第十三章 蒋家王朝的覆灭
 

CHAPTER XIII

COLLAPSE OF A DYNASTY

第五十六节 蒋介石其人
56. Chiang Kai-shek
  

  国民党军队溃败,共军进抵长江北岸,使首都南京的形势大变。蒋介石显然非下台不可了。自从一九三二年以来,这还是第一次出现可以逼他下台的机会。甚至当年拥他上台的亲信、故旧,也同上海的商人串通一气,要把这个独裁者赶出南京。在深入探讨形势之前,我们可以先来再次打量一下这位在战争和革命风暴中一直统治中国达二十年之久的人物。

链接:蒋介石——中国最早的股民

THE defeat of the Nationalist army and the advance of the Communists to the north bank of the Yangtze River changed everything in the Kuomintang capital at Nanking. It was clear now that Chiang must go. The opportunity to force him out existed for the first time since 1932. Even his old cronies who had ridden with him to power ganged up with Shanghai merchants to drive China's dictator from his capital. Before examining these events we may perhaps pause and have a last look at this man who ruled China almost without interruption for two violent decades of war and revolution.
  有不少观察家认为,最近四分之一世纪以来,中国兵连祸结、国势日衰,全要归咎于蒋介石的独断专行。史迪威将军曾在抗日战争中一度担任蒋的参谋长,因此有极好的机会观察蒋介石的工作作风。他在日记中写道,根治中国各种弊病的唯一良策就是除掉蒋介石。后来到了内战期间,人们又一再反复提出这种观点,尽管具体说法略有不同。许多观察家,特别是外国人,甚至干脆把中共的胜利归因于蒋介石的愚蠢和刚愎自用。
  It has been assumed by no few observers that the personal traits of the generalissimo were responsible for the terrible series of events that have wasted China for the last quarter of a century. General Stilwell, who was Chiang's chief of staff during part of the Japanese war and who had an unparalleled opportunity to watch China's dictator at work, wrote in his diary that the cure for the troubles of China was the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek. This viewpoint was echoed and re-echoed with varying modifications throughout the civil war. Many observers, especially foreigners, even went so far as to attribute Communist victories to Chiang's stupidities or his domineering disposition.

 

  笔者不敢苟同这种从心理学角度分析历史问题的方法。把中国社会大变动说成是蒋介石的个性所引起的,就犹如说罗马文明衰落的原因在于某个罗马皇帝治国无方一样荒唐。亿万人陷入内战,农民斗地主、兄弟阋墙、夫妻反目,这一切不可能是由一个人的错误造成的。当然,如果抗日战争结束时不是蒋介石当政,中国的政局就会另是一番景象,内战可能打不起来,即使打起来,某些事件发生的顺序也会有所不同。但是中国的革命无疑决不是由蒋介石的个性引起的,即使换一个叫其他名字的独裁者,也仍然不可能解决中国的问题。我们也不能以为中国共产党人赢得胜利的原因在于中国独裁者的无能。我们不能孤立地说某人聪明或愚蠢,而必须联系他所处的具体环境来看。如果一个农民能在并不肥沃的土地上把庄稼种好,那他就称得上是世界上最聪明的人。但是如果要他去操作一台复杂的机器,他就可能显得像是一个十足的白痴。拿破仑在奥斯特里茨战役中是天才,在莫斯科战役中就成了蠢才。同样,蒋介石在一九二七年举行反革命政变、黄袍加身的时候,简直被誉为大智大慧的人。到了一九四五年至一九四九年期间革命浪潮风起云涌之际,蒋一败再败,却像是一个进退失据的狂人。

 

  This psychological approach to the problems of history is not one which the writer finds very useful. To say that the causes of the tremendous social upheaval in China lay in the character traits of the generalissimo is as meaningless as to say that the cause of the fall of Roman civilization was that a certain Roman emperor ruled his state badly. The causes of such an event in which millions of people fought one another, peasants turned on landlords, brothers on brothers and wives on husbands, cannot be the fault of one man. No doubt, if Chiang Kai-shek had not been in power at the end of the war with Japan, then China's political structure would have been different and it is possible that war might not have broken out or that some of the events of the war might have taken place in a different order. But it is indisputable in any case that the Chinese Revolution did not result from the character of Chiang Kai-shek and that a dictator with a different name would not have solved its problem. Nor can we see the cause of Communist victories in the incompetence of China's dictator. People are not stupid or clever in themselves, but only in relation to their circumstances. A peasant may seem like the smartest man in the world by coaxing crops from unfertile ground, but he may appear like a perfect idiot when asked to cope with a complicated machine. Napoleon at Austerlitz is a genius; at Moscow, a fool. Just so Chiang Kai-shek, when he rode to power during the counterrevolution of 1927, appeared to personify the wisdom of his age; when he was constantly defeated during the revolutionary upheavals of 1945 to 1949 he seemed like a blundering madman.

  造成中国内战和革命的各种因素是超越个人性质的,促使共产党上台的各种因素也同样是超越个人性质的。其中有一个因素既是专制独裁制度。这种制度本身的性质就决定它是同个人联系在一起的。然而,不是蒋介石的个性决定专制独裁制度的性质,而是专制独裁制度的性质造成了蒋介石。而且,这种专制独裁制度本身的性质是由中国社会的半封建、半殖民地性这一更根本的因素所决定的。

  中国社会的两重性造成了本国地主和依附于外国资本的工商资产阶级两位一体的统治。作为独裁者,蒋介石体现了这两大统治集团的联合。国民党和军队从属于这两大统治集团,但也有爬到他们头上去的时候。中国社会的资产阶级和封建地主阶级经常相互斗争。同样,蒋介石个性中的买办因素和地主因素也经常相互斗争。依附于外国资本的中国资产阶级既有民族自卑感,也有排外情绪。同样,蒋尽管依赖洋人,却也憎恨洋人。中国的地主阶级是一个垂死的统治阶级,它预感到自己的死期不远,尽管表面上还装着满不在乎的样子,心里却怕得要死。同样,蒋介石内心也虚弱得很,却硬装出一副了不起的样子为自己壮胆。

  The forces that brought about China's civil war and revolution were superpersonal in character and so were the forces that swept the Communists toward power. One of these forces was dictatorship or despotism. This institution by its very nature is bound up with the personal. But it was not the personality of Chiang Kai-shek that shaped the nature of the despotism, but the nature of the dictatorship that shaped Chiang Kai-shek. Moreover, the character of this despotism was itself shaped by much larger forces - that is, the semifeudal, semicolonial quality of Chinese civilization.

  This dual nature of Chinese society resulted in a dual sovereignty - the rule of the native landlords and the merchant-industrial class tied to foreign capital. In his role of dictator, Chiang personified the union of these two ruling groups, with the party and the army adhering to them and sometimes sitting on top of them. The bourgeois and feudal elements in Chinese society were always at war with each other and so were the comprador and landlord elements in Chiang's character always fighting one another. The Chinese bourgeoisie, tied to foreign capital, was infected with feelings of inferiority and antiforeignism. In the same way, Chiang hated foreigners even while he depended on them. The landlords, the dying ruling class of China, were pervaded by premonitions of early death and were mortally afraid even while they tried to maintain their own attitude of superciliousness. So Chiang Kai-shek was afraid and tried to rid himself of his fears by an outward show of arrogance.

 

  国民党内的买办势力压倒了封建势力,所以在蒋介石的性格中,买办性也占了上风。买办的基本特点,一是依赖洋人,二是没有骨气。蒋就像任何一个普通的买办一样,尽管并非毫无摆脱外国老板而自立的幻想,但是一到摊牌的时候,却很少能同他们作斗争。他只是在日、俄、美、英之间纵横捭阖,先事一大国,再事另一大国。买办不像一般的资本家那样搞生产,而是买空卖空,全凭耍手腕。蒋也是如此。他为人狡诈、凶狠、毒辣,不惜重金收买别人,以达目的。买办总是在地主和洋商之间周旋,以求左右逢源,财运亨通。他永远也不能自立,也根本没有自己真正的个性可言。这也就是蒋的处世之道,他总是设法在中国封建势力和外国势力之间周旋。蒋既不能一心维护中国的旧派势力,也不能一心支持中国的新派力量,因此他就既得不到洋人的欢心,也得不到中国旧派人士的欢心。

  Because the comprador element dominated the feudal element in the Kuomintang, it also dominated in the character of the country's ruler. The primary traits of a comprador are: 1. Dependence on foreigners, and 2. Lack of character. Like any common compradore, who has illusions about making himself independent of his foreign boss, Chiang also cherished such dreams, but when it came to a showdown, he was seldom able to fight any of his bosses, but maneuvered among Japan, Russia, the United States and England, serving first one power and then another. Because a comprador is not engaged in production, like an ordinary capitalist, he has nothing to sell but tricks. It was the same with Chiang. He was sharp, quick, ruthless and did not hesitate to spend money in huge bribes to win his ends. A comprador is always maneuvering between landlords and foreign businessmen, trying to make money from both, and he can never be independent and never have any real character of his own. Chiang operated in the same way, trying to maneuver between both feudal China and foreign countries. Because he could be loyal neither to the old China nor to the new China, Chiang was disliked by foreigners and by old-style Chinese.

  中国社会的封建性使蒋的买办性复杂化了。蒋虽是个专制寡头,但骨子里却还是一个中世纪的氏族首领。他为人要比旧式军阀精明,但在政治上却仍然继承了他们的衣钵。他通过地主豪绅的代理人——村痞、狗腿子、打手等等统治农村,通过地痞流氓、青红帮统治城市。蒋既是封建暴君、买办资本家、恶霸地主、秘密帮会的把兄弟,又是政党领袖;既是一个过渡社会的产物,又是它的无冕之王。他的哲学、个性、思想以至日常行动部是由此决定的。

  蒋介石的形像有点忧郁,也有点滑稽,总是充满了矛盾,时而带有悲剧色彩。构成悲剧的一个主要因素,在于自由意志与必然性之间的关系。蒋的悲剧在于他想做不可能做到的事。他企图通过封建主义实行资本主义,通过儒家学说实行基督教义,通过专制独裁实行民主,通过沙文主义实行民族主义。到头来,徒然造成一团混乱——既造成了中国国内的混乱,也造成了他自己思想的混乱。

  Chiang's compradorism was complicated by the feudal nature of Chinese life. Scratch the despot in Chiang and underneath you would find a medieval clan leader. He was smarter than the old-style warlords, yet politically he was descended from them. He ruled the countryside through village loafers, dog legs, and bailiffs who were the agents of the landed gentry. He ruled the cities through gangsters and secret societies. Feudal tyrant, bourgeois comprador, village suzerain, secret society member and party leader - Chiang was both the product and the tincrowned head of a society in transition. His philosophy, personality, thoughts and even daily actions were molded by this fact.

  The figure of Chiang Kai-shek is a little depressing, a little ridiculous, at all times contradictory, and sometimes tragic. One of the chief elements of tragedy lies in the relation of the free will to necessity. The tragedy of Chiang Kai-shek was that he tried to do the impossible. He attempted to create capitalism through feudalism, Christianity through Confucianism, democracy through despotism, nationalism through chauvinism. In the end, he created only chaos - both within the nation and within his own soul.

  

  蒋生于上海附近的浙江省,据说他自称是一个中国古代帝王的后裔。这位中国独裁者眼睛总是向后看或者向上看。因此他必然不会去注意跟前的普通农民,更不会注意到这些纯朴的农民正在大踏步地向前迈进。因此,直到他已经被农民的怒潮冲倒的时候,还闹不清楚究竟是什么力量把自己打倒的。

  在伦理方面和政治方面,蒋都以儒家为标榜。但是此人究竟有无原则,实在令人怀疑。哈罗德·艾萨克斯在《亚洲无和平》一书今说得好:蒋“一切从自我出发,借各家思想为其所用……他采用过共产主义思想,盎格鲁——撒克逊的民主思想,基督教思想以及欧洲法西斯主义思想。”蒋接受基督教的某些信条,却不接受它的基本思想。他不懂得善行和怜悯,更不懂得人权和人类的平等。他既皈依基督,又祭祀鬼神,他口头也讲民主,却又奉行儒家的“王道”学说。他笃信孝道,鼓吹忠君孝悌这一套。而且他俨然是一个君主。

  蒋介石施政之道,取法于汉代专制君主的那一套——在官僚等级制度基础上一人独揽大权。君权是由于君主及其祖先拥有“德”这种神力。“仁、义、礼、智、信”可使国运亨通。蒋介石袭用“风行草偃”这句古语。但不知怎的,他的风越吹,人民就越是朝相反的方向倒去。

  蒋介石搬用古代巫医发明的这套哲理,来医治已经病人膏肓的中国社会的各种弊病,未能奏效,就归咎于世风日下,人心不古。农民是因为“不孝”,才造反,知识分子是因为“不义”才批评他,将领是因为“不忠”才倒向共产党。也就是说只有他蒋介石自己才是品德高尚的完人。这就必然使中国人民反而感到蒋自己才是寡廉鲜耻的小人,使这位高贵者为卑贱者所唾弃。

 

  Born in Chekiang Province, not far from Shanghai, Chiang reportedly claimed kinship with an ancient king of China. With his eyes looking back and up, it became inevitable that China's dictator noticed neither the lowly peasant at his feet nor the gigantic strides this simple man was taking forward. As a result, he fell before the peasant's onslaught hardly knowing what hit him.

  In morals, as well as politics, Chiang claimed to be a Confucianist. But it is doubtful if he had any principles at all. As Harold Isaacs put it in No Peace for Asia, Chiang's "motivations are in terms of himself. Ideas he must borrow... He has used communism, Anglo-Saxon democracy, Christianity, European fascism." Chiang embraced some of the tenets of Christianity, but none of its basic concepts. He knew little charity or mercy and less about the sanctity of the individual or the equality of man. He spoke of Christ, but burned offerings to the dead; he spoke of democracy, but practiced the Confucian doctrine of the "princely man"- the "Superior Man." His faith was that of filial piety and he believed that a son should obey his father, a younger brother an elder brother, and a subject his ruler. He was the ruler.

  His governmental principles were those of the Han despots - political authority centralized in one man, reinforced by a graded bureaucracy. The sanction for government was the possession by the ruler and his ancestors of a magical (1) property called "Virtue." Benevolence, Righteousness, Wisdom, Fidelity and Politeness - these insured the prosperity of the country. "As the wind blows so will the grass incline," said the ancients. Chiang echoed them. But somehow, the more he blew, the more the people inclined in the opposite direction.

  When he was unable to cure the ills of a mortally sick China with this philosophy borrowed from Chinese medicine men, Chiang blamed it on the loss of the ancient goodness. The peasants revolted because they were "unfilial." The intellectuals criticized him because they were not "sincere." A general turned over to the Communists because he had forgotten "loyalty." This attempt to monopolize moral goodness inevitably led the people of China to consider Chiang, himself, immoral. The inferior man was tired of the Superior Man.

原注一:在中国古代,统治者是通过“天命(君权神授)”获得统治权的。后来,孔儒赋予“天命(君权神授)”以“德行”的含义。一旦天命另有所归,统治者也就完蛋了。所以蒋介石拼命要垄断天命。 (1) In ancient China, kings derived sanction for their rule from the possession of a quality known as "teh" or "magical power." Later, Confucian scholars gave the word the moral connotation of virtue. When the magic virtue was lost, the ruler was destroyed. That is why Chiang tried to monopolize this commodity for himself.
  

  崇拜蒋介石的人曾把他比作拿破仑。但是这两个人并没有什么共同之处。虽然这两个人都是通过搞政变上台,而且都是调转枪口反对革命的,但是那位法国皇帝是天才的军事家、干练的组织家和有创新精神的行政家。至于这位中国独裁者,战略上他一窍不通,组织上他毫无章法,行政上更是一塌糊涂。拿破仑是资产阶级的化身,他用法国大革命的炮火轰倒了欧洲的封建主义。蒋介石却不是中国资产阶级的真正代表,也从来没有同本国的封建残余进行过斗争。拿破仑是威震异邦的伟大征服者,蒋则是拜倒在洋人脚下的顺从奴才。况且,像蒋这样一个昏庸的党棍,同曾经把《拿破仑法典》赋予欧洲的那位伟人又有什么共同之处呢?

