundred thousand men Chiang had assembled to hold Suchow had become casualties, surrendered or been broken up to a point where they no longer represented an organized military force.

  此时蒋介石又插了一手,结果又像在满洲一样,把本来已经混乱的局面弄得更加不可收拾。他当撤不撤,像一个输红了眼的赌徒,想要翻本,又下新的赔注,结果输得更惨。

  眼看第七兵团处境危急,蒋把实力未受损失的第二兵团调离徐州西北防地,东驰解围。第二兵团勉强开拔后行动迟缓,尚未赶到,待援的第七兵团已被全歼。可是第二兵团调离徐州以西防地后,独眼龙刘伯承指挥的中原解放军乘虚而入,并且迅速占领了徐州以南五十英里的宿县。

  刘以一部分兵力对付蒋的第十二兵团。第十二兵团原来并不是防守徐州的部队,它是在局势吃紧时从汉口开来增援徐州守军的。这个兵团拥有十二万人,行军途中遭到刘伯承部队的截击,在宿县以西二十英里处陷入重围,抵抗一阵后终于在十二月七日被歼。

  刘以部分兵力进行这些战斗的同时,他的其他一些部队又同从东面开来的陈毅的部队会合。两支大军在徐州以南合围,切断了该地区同南京的联系。可以说共军实际上是撒下了一个天罗地网,而蒋介石却乖乖地把大批部队源源送进罗网,有去无回。其实这些部队大都也并不想回去。

 

  At this point, Chiang Kai-shek took a hand and again, as in Manchuria, introduced chaos into a confused situation. Instead of withdrawing as it was imperative for him to do, the generalissimo, like a gambler who has lost his nerve, began throwing good money after bad.

  Seeing the plight of the 7th Army Group, Chiang ordered the still untouched 2nd Army Group to leave its position northwest of Suchow and rush east to break the trap. This group marched, but its movement was reluctant and slow and the force it was to rescue was totally eliminated before it arrived. Meanwhile, its departure from the west enabled the Central Liberation Army under one-eyed Liu Po-cheng to rush into the vacated breach. Liu's troops soon took the town of Suhsien fifty miles south of Suchow.

  Liu used part of his troops to deal with Chiang's 12th Army Group, which was not originally one of the forces defending Suchow but had been ordered from Hankow to reinforce the garrison when the situation became critical. Composed of 120,000 men, this force was intercepted by Liu when on the road and surrounded twenty miles west of Suhsien. It continued resistance for a while but was finally wiped out on December 7.

  Liu had enough troops to spare during these operations to join Chen Yi's armies coming from the east. The two commanders made contact south of Suchow and ringed the whole area, cutting it off from Nanking. What the Communists had done in essence was to erect a trap into which Chiang obligingly sent all his forces which now could not escape. Moreover, most of them did not want to escape.

  可是蒋介石非要他们突围回去不可,否则南京政府就完蛋了。蒋命令他们投入罗网以后,又命令他们突围,撤回长江一带保卫南京,但是已经来不及了。驻防徐州城内的蒋军尚未同解放军对过阵,他们不愿冒险出城——因为陈毅和刘伯承正在那里严阵以待。蒋只是在完全停止空投徐州守军赖以活命的物资供应后,才得以迫使他们遵命突围。

  蒋军刚撤离徐州向南突围,陈毅立即挥军迎击,把蒋军拦腰截为数段,打得他们狼狈不堪,乱作一团,在徐州西南五十英里处再次陷入重围。第十三兵团随即全军覆没,所属部队全部投降。

  事情已经很清楚,不单具有重要战略意义的徐州地区已被彻底断送,而且调集徐州的大军也已全军覆没,连一支部队也拉不出来去保卫首都南京或别的地方了。这是一场典型的包围战,其结局使蒋介石在其控制地区几乎无可用之兵,断绝了他在军事上重整旗鼓、卷土重来的希望,甚至可以说敲响了他的丧钟。

  Yet they had to escape. Else the government at Nanking was finished. Chiang had ordered them into the trap, now he tried to order them out so that they could get back to the Yangtze and defend Nanking. It was too late. The city garrison in Suchow, which had not yet faced any enemy, was reluctant to venture into open country where Chen Yi and Liu Po-cheng were waiting for it. Only by cutting off all the air-borne supplies on which the troops in Suchow depended was Chiang able to get them to obey his orders.

  As soon as Chiang's forces left Suchow in a southerly direction, Chen Yi swung up to meet them. He hit their line of march in several places, driving them in great disorder and panic into a new encirclement fifty miles southwest of the city. Within a short while the 13th Army Group was completely wiped out, with all its troops surrendered.

  It was now clear that not only had the strategic Suchow area been lost for good, but none of the great army that had been gathered there would ever be free to defend the capital at Nanking or any other point. The end of this classic battle of no combat troops in parts of China under his control and wrote finish to his hopes of military comeback, and perhaps of survival itself.