第十三章 蒋家王朝的覆灭
 

CHAPTER XIII

COLLAPSE OF A DYNASTY

第五十七节 旧中国的末代统治者
57. The Last Rulers of Old China
  读者读到这里可能会想,那些不愿落入共产党手中的国民党领导人,为什么不踢开蒋介石自己搞革命呢?许多中国人也都不明白其中的道理。当时确实有一些国民党的头头想这样干,但他们没有这个胆量。国民党头头中有一些人觉得蒋介石是一堵挡风的墙,可以保护自己争权夺利。另一些人采取滑头的态度听任共产党领导的革命不断发展,自己则乘机大发战争财,同时还想好后路,以备随时逃往国外。更有许多人随波逐流,或是因为感到自身难保而惶惶不可终日。

  尽管如此从内战的第二年起,到蒋介石下野离开南京的那天为止,许多南京政府官员,以至美国驻华使馆官员和美国国务院的官员,未尝不想踢开中国的这位独裁者,实行改革。但这种想法直到内战的最后阶段才付诸行动,可见统治集团内部的反对派十分软弱无能,同时这也表明打倒蒋介石的力量主要来自下面,而不是统治集团内部。

IT MAY have occurred to the reader of these pages, as it occurred to many people in China, to ask why the Kuomintang leaders who wanted to save themselves from the Communists did not get rid of Chiang Kai-shek and create a revolution of their own. Some wanted to, but did not dare. Others found Chiang a useful screen behind which to conduct their own personal struggle for power and riches. Still others cynically let the Communist-led revolution take its course, while piling up wealth by means of war and leaving the back door open for flight abroad. Finally, many drifted with events or were held spellbound in the grip of a suicidal feeling.

  Nevertheless the idea of throwing out the nation's dictator and instituting reform was one that attracted many officials in Nanking as well as members of the American embassy and the American State Department from the second year of the war right up until the day Chiang abdicated his capital. That this thought was never transmuted into action until very late in the civil war is proof of the weakness of the opposition inside the ruling group and also proof that the forces which defeated the generalissimo came primarily from below and not from within his own ranks.

  然而政府内部的矛盾斗争对于事态的发展绝不是毫无影响的。国民党最后终于四分五裂,最高领导集团内部爆发了剧烈的派系斗争,这是促使共产党取得胜利的一个因素,虽然只是一个消极被动的因素。这也是蒋介石之所以能超过人们预料长期独揽大权的原因之一。蒋奉行分而治之的方针,向来得心应手。在平时,当权力问题仅仅限于究竟由谁来统治国民党的时候,这种策略确实非常管用。但是到了革命高潮时期,当问题扩大为究竟由谁来领导国家、由谁来领导从旧的社会秩序中产生出来的新社会时,这种办法就有致命的弊病。因为往后一种情况下,分而治之的做法不但分化了国民党内部的倒蒋势力,而且也分化了共产党的敌人。

  看来蒋介石一直没有感到使用这一惯伎会有什么危险,直到内战末期才算有所觉察。他一直未能认识到他是在对付一场革命而不是什么阴谋活动。至于谈到他在国民党内部的敌人,其实对于蒋说来,主要的危险倒不是他们会把他抓起来,而是他们会抛弃他,统治集团内部的各派如果要除掉蒋,最简单的办法就是把他杀死,或者把他劫持和监禁起来。但是尽管对蒋的恶感一直渗透到国民党的最高层,尽管共产党在军事上大胜后公开号召国民党反对派领袖逮捕蒋,但是却没有任何证据表明有人曾横下一条心密谋加害于这位中国独裁者。美国尽管很想搞掉蒋介石以改造国民党政府,但是肯定从未参与这种密谋。

  直接采取这种行动是违背美国传统的。然而却并不违背中国的传统。中国历史上用这种办法除掉昏君的事例屡见不鲜。最近的例子就是一九三六年劫持蒋介石的西安事变。因此,如果蒋介石的老同事把他抓起来,并不见得一定会触犯中国的公众舆论。恰恰相反,如果有哪个国民党领导人这样做了,哪怕他本来声名十分狼藉,也可能立即变成民族英雄。但是国民党统治集团中没有任何人有意采取这样的行动。当然其中有许多人是担心,向蒋介石发射的子弹也会击中国民党的心脏,使它断送在共产党手里。这种担心恐怕是有道理的。但是,这并不是使国民党官僚不敢瞄准这位独裁者开枪的唯一原因。

  What went on in government circles, however, was by no means without effect on the course of events. In the end, the Kuomintang fell to pieces and a bitter struggle of cliques prevailed at the summit of power. This was one of the premises of Communist victory, though a passive one. It was also one of the reasons Chiang was able to hold on to many of the strings of power beyond a period of normal expectancy. Cbiang had always operated successfully on the principle of divide and rule. But this tactic which was so effective in normal times, when the question of power was limited to who ruled the Kuomintang, was fatally defective during a period of revolutionary upsurge, when the question of power was broadened to who ruled the state and who ruled the new society growing up within the old social order. Under these last circumstances, the principle of divide and rule not only divided Chiang's enemies within the Kuomintang, it also divided the enemies of the Communists.

  A sense of the danger of employing his favorite tactic does not seem to have awakened in Chiang until very late in the civil war. He never could get it into his head that he was facing a revolution and not a conspiracy. As for his enemies within the Kuomintang, the danger to Chiang was not so much that they would seize him as they would walk away from him.