  也有人把蒋介石比作希特勒,因为他性情暴戾,而且总是板着脸,摆出一副道貌岸然的样子。蒋在洋人面前摆出一副莫测高深,心平气和的脸孔。可是对待自己的部下动不动就大发雷霆,像泼妇一样地叫骂、摔茶杯、拍桌子。希待勒也如此。这两位独裁者有一点倒是一模一样的,他们都因不相信自己而不相信任何人。但是希特勒还有一定的风度和一定的创造性。而蒋则既没有什么风度,也没有什么创造性。比起蒋介石来,希特勒的吸引力要强得多。希持勒那些慷慨激昂的演说,尽管构思怪涎,总还包含一点激情,包含一点近乎高尚的东西。而蒋则至少在公众场合从未说过任何激动人心的话。希特勒激励了战败的德国人民受伤的心灵,可是蒋除了使人感到恐惧外,从来没有在任何人——甚至他的最热忱的支持者——都没有激起真正深刻的感情。希特勒是宗教狂,虔诚地相信天赋予己的使命。而蒋是一个思想混乱的马基雅维里式的人物,但却没有这位意大利人的明确思想和高明策略。希特勒是一个穷凶极恶的魔鬼,而蒋却不过是一个既无能耐又想当圣贤的“领袖”。

  Chiang has been compared by his admirers with Napoleon. But the two men had little in common. To be sure, both came to power by means of a coup d'etat and both turned their guns on the revolution. But the French emperor was a military genius, an efficient organizer and a creative administrator. China's dictator was an atrocious strategist, a bad organizer and a worse administrator. Napoleon was the very personification of the bourgeoisie and he brought down European feudalism with the artillery of the French Revolution. Chiang was not a true representative of the bourgeoisie in China and he never came to grips with the relics of feudalism in his own land. Napoleon was a great conqueror of foreign countries; Chiang was a servant of foreign nations. Finally, what did a party mandarin like Chiang have in common with the man who gave Europe the Napoleonic Code?

  Chiang has also been compared to Hitler because of his unstable character and his air of injured nobility. Before foreigners, Chiang put on a face of expressionless calm. With his own subordinates, however, he went into rages, screamed like a shrew, threw teacups, pounded on tables. So did Hitler. These two dictators were alike in their distrust of everybody due to a distrust of themselves. But Hitler had some style and some originality. Chiang had little style and not much originality. Hitler was vastly more colorful; there was an element of passion, almost of greatness in Hitler's rantings, however foully conceived. Chiang never said anything - at least publicly - with the slightest emotional appeal. Hitler inspired the bruised and defeated soul of the German people. Chiang stirred no one - not even his most ardent supporters - to any real depth of feeling unless it was fear. Hitler was a religious fanatic who devoutly believed in his mission. Chiang was a confused Machiavellian with none of the clarity of thought or well-conceived tactical principles of the Italian. Hitler was the Devil himself and his evil was thorough and black. But Chiang was merely an inefficient "leader" who wanted to become a sage.

  蒋不仅反复无常,而且背信弃义。一九三六年西安事变中,张学良留下他一命,而蒋却恩将仇报,把这位不疑有他、飞到南京的少帅拘禁起来。蒋一则怕张成为同他分庭抗礼的对手,二则出于嫉妒,因为事实证明张比他更了解其部下军官的政治情绪。

  也许蒋本人并不残忍凶狠。但他叫别人替他干坏事,以避免直接承担责任。他也很少惩办那些以他的名义杀人的凶手。他上台伊始就唆使流氓屠杀上海工人,并把这些流氓的头子当作其政权的一根支柱。国民党报纸竟把这个青红帮头子称为“著名慈善家”。在蒋的统治末期,国民党军队屠杀了台湾人民,蒋不去惩办进行屠杀的军人,反而谴责受到屠杀的岛上居民。据说蒋介石的特务头子戴笠因飞机失事丧命时,他倒伤心得掉了眼泪,尽管戴的手下部是些专用刀斧、毒药和手枪杀人的家伙。蒋可以为杀人刽子手之死哭泣,而对教授们的惨遭谋杀无动于衷。这样一个统治者真是比最无知、最爱动手杀人的庄稼汉还要可怕。庄稼汉是出于义愤或是出于深仇大恨去杀人的。而蒋指使别人行凶,自己却若无其事地宣讲耶稣和孔子的圣训,既到卫理会教堂做祷告,又向祖宗牌位顶礼膜拜。蒋同时乞灵于封建地主的神主和西方列强的上帝,这恰恰是蒋介石政权的物质基础所具有的双重性在精神方面的反映。

  Chiang was not only unstable, but treacherous. When Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang saved his life during the Sian kidnaping of 1936. Chiang repaid this deed by imprisoning the Young Marshal when that commander flew in all trust to Nanking. This was fear of a rival and also a kind of revenge on a man who had shown himself a better judge of the political temper of his officers than had Chiang.

  Chiang may not have been personally cruel. But he let others do his dirty work for him and thus avoided direct responsibility, and he seldom condemned those who performed murders in his name. At the very dawn of his reign, gangsters slaughtered the Shanghai workers and Chiang made the gang leader one of the pillars of his regime. In fact, Kuomintang papers called this gangster king "the well-known philanthropist." Toward the end of his reign, when his soldiers massacred the Formosans, Chiang castigated the murdered islanders, but not his murdering troops. Yet, when Tai Li, the head of his secret service, whose men performed their duties with hatchet, poison and pistol, died in an airplane accident, the generalissimo is said to have wept. This ruler who could weep for the death of a hatchet man, but could remain unmoved by the killings of professors, is somehow more awful than the most ignorant and bloodthirsty peasant. The peasant killed in the name of an honest passion and a strong personal desire for revenge. Chiang let others do the killings, then gave a lecture on Jesus Christ and Confucius, prayed in the Methodist Church and bowed to his ancestral tablets. This simultaneous calling on the gods of the feudal landlords and the Western powers was, of course, but the spiritual reflection of the dual nature of Chiang's material bases of power.
  人们不能不感到,蒋介石反复无常的性情后面隐藏着一种极度的恐惧。他十分虚荣、神经过敏,几乎到了歇斯底里的程度。他患有小人得志时所常犯的神经极度过敏症,只有同平庸无能之辈呆在一起才感到心安理得。在他当政的二十年中,只有算卦的、看相的、土巫师说他的好话,却没有一位稍有名望的中国作家赞扬过他。蒋介石才疏智浅,却故意装腔作势。像宋子文、史迪威将军一类的优秀人才,不肯对他低三下四、奴颜卑声,唯命是从。只在危难之际他才起用有头脑、有个性的人物。

  蒋介石越是内心感到自卑,便越是妄自尊大,到了十分可笑的地步。他往往抓住一些鸡毛蒜皮的事情大发淫威。一九四四年,蒋介石由史迪威将军陪同参加了军官学校的毕业典礼。史迪威将军说话尖酸刻薄,对事观察入微,在日记中这样描述中国的统治者在那些未来的卫国勇士面前的举动;

  “蒋光头登上主席台时,乐队指挥数救说一——二——三。蒋光头勃然大怒,命令停止奏乐,厉声大骂指挥说:‘要么数到一就开始奏乐,要么数到三再开始。不准在数二时开始。’后来有一位讲演者从裤兜里掏出讲稿,蒋光头为此又暴跳如雷,冲着他厉声训斥说,在外国,裤兜里只能放手帕不能放文件。应该把文件放在上衣的下面口袋里,如果是密件,必须放在上面的口袋里。后来有人在掌握大会程序上出了一点差错,蒋光头就疯也似地尖叫说该把这个人枪毙……”

  不可想象美国的总统会当着西点军校毕业进来这么一番表演。可是,蒲立特先生却吹捧蒋是一位“有远见的政治家”,说他的形象甚至比当代的任何美国人都要高大。我们认为,决不能把蒋称作什么政治家,除非政治家一词的含义变成公众生活中卑鄙无耻现像的同义词。史迪威称蒋为“光头”、“小瘪三”、“酋长”、“那个大小子”、“老滑头”、“响尾蛇”。我们认为这些绰号远比蒲立特的话更接近于蒋的真实形象。

  Underneath Chiang's instability, it is hard not to see a gnawing fear. He was vain and touchy to the point of hysteria. He had the supersensitivity of an omnipotent nobody and felt at ease only among mediocre people. Public soothsayers, fortunetellers and village witches said him well. But during his twenty-year reign, scarcely one Chinese writer of any standing had anything good to say about him. Not sure of his talents, Chiang took refuge in being noble. When dealing with rare characters like T. V. Song or General Stilwell who refused to kowtow and scrape before him, Jie got rid of them. He selected his ministers and commanders on a principle of loyalty and moral supineness. Men of brain and character he summoned only in an emergency.

  Chiang's basic feelings of inferiority led him to indulge his vanity to the point of meanness. Even the smallest incidents of everyday life furnished him with an excuse for an arrogant display of his power. In 1944, General Stilwell, a man with a vinegar tongue and a sharp eye for detail, accompanied the generalissimo to graduation exercises at the Military Academy and noted down in his diary this description of the ruler of China as he appeared before the future defenders of the country:

  As the Peanut [Chiang] mounted the rostrum, the band leader counted 1-2-3. The Peanut was furious, stopped the band, bawled out the leader. "Either start playing on 1 or start on 3. Don't start on 2." Then a speaker pulled his notes out of his pockets. This infuriated the Peanut. He bawled him out and told him that in foreign countries you could put a handkerchief in your pants pocket, but not papers. Papers go in lower coat pockets and if secret in upper coat pockets. Then someone stumbled on procedure and the Peanut went wild screaming that he ought to be shot... (2)

  It is impossible to imagine the president of the United States acting in such a fashion before a graduating class of West Point cadets. Yet Mr. William C. Bullitt declared that Chiang was a "far-sighted statesman" who bulked larger than any living American. For ourselves we cannot call Chiang a statesman unless this word be synonymous with what is mean and invidious in public life. And we think Stilwell was much closer to an accurate portrait than Bullitt when he referred to Chiang as "the Peanut," "little bugger," "tribal chieftain," "big Boy," "the all-wise," "the rattle snake."

原注二:引自《史迪威报告》,西奥多·怀特编著(见下图)。 (2) The Stilwell Papers, ed. Theodore H. White (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948).

  蒋并非政治家而是一个专制统治者,不管是仁慈的还是不仁慈的。他具有一个专制统治者的全部特征。此人精通政治权术,讲起策略来专会投机取巧。治理国家他毫无章法,指挥作战他是十足蠢才。

  他是通过搞阴谋诡计、叛卖、讹诈、恐怖以及宣扬孔孟之道上台的。一九二六年他在孙中山的国民党内部搞政变,篡夺了党的领导权。一九二七年他屠杀上海工人,窃得全国政权。他靠一系列不露声色的阴谋和虚张声势的讨伐进一步巩固了他的统治。他诱骗“基督将军”冯玉祥投到他的阵营以后,把他的部队全部挖走;把军阀韩复榘骗到火车上开会就枪毙了他,说服张学良将军不去打侵占其满洲老家的日本人,而去打主张抗日的共产党。

  中国的这位独裁统治者在这方面确实是颇为在行的。蒋上台后,能用挑动各种对立势力互相斗争的办法来维护自己的统治;他让右派同左派斗,反动派同自由派,小军阀同共产党斗,特务同学生斗,秘密警察同商人斗,党部同政府斗,宋子文同孔祥熙斗,陈纳德将军同史迪威将军斗,美国同俄国斗。

  Chiang was not a statesman. He was a despot, benevolent or otherwise, and he felt all the effects of one. In the field of political tactics, he was a master; in strategy - an opportunist; in government - a fumbler; in war - a fool.

  With intrigue, treachery, blackmail, terror and Confucian maxims, he rode to power. A coup d'etat against the Kuomintang of Dr. Sun Yat-sen brought the party to his feet in 1926. The slaughter of the Shanghai workers delivered the whole nation into his hands in 1927. A series of slow-burning intrigues and comic-opera wars further consolidated his control. Well did China's dictator know how to coax the Christian General Feng Yu-hsiang into the fold and then win all his soldiers from him; how to lure Warlord Han Fu-chu to a meeting in a railway train and execute him; how to persuade Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to fight, not the Japanese who were in his Manchurian homeland, but the Communists who were advocating war against Japan.

  Once in power, Chiang kept there by playing one opponent off against another: right against left, reactionary against liberal, warlord against Communist, secret service against student, gestapo against merchant, party against government, T. V. Soong against H. H. Kung, General Chennault against General Stilwell, and the United States against Russia.

  拍桌子跺脚,破口大骂,威胁恫吓,用圣贤之言攻破对方的计策,用鬼蜮手段取胜,通过收买铲除异己——蒋介石什么事情都干得出来——不停地搞阴谋、耍诡计——他相信这种办法灵得很,因为他懂得人的贪婪、软弱和怯懦。这一手确是厉害,在他所生活的乱世里,这位道貌岸然的东方君主就凭这一手在中国政治舞台上称霸了近四分之一世纪。

  蒋凭着这一手,在他发迹初期的小规模战争中所向披靡,制服了各个军阀:在这些战争中施展计谋比实际作战更为重要。但是现在时代变了,这一手突然失灵了,对付不了人民战争和革命。共产党发动的人民战争和革命,就像一根千钧棒一样,正向蒋介石的脑门猛击过来。在革命的人民战争中,群众的情绪决定一切。正是蒋所不能理解的这种群众情绪把他推翻了。

  究竟是历史迫使蒋介石搞专制主义,还是他自己要走这条路,这个问题最好由哲学家来回答。但是,有一点很清楚,专制独裁的逻辑本身使他不可能预见到反对他的凶险的力量正在农村中勃然兴起。

 

  To stamp, to rage, to threaten, to breach his opponent's strategy with quotations from the Master, to win by stealth and destroy with rewards - for Chiang everything lay in this - to plot, plot, plot incessantly - and he put his faith in this method for he understood the cupidity, the weakness and the cowardice of men. It was a formidable method and one which united to the desperate times in which he was born, made this austere lord of the Orient invincible in Chinese politics for nearly a quarter of a century.

  But times changed, and this method which overwhelmed warlords and was irresistible in the limited wars of his early career, where intention rather than execution ruled, suddenly was no longer applicable to the people's war and the revolution which the Communists hurled like a club at Chiang's head. In these spheres, mass passions were king and it was these passions that Chiang failed to understand and that overwhelmed him.

  Whether history forced Chiang into despotism or he chose the road voluntarily himself is a question best answered by philosophers, but this fact is plain - the very logic of dictatorship prevented him from foreseeing the dark forces that whirled up from the countryside against him.

  谁也不对蒋介石讲真话。谁也不敢讲。如果有人同他争论,蒋就会暴跳如雷。他听不得半句逆耳的话,所以大家都对他报喜不报忧。他的一个亲信说:“对他只有一个办法,就是说他是世界上最了不起的人物。”外国记者对蒋的采访向来搞不好,因为政府的译员在他面前吓得不敢把记者所提的问题原原本本照译出来。小官儿在他面前都吓得直发抖。由他主持的会议,无人敢抗争,也无人敢提出问题。他举行的宴会冷冰冰的,尽是些陈词滥调,正像史迪威所描述的那样人人正襟危坐、恭聆这位皇上的纶音。

  蒋介石对待他的政府官员就像一位贵夫人对待自己家里的奴婢一样。有时由于舆论的压力或者由于美国人表示不满,他不得不搞一点内阁改组。但是正如白修德和雅各比所揭露的,蒋介石改组内阁“简直就像美国儿童玩抢椅子的游戏一样,一发信号大家就互相抢座位”。老是那么几个人参加游戏,老是那么几张椅子,难得有圈外人参加。

  No one told Chiang Kai-shek the truth. No one dared. Chiang flew into a rage if anyone argued against him. He was not willing to listen to anything unpleasant. So everybody told him pleasant things. "The only way to handle him," remarked a close associate, "is to tell him he is the most wonderful man in the world." Foreign correspondents never could interview Chiang successfully because official interpreters were too scared to ask questions posed by reporters. In his presence, petty officials were seized with fits of trembling. His conferences were sterile of arguments and questions. His dinner parties were icy affairs where nothing but platitudes were served and everyone, as Stilwell remarked, sat stiffly waiting to be addressed from the throne.