  The simplest method of the ruling groups to rid themselves of Chiang would have been to kill him, kidnap him or imprison him. But though the malice against the generalissimo penetrated the highest circles and though the Communists after their great military victories even called on opposition Kuomintang leaders to seize Chiang, there is no evidence that a determined plot against the person of China's dictator ever existed. Certainly the United States which was anxious to get rid of Chiang in order to reform the government was never party to such intrigue. Direct action of this kind was contrary to American tradition. It was, however, not contrary to Chinese tradition. Chinese history is filled with instances of such corrective practices effected against unpopular rulers: this type of operation was last carried out in the kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek in 1936. It is by no means certain, therefore, that a seizure of the generalissimo's person by his old comrades would have offended Chinese public opinion. On the contrary, such a deed might have transformed even the most odious of the Kuornintang leaders into a kind of national hero. But no one in the ruling group had stomach for such an action. Of course, many were afraid that a bullet directed against Chiang would also reach the heart of the Kuomintang and deliver it into the hands of the Communists. This fear was probably correct. But dread of the Communists was not the only thing that kept the bureaucrats from taking aim at their dictator.

  最有机会除掉蒋的人就是那些最接近他的人。在这位中国首脑身边管事的是一个矛盾重重的班子、生拼硬凑的大杂烩,其中有基督教青年会的秘书、上海的地痞流氓、趋炎附势的野心家、幻想破灭的空想家、党棍、心灰意懒的革命党人、郁郁不得志的自由派、宫廷宦官、打诨插科的小丑、贪官污吏、帮闲文人和心理变态症患者。各国驻华的外交官给国民党集团的领导人起了许多浑名,什么“太监总管”啦,“拉斯普庭”啦,“小马基雅维里老爷”啦,等等,等等。可见国民党政府在国内外声名狼藉之一斑。这些人多半是出于谋求私利,因循旧习,或者出于恐惧而追随蒋介石的。他们对自己的事业毫无信仰,其实他们根本就无事业可言。

  从某种意义上说,国民党的老一代领导人可以算是闯将。他们在青年时代造了当时各种传统的反。推翻清期皇帝、建立民国、同军阀斗争,这一切他们都参加了。他们曾经精诚团结、情同手足,致力于打倒统治中国达百年之久的西方帝国主义。但是,正如威廉·博莱索所说,等待着一切冒险家的无可名状的悲剧压垮了这些人:他们后来已经不再是闯将了。

  蒋介石本是在证券交易所搞投机买卖的经纪人,上海青红帮的把兄弟,搞政变的能手,后来摇身一变,成了言不由衷的专制寡头,沉湎于祈祷和劝人从善的说教。年轻的女基督教徒宋美龄,同当时声名狼藉的军阀头子蒋介石结合后,变成了装腔作势的中产阶级妇女。汪精卫青年时曾谋刺清摄政王,是国民党的卓越领导人,曾任行政院长,后来他为了保住自己的财富和权势竟然当了日本人的傀儡头子,在警卫森严的深宅大院里了却残生,成为自己的贪婪和恐惧的牺牲品。宋子文本是个既有胆略、又有才识之士,是少数敢顶撞蒋介石的人之一,又是一个创建银行和金融体系的巨擘。在一九二七年的反共大屠杀后,他为良心所责备,曾向文森特·希恩慷慨陈词。可是此人后来却变成了平庸的、神经质的百万富翁。主管党务的陈立夫,年轻时就立志在思想领域有所建树,怀着真正造反者的热情研究西方科学。但是后来他失去了探索的精神,竟沉湎于诵念迂腐的学说。孙科的父亲就是为中国摆脱列强控制而奋斗终身的国父孙中山,但是他自己却觉得建设一个独立国家的伟大事业太艰巨了,最后竟然干脆央求美国在中国领土上建立陆海军基地。

  国民党的领导人先是朝前看,面向未来,后来却朝后看,面向过去;先是探索未知的领域,后来却在已知的领域中苟且偷安;先是热衷于争权夺利,后来却只想保住既得利益,失去了对事物的敏感,日益胆小怕事。这种变化真是不可思议,令人感慨。一些国民党领导人最大的推动力就是贪婪,可是他们甚至在这方面也失去了早先的劲头。在抗日战争期间和内战初期,尽管中国已经快到了民穷财尽的地步,可是国民党的那些官僚却还为争发国难财而闹得不可开交。

  到了内战后期,他们搜刮民脂民膏的本能变成了守业的本能,他们极力想保住既得利益。威廉·博莱索说得好:“当江洋大盗清点赃物时,他们就成为区区的窃贼。”这句话完全可以用来刻画国民党中国的许多领导人。

  Those with the best opportunity of getting rid of Chiang were the men closest to him. But the immediate camarilla surrounding China sleader was a contradictory crew - an indigestible mixture of YMCA secretaries, Shanghai gangsters, ambitious sycophants, disillusioned visionaries, party thugs, tired revolutionaries, wistful liberals, palace eunuchs, feudal clowns, corrupt bureaucrats, Confucian mystics and sick psychopaths. "The Grand Eunuch," "Rasputin," "Little Lord Machiavelli" these were some of the names foreign diplomats fastened on the leaders of Kuomintang society and they adequately bespeak the low prestige in which the government was held both at home and abroad. Most