  Chiang handled his government officials as a titled lady handles her household servants. Occasionally a wave of public criticism or disgusted American pressure would force some cabinet change. Then the generalissimo, in the words of White and Jacoby (3) would make cabinet changes "almost the way American children play musical chairs; on the given signal everyone would rush for someone else's seat." There were usually the same number of chairs and the same number of players, and outsiders rarely got into the game.

  蒋从不相信任何人,自以为一贯正确。他下过成千上万道命令,下级都对之唯唯诺诺,但是这位委员长却并不怎么了解人们究竟是怎样执行他的命令的。他似乎从来不明白,用一个地主指挥全村事情那样的办法来指挥全国范围的事务是不行的。等他认识到这一点的时候已经太晚了。差不多直到他下台为止他始终执迷不悟,一直把自己看作是主宰一切的上帝。

  蒋介石呆在离前线两千英里的后方,向部队的指挥官们下了无数道命令,叫他们采取根本不符合当地情况的行动。他曾对史迪威说:“我接连几天睡不着觉,揣测他们(将领们)可能会干什么蠢事。然后我就发出命令,叫他们不要去做这些蠢事……这就是指挥他们的秘诀……你得想象出他们可能犯的各种错误,然后告诫他们别那么干。”蒋这样做的结果,必然是使师长们不按照实际需要办事,而是一味迎合他的旨意办事。

  Because he distrusted everyone, Chiang had to consider himself infallible. He wrote orders by the thousands and everyone said yes to his orders, but the generalissimo seldom knew what had been done. He seems never to have been aware - until too late - that he could not order events on a nationwide scale in the same manner that a landlord could order events within a village. Almost to the end of his reign, he persisted in the delusion that he was a god who could control every happening.

  Two thousand miles from the front, he wrote endless instructions to his commanders, telling them to take actions that bore no relation to existing conditions. "I have to lie awake nights," he told Stilwell, "thinking what fool things they [the generals] may do. Then I. write and tell them not to do these things. . . This is the secret of handling them ... you must imagine everything that they can do that would be wrong and warn them against it." (4) The result of this, of course, was that division commanders became vitally interested in doing what they thought Chiang wanted them to do and not what the situation required.

原注三:引自西奥多·怀特(二战时“时代”杂志驻重庆的记者,即白修德,1962年获普利策奖)和安纳利·杰可比合著《中国的雷声》(见前图)。

原注四:引自《史迪威报告》(见前图)。

(3) Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1947), p. 114.

(4) The Stilwell Papers, p. 117.

  上面讲的情况可能会使人以为蒋有控制他部下的无限权力。其实即使最独断专行的统治者也不可能随心所欲地指挥别人、左右局势。列夫·托尔斯泰很懂得这一点,他说:“同其他人最牢固、最持久、最累赘也是最经常的关系就是所谓支配别人的权力,其实这意味着对别人最大的依赖。”这些话简直像是针对蒋介石说的。他完全依赖别人,即使在他的全盛时期,这位中国独裁者也不得不在农村的家族势力与城市的买办势力之间搞平衡。由于他在两方面都有敌人,他就努力在军内和党内,特别是在秘密警察中建立一个效忠于他个人的独立体系。因此,在一段时间里,他得以在一定程度上牢牢控制局面。但是,随着他开始走下坡路,他的统治机器也开始运转不灵甚至完全不管用了。原先的社会组织者背弃了他,他进一步成为孤家寡人,众叛亲离之势渐成,险像环生。中国的独裁者把握不住局势的发展。这时专制体制本身成了极大的障碍。蒋介石周围都是马屁精和密探,对于他的官僚等级机构内部的任何一点风吹草动,都有人随时向他汇报。但是,当斗争的范围扩大,变成像抗日战争那样的抵御外侮的民族战争,或是像共产党领导的群众起义时,由于手下的人谎报军情,把他蒙在鼓里,加之他素来疑神疑鬼,偏听偏信,就搞得自己更加孤立,更无从准确地预见事态的发展,而像一个盲人失去了引路狗一样到处瞎撞。   From this it might appear that Chiang had unlimited power over his subordinates. But even the most despotic rulers cannot arbitrarily control either men or events. Leo Tolstoy understood this very well when he said: "the strongest, most indissoluble, most burdensome, and constant bond with other men is what is called power over others, which in its real meaning is only the greatest dependence on them." These words might have been written about Chiang himself. He was utterly dependent on other men. Even in the heyday of his career, China's dictator had to balance himself between the clandom in the countryside and the compradors in the cities. Since he had enemies in both camps, he tried to build up an independent apparatus in the army, the party and above all in a secret service loyal to him personally. For a while he was able to control affairs with some degree of accuracy. But as his sun declined toward the west, his machinery of power began to creak and break down. The old organizers of society deserted him; his despotism became more isolated, the circle of loyal supporters grew less and the dangers increased all the time. China's dictator lost the ability to predict what was going to happen. In this respect, the institution of despotism itself proved an unbearable handicap. Surrounded by lickspittles and spies, the generalissimo was alert to the slightest tremor in the ranks of his graded bureaucracy, but when the arena of struggle was enlarged to a national war against a foreign foe such as the Japanese, or a mass rebellion such as that led by the Communists, Chiang, being isolated by a wall of misinformation and lies and compounding his own isolation by acts of fear and favor, was unable to predict the course of events accurately and staggered around like a blind man who has suddenly been deserted by his seeing-eye dog.

  在抗日战争初期,蒋的顾问们说,只要他坚持在淞沪抗战,西方列强就会出面进行干预。于是他就没有把部队集中在内地,以充分利用后方辽阔的优越条件。相反,他把七十八个师的兵力部署在日本海军炮火威力所及的沿海地区,结果使他的精锐部队被歼,自己也不得不逃到一千五百英里以外的重庆。内战初起时,国民党内的右翼宣称他们可以在半年内消灭共产党,蒋于是撕毁了马歇尔主持达成的停战协定,贸然发动了进攻,因为他没有准确的情报。一位在美国留过学的中国将军认为最好还是撤出满洲,但蒋的特务进谗说,此人正同美国人密谋取蒋而代之。于是蒋偏下令死守满洲,直到部队全被歼灭方休。一九四八年十一月,他的空军报称在徐州获得大捷,于是蒋就死守徐州,共军乘机攻击他的后方,终于包围并基本歼灭了他的两个兵团,直接威胁首都南京。国民党头目说,学生举行大规模游行要求和平,这完全是共产党策划的阴谋,因此蒋便听任军警驱散游行队伍,殴打学生,而不加制止。他的秘密警察说,写文章抗议通货膨胀的教授是共产党,于是蒋就下令逮捕这些教授。外国记者报道国民党军队在台湾岛上开枪打死打伤了手无寸铁的银行家、律师、教员、学生和农民,这位委员长竟斥责记者报道失实,有损中美人民的友谊。

  At the start of the Japanese war, Chiang's advisers indicated the Western powers would interfere if he fought in Shanghai, and instead of massing his troops in the interior and taking advantage of his magnificent back country, he put seventy-eight divisions under Japan's naval guns, until the better part of his army was wiped out and he had to flee fifteen hundred miles to Chungking. At the start of civil war the rightist clique in the party said they could wipe out the Communists in six months and Chiang, having no better information, tore up the Marshall truce agreement and launched an ill-conceived offensive. An American-educated Chinese general thought it would be best to get out of Manchuria, but Chiang's spies hinted that this man was plotting with the Americans to take over his pOsition in China and he clung on till he was liquidated. His air force declared it had achieved a big victory at Suchow in November 1948 and Chiang held onto the city, while Communists were striking at his rear until two army groups were surrounded, practically annihilated and his very capital at Nanking threatened. His party bosses said the mammoth student parades for peace were mere Communist plots and he never interfered with the breakup of the parades and the clubbing of the students. His secret service declared that professors writing articles against inflation were Communists and he let them be arrested. Foreign correspondents reported that his soldiers had shot down and killed unarmed bankers, lawyers, teachers, students and farmers on the island of Formosa, and the generalissimo reproved the reporters for making misstatements that might alter the friendly relations between the Chinese people and America.
  这种狂妄专横的态度,这种除了自己的亲信、特务的报告外其他情报一概不信的态度,这种对震撼中国的激烈社会动荡视而不见的态度,使这位委员长陷入了一种怪诞的思想境界,简直可以说是神经错乱。随着战局日益失利,蒋更加脱离现实环境,遁入自己所虚构出来的世界之中。希腊人说,“上帝要使人灭亡,必先使他疯狂”。信哉斯言!

  蒋虽说是帝王苗裔,可惜生不逢时。史迪威说:“如果是在五十年或一百年前,他可能是中国可以接受的一位领袖。但是在现代情况下,他的不学无术成了一大不利条件。”当事态发展不顺心时,他先是不知所措,接着就恼羞成怒。同米尼弗·奇威一样,蒋为事与愿违而浩叹,而且“因背天逆时而消得人憔悴”。

  This supercilious, despotic attitude, this unwillingness to give credence to any reports but those of his own loyal spies, this blindness to the mighty social convulsions that were shaking China, led the generalissimo into weird realms of thought that can hardly be described as anything else but insanity. As the war went against him, Chiang lost touch with his material environment and lived in a world of his own making. "Those whom the gods will destroy, they first make mad," said the Greeks, and it is hard not to believe them.

  Chiang was well born, but late born. "Fifty or a hundred years ago," said Stilwell, "he might have been an acceptable leader in China. But his lack of education handicapped him under modern conditions." When events refused to bend to his will, be became bewildered, then angry. Like Miniver Cheevy, Chiang sighed for what was not and "grew lean while he assailed the seasons."

  他想成为一代宗师、宗教领袖、哲学大师,但他没有什么文化。史迪威说,“我们一目了然的事情,他却一窍不通……他不顾常理,只凭自己的直觉办事,借口中国人心理不同而随意掀翻已经证实的规律。”

  蒋毫无科学知识,却企图指挥美式配备的部队。在当时的情况下,如果他干脆像共产党那样完全按照中国的办法去打仗,结果可能要好得多。因为他不了解外国的文化和外国的心理,他就用对付地方军阀的办法来对付列强,沿用“以夷制夷”的祖训,企图挑动列强互相争斗,以从中渔利。结果却几乎得罪了所有的列强。
  He wanted to be a moral potentate, a religious leader, a philosopher. But he had little culture. "The picture we see clearly," said Stilwell, "is dark to him... " He hurdles logic by using his intuition, dismisses proven principles by saying Chinese psychology is different."(5)

  Chiang had no scientific knowledge, yet tried to direct forces equipped with American arms. Under the circumstances he would have been much better off to fight on purely Chinese terms, as did the Communists. Because he knew little of foreign culture or foreign morality, he dealt with foreign powers as if he were dealing with local warlords, followed the ancient dictum of using "barbarians to control barbarians" and tried to play one power off against the other until he had alienated almost every chancellory in the world.
原注五:引自《史迪威报告》。 (5) Ibid.
  蒋的孤陋寡闻造成了他性格的严重缺陷。他早年曾以勇敢果断著称,但是在抗日战争和剿共战争期间,这一优点已丧失殆尽。在抗日战争中,他要对付一个既无法讹诈或收买,又无法欺负的敌人;在剿共战争中,他要对付普通百姓的大规模造反。在这两次战争中,他都不得不同自己所不熟悉的对手打交道,因而才穷智尽。而且蒋越是意识到自己优柔寡断的危险性,就越加胆怯,变得手足无措,不知如何是好。一九三七年淞沪之役,他不愿后撤,长期犹豫不决,举棋不定,以致遭到惨重损失,断送了他最精锐的部队。一九四七年和四八年间,他一念孤行,在山东地区始则盲目冒进,继而迟疑不前,举棋不定,接着又死守阵地,不进不退,结果闹得他的一些将领愤而投奔共军。   Chiang's intellectual deficiencies had serious effects on his character. Noted in his early days for his boldness and resolution, Chiang lost both qualities in the wars against Japan and the Communists. In the one case he was up against an enemy that could not be blackmailed, bribed or bullied; in the other case he was up against a mass rebellion of common people. In both cases, since he had to deal with the unfamiliar, his intelligence lost its original force, and Chiang became only the more timid the more he became aware of the danger of irresolution which held him spellbound. Thus we find him caught in the horrible slaughterhouse at Shanghai in 1937, unwilling to retreat, unable to come to a decision and vacillating so long that he lost the flower of his army. Thus we find him in 1947 and 1948 plunging forward stubbornly in Shantung, then halting, then wavering, then holding on, refusing to advance, refusing to retreat, until in disgust some of his generals turned over to the Communists.

  蒋并不是软弱之辈。但是他的坚强性格常常化为固执。经过多年的奋斗,他变得刚愎自用,有时不免犯一种毛病:办事凭意气,而不是按照一种信念或大的原则。正是由于他的固执,使他不顾张学良少帅的一再警告,不相信张的东北军再也不愿打共产党了,结果酿成一九三六年的西安事变,他被扣押起来。他的愚顽不化使他在一九四二年撤销史迪威将军的命令,不让中国远征军取道印度撤出缅甸,致使许多士兵在西藏的穷乡僻壤迷途丧命。他的刚愎自用使他在一九四五年不顾魏德迈将军的劝告而进军满洲。最后,还是由于他盲目地固执己见和疯狂地自以为是,使他不顾手下将领们的一再告诫,不相信只能用政治手段来解决这场战争,结果搞得文官不愿主持政务,武将拒绝挂帅上阵,外国也拒绝继续提供援助。当然也可以把这称之为坚忍不拔。要是那样的话,当年希特勒命令冯·保罗斯死守斯大林格勒,命令伦斯泰德死守诺曼底,命令西线德军死守莱茵河,致使全军覆没、战争失败,不也可以说是坚忍不拔了吗?

  Chiang was not a weak man, but in him strength of character often led to a degenerate form of it, obstinacy. Hardened by years of struggle, he sometimes fell into the error of proceeding with plans from a feeling of opposition instead of from a conviction or a higher principle. It was stubbornness that made him disregard the warnings of the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, that his Manchurian soldiers no longer wanted to fight the Communists, and resulted in his being kidnaped at Sian in 1936; it was ignorant obstinacy that made him countermand General Stilwell's order in 1942 for Chinese troops to evacuate Burma by way of India so that many were lost under the fastnesses of Tibet where they died; it was conceited mulishness that made him go into Manchuria in 1945 against the advice of General Wedemeyer; and finally, it was blind obstinacy and a crazy faith in his own rightness that made him disregard the warnings of his generals that the war could only be settled by political means until in the end politicians refused to head the government, generals refused to take command in the field and foreign powers refused to send him any more aid. You may call this resolute determination, if you will, but then call Hitler resolute for directing von Paulus to hold on at Stalingrad, von Rundstedt to hold on in Normandy and the German Army of the west to hold on at the Rhine so that all were wiped out and the war lost.

  

  闹到最后,蒋介石脱离了人民群众,甚至也脱离了拥护他的人们。不管将领们要求他下令后撤也好,知识分子请愿要求自由也好,学生游行要求民主也好,司徒雷登大使要他实行开明政策也好,结果全是枉然。到头来,将军被撤职,知识分子被枪毙,学生被殴打,司徒雷登大使则被回敬以孔子遗训一则。

  由于虚荣,蒋无法改弦更张。由于“高贵”,他不能同贫贱者接触。由于有“德”,他可以懂得仁、诚、忠,却不懂人民需要宽厚、同情和希望。他号称信奉基督教,却没有什么慈悲心肠。他自称革命,但总是朝后看。他在战场上缺乏勇气,在政治上缺乏创见,在治国方面缺乏公正。他既不能统率大军南征北战,又不能制订宏伟的政治纲领,也不能提倡任何重大改革。总之,蒋脑筋陈腐,完全落伍于时代,根本无法承担肩上的重任。

  In the end, Chiang divorced himself not only from the mass of the people, but even from his own supporters. In vain might the army officers beg him to retreat, the intellectuals plead for freedom, the students parade for democracy, Ambassador Leighton Stuart tell him to liberalize his government. The army officer would be relieved, the intellectual shot, the student beaten and Ambassador Stuart given a Confucian maxim.

  Being vain, Chiang could not change. Being "superior," he could not get in touch with the poor. Being "virtuous," he could understand benevolence, sincerity and fidelity, but not the people's need for charity, sympathy and hope. Professing Christianity, he had little compassion in his make-up. Asserting he was revolutionary, he kept his face turned toward the past. On the battlefield, he lacked boldness; in politics he lacked creativeness; in government, he lacked justice. He could neither unite broad masses of troops in great sweeping maneuvers, make bold political plans, nor create any major reforms. In short, Chiang, caught in an age entirely too modern for his intellect, was in a job much too large for his talents.

  蒋介石也不是毫无头脑,毫不了解国情,像当年被革命的车轮辗得粉碎的俄国沙皇尼古拉和法国国王路易十六那样昏庸。蒋介石没有像他们那样受制于悍妻。可是他的夫人宋美龄对他还是有很大的影响,在各国驻华外交宫中素有“女委员长”之称。随着蒋的处境日益困难,随着他对美国的依赖日益加深,这种影响也就逐年增长。这对男女“委员长”堪称中西合壁的联姻,绝妙地反映了在中国社会占统治地位的封建地主和资产阶级的结合。这里且来介绍一下宋美龄的情况。

  Not entirely lacking in imagination, nor completely impervious to the needs of his country, as were Czar Nicholas of Russia and Louis XVI of France, when they were ground beneath the wheels of revolution, Chiang Kai-shek was not dominated by a strong wife as were those rulers. Yet he was much under the influence of the madamissimo, as foreign diplomats called his consort, and this influence increased with the years and the difficulties and Chiang's dependence on the United States. Together the gissimo and the missimo constituted a kind of unit - and this combination was almost an exact parody of the union of the Occident and the Orient in Chinese life and the subsidiary union between the feudal and bourgeois elements of the ruling social structure. But first we must speak of Madame Chiang herself.

  中国的这位第一夫人是赫赫有名的宋氏家族的成员,她的兄弟姐妹全都是中国现代史册上的风云人物。父亲是一位基督教徒,托圣经的福发家致富,得以把子女送到美国上学。宋氏兄弟姐妹聪明伶俐,在美国深得西方文化的真传,回国以后几乎立即在中国政治生活中崭露头角。宋家第一个有作为的是天资聪颖、抱有崇高理想的宋庆龄,她嫁给了中华民国的国父孙中山。宋美龄后来居上,嫁给了扼杀民国的刽子手蒋介石。宋霭龄嫁给了中国的理财大师孔祥熙博士,孔曾任行政院长,退隐后移居美国。她们的兄弟宋子文成了中国最大的富豪之一,也曾一度出任国民政府的行政院长。他们一家全都活跃于中国政坛,操纵战争和政治好像是他们的家常便饭。同天下所有的家庭一样,宋家成员之间也有分歧。孙夫人是这一家的理想主义者,蒋夫人是个权力狂,孔夫人爱财如命。宋子文集其三姐妹的大成,既是理想主义者,又野心勃勃。   This first lady of China was a member of the fabulous Soong family, consisting of three sisters and several brothers, all of whom bulked large on the pages of recent Chinese history. The father of the Soongs was a Chinese Christian who waxed moderately wealthy on the word of God and was able to send his children to school in the United States. In America the Soongs absorbed the teachings of Western culture with such rapidity and acumen that they were able to return to their native land and almost immediately assume an important role in Chinese government and politics. The first Soong to come into prominence was the gifted and idealistic Soong Ching-ling who married Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Chinese Republic. Soong Mei-ling went her sister one better and married Chiang Kai-shek, the assassin of the republic. A third sister married Dr. H. H. Kung, the financier of the republic, who became premier of China and retired to the United States. A brother, T. V. Soong, became one of the richest men in China and also was at one time premier of the national government. All the Soongs had a finger in public Chinese life and they conducted war and politics as if it were a family affair. Like all families, the members had their differences. Madame Sun Yat-sen was the idealist of the family; Madame Chiang loved power; Madame Kung liked money. T. V. Soong, combining all the qualities of his sisters, was idealistic and ambitious.

  宋美龄有一个方面非常像沙皇尼古拉和法王路易十四的皇后:尽管她与俄后亚历山德拉和法后玛丽·安托万内特不一样,并非在外国出生的,但是在中国人民中间她却总有点显得像一个外国人。她在美国受的教育,完全是美国中上层妇女的派头。二十年前,有一个美国记者刻薄地把她称作“爱打扮的美国女郎”。这固然是夸张,但也有点道理。蒋夫人讲排场,爱出风头。从她身上的穿戴就可以看出她爱摆阔气的心理。她的毛皮大衣多得数不清,还有非常考究的披肩和剪裁十分合身的花衣服。她足蹬脚尖镂空的高跟皮鞋,手提讲究的拎包,耳朵上还挂着钻石耳坠。

  雍容华贵的宋美龄还出国活动。第二次世界大战期间,她访问美国,呼吁立即援华,很有办法地博取美国国会议员们的同情。她对那些上了年纪的参议员们大灌迷魂汤,以致当时想先集中全力把欧洲战事了结再说的马歇尔将军向记者惊叹说,蒋夫人是他所见到过的最难对付的说客。一个被她迷得神魂颠倒的美国记者写道:“她那乌黑的眼珠犹如清澈见底的一汪秋水;皓齿微启,发出美妙的乐章;纤雅的双手犹如夏夜微风中婆娑的荷叶。”

  In one respect, Madame Chiang was very much like the consorts of Czar Nicholas and Louis XVI. Not actually foreign born like Alexandra and Marie Antoinette, the madamissimo was nevertheless somewhat of an alien among her own people. Educated in the United States, she took on all the trappings of an upper-middle-class American woman. Twenty years ago, a reporter was unkind enough to refer to her as an "American flapper." This statement was an exaggeration, but in it there was an element of truth. Madame Chiang had a taste for luxury and excitement. Her clothes betrayed an expensive state of mind. She had numerous fur coats, fine wraps and carefully fitted printed dresses. She wore toeless shoes with spiked heels, carried smart handbags, and decorated her ears with diamond clips.

  With such trappings, Madame Chiang went far. When she visited the United States during World War II to plead for immediate help to China, she had no trouble winning the sympathy of American congressmen. So devastating was her effect on aging senators that George Marshall, who was trying first to finish off the war in Europe, was moved to tell correspondents that Madame Chiang was the most powerful advocate he had ever had to face. An American reporter who came under her spell wrote: "Her eyes are limpid pools of midnight inkiness; her teeth are visual symphonies of oral architecture; her hands are lotus fronds swaying in a summer breeze."

  宋美龄颇有演戏的本事。在传教士面前她端庄婉静,在摄影记者面前她搔首弄姿。对于耿直爽快的史迪威将军她就开门见山,不绕圈子。她对史迪威将军封官许愿说:“我们要保举你当上将。”有一次,她对史迪成说;“你的吉星高照,很快要晋衔了。”随着岁月的流逝,宋美龄越来越扮演着中国第一夫人的角色。外国驻华外交官称她为“王母娘娘”,或者称她“玛丽皇后“。史迪威还给她另外起了个绰号:“白雪公主”。

  不过,史迪威还是很佩服宋美龄的。看来这位将军赞叹的是宋美龄这个东方躯体上竟是满脑子西方思想。史迪威曾说;“她是一个很有手腕的聪明女人。她理解西方的观点,懂得外国人的心理”。这在一定程度上是对的。可悲的是,除了他周围一小帮人以外,她对本国人民的心理毫不懂得。西方教育使宋美龄学到一点男人的气质。她曾对史迪威说,她但愿自己生为男子汉。她干脆、泼辣,干劲十足。她像男人一样爱掌权,但在喜欢阿阿谀奉承方面又是女人本色。她极想有所作为。史迪威认为,如果让她当国防部长,倒不失为一个好主意。

  宋美龄长期侨居海外,对外国的情况有所了解,却不了解本国的国情。她可以学罗斯福夫妇的样子搞炉边恳谈,却学不了罗斯福夫人待人亲切、民主、宽厚的精神,甚至也学不了她自己的姐姐孙中山夫人的品质。由于蒋介石背叛孙中山的三民主义,孙夫人就同蒋决裂了。宋美龄虽然能在她丈夫同马歇尔将军和罗斯福总统这样高级人士之间担任翻译,却不能在她丈夫和中国人民之间沟通思想。

  Madame was somewhat of an actress. With missionaries, she was reserved. With photographers, she was temperamental. With General Stilwell, a blunt and forthright man, she also was blunt and forthright. She tried to feed General Stilwell's vanity. "We're going to make you a full general," she would say. Another time, she told Stilwell: "Your star is rising." As the years passed, Madame Chiang came more and more to play the role of China's first lady. "Madame Empress," foreign diplomats called her. Or else: "Queen Marie." Stilwell had another name for her: "Snow White." Nevertheless, Stilwell had a great deal of admiration for Madame Chiang. What the General seems to have admired most was the Occidental mind that existed in Madame Chiang's Oriental body. "A clever brainy woman," said Stilwell. "she sees the Western viewpoint and can appreciate the mental reactions of a foreigner." This was true to a certain extent. The tragedy was that Madame Chiang couldn't appreciate the mental reactions of any but a narrow clique of her own people.

  Western education gave the madamissimo a touch of masculinity. She told Stilwell she wished that she had been born a man. She was direct, forceful, energetic and loved power like a man, but ate up flattery like a woman. She craved action. Stilwell thought it would be a good idea to make her a minister of war.

  Her long residence abroad gave Madame Chiang an understanding of the world, but deprived her of an understanding of her own country. She could imitate the fireside chats of the Roosevelts, but not the warm and democratic humanity of Mrs. Roosevelt, nor even that of her sister Madame Sun Yat-sen who broke with Chiang Kai-shek for what she considered a betrayal of her husband's doctrines. And while Madame Chiang could act as a translator between her husband and such highly placed persons as General Marshall and President Roosevelt, she could not interpret between him and the Chinese people.

  某些社会心理学家应当注意到,统治中国的这对夫妇的相互结合,同中国的两大统治阶级——地主和买办资产阶级——之间的结合具有共同之处。作为西方贸易的产物,中国工商业资产阶级从来未能割断同中国封建势力千丝万缕的联系,甚至还同地主建立了新的联系。同样,作为西方文化产物的宋美龄也从未能同旧中国彻底决裂,反而还同它的最高代表人物结成夫妇。这两种结合几乎是同时实现的,这一点也不奇怪。一九二七年,中国资产阶级被自己狭隘的阶级利益蒙住了眼睛,向支持自己的人民群众猛扑过去,背弃了自己的主义,同地主结成了联盟。差不多也就在这个时候,宋美龄嫁给了蒋介石。人们曾经以为银行家和实业家将同蒋介石决裂。同样,他们也预言宋美龄将在婚后一年以内同蒋介石离婚。但是这两起结合尽管十分勉强,很不稳定,却一直维持到了一九四九年。直到那时,城市的工商资产阶级才同农村的封建势力决裂,宋美龄也才离开蒋介石前往美国。

  就像实业家同封建势力闹矛盾一样,宋美龄同蒋介石有时也闹矛盾。这不单是由于性情不合,而且也是由于利害关系和文化修养不同。中国的银行家和工业家远比地主有见识,同样,宋美龄也远比蒋介石有见识。银行家常向美国人诉说封建将领和满脑子封建思想的国民党人如何愚蠢,同样宋美龄有时气急败坏地跑到史迪威将军那里说:“我求过他,什么办法都不行,除非干掉他。”

  

  Some social psychologist ought to draw an analogy between the marriage of China's ruling pair and the marriage between her two ruling classes, the landlords and the comprador bourgeoisie. Just as the merchant-industrial class, a product of Western trade, could never cut the cords that bound them to feudal China and even fashioned new ties with the landlords, so Madame Chiang, a product of Western culture, could never completely break away from the old China and tied herself to its crowned representative. That these unions took place almost simultaneously is not strange. In 1927, the Chinese bourgeoisie, blinded by its own narrow class interest, turned on its supporters, disavowed its principles and allied itself with the landlords. Almost at the same time, Madame Chiang threw in her lot with the generalissimo.

  People thought the bankers and industrialists would break with Chiang Kai-shek, just as they predicted Madame Chiang would divorce her husband within a year of her marriage. Both unions, though strained and uneasy, however, lasted until the year 1949 when the merchant-industrial class in the cities broke with the feudal countryside and Madame Chiang left her husband and came to the United States.

  Madame Chiang was sometimes at war with her husband as the businessmen were at war with the feudal elements. This was due not only to a difference in temperament, but to a difference of interests and intellectual attainments. As the bankers and industrialists of China were far more intelligent than the landlords, so Madame Chiang was more intelligent than her husband. Bankers used to complain to Americans about the stupidity of feudal generals and feudal-minded party members, so Madame Chiang, on occasion, came running in despair to General Stilwell to report: "I've prayed with him; I've done everything but murder him." (6)

  中国的历史性悲剧,在这对统治中国的夫妇的个性上反映了出来。旧中国的崩溃,对普通的农夫农妇都有影响,更不用说蒋介石夫妇了。他们的性格肯定受了这一伟大事件的影响,在一定程度上也受了两人结合后相互的影响:宋美龄把蒋介石拉向西方和现代,蒋介石则把宋美龄拉向东方和落后。史迪威认为宋美龄对蒋介石的影响有良好的一面。想必这是指宋美龄把蒋介石的中世纪意识克服了一些,使他思想开通一些,倾向西方一些。但是,反过来同样可以说,宋美龄对蒋介石也起了不好的影响。由于各种相互矛盾的历史文化因素在身上起作用的结果,蒋介石的思想本来就已经够混乱的了,宋美龄想改造他,结果只是使他的思想更加混乱不堪。

  如果宋美龄是在把蒋介石引上正路,为什么中国人民对她仍毫无好感呢?答案很简单。正当中国人民在为摆脱外国统治而奋斗的时候,宋美龄却学习西方的风俗习惯,甚至还信奉西方的上帝,力求维护其中国第一夫人的地位。她可能是诚心爱国的。但是,人们却看到她同中国社会上封建势力作斗争时,一般总是代表了她的兄弟宋子文和她的姐夫孔祥熙一类同外国资本勾结的实业界人士。她一旦爬上了中国专制统治的顶峰,就不想再下来了。

  在蒋介石被迫离开首都南京前几天,宋美龄跑到美国恳求美国总统去拯救她丈夫的政权,因为她已经无法向中国人民求情,他们也肯定是不会听她那一套的。这就是她为挽救土崩瓦解的蒋家王朝所做的最后努力。它再清楚不过地说明了蒋介石政权究竟是靠谁支持、宋美龄究竟又代表谁的利益。

  The historic tragedy of China was refracted through the personalities of her ruling couple. Still less than any peasant and his wife were the generalissimo and the Madame able to escape from the effects of the breakup of ancient China. Their characters were definitely molded by this mighty event. To some degree, they were also molded by association with each other, Madame pulling Chiang toward the West and modernity, Chiang pulling his wife toward the East and backwardness. Stilwell thought the influence of Madame on her husband was along the right lines. By this we suppose he meant that Madame softened her husband's medievalism, modernized his thinking and turned him toward the West. However, in another way, it is just as safe to assume that Madame Chiang influenced her husband along the wrong lines. For in trying to change her husband she added an element of personal confusion to a mind which had already been turned into a squirrel cage by conflicting historical cultures.

  If Madame was leading China's ruler in the right direction, why did the people of the country pay her so little respect? The answer is simple. While trying to maintain her position as China's first lady, Madame Chiang adopted the habits and customs and even the God of the West in that very period when the Chinese people were making mighty efforts to free themselves from alien domination. Madame Chiang was probably sincerely patriotic. But it was noted that whenever she struggled against the feudal elements in Chinese life, she generally did so on behalf of the business elements - her brother T. V. Soong and her sister's husband, H. H. Kung - who were allied with foreign capital. Having risen to the heights of Chinese despotism, this lady did not want to step down.

  A few days before her husband was forced from his capital at Nanking, Madame Chiang, being unable to plead with the Chinese people, who certainly would not have listened to her, came to the United States to plead with the president of this country to save her husband's regime. There is perhaps nothing that indicates more clearly where Chiang's power lay or where the interests of his wife resided than this final attempt to save a tottering dynasty.

原注六:引自《史迪威报告》。 (6)Ibid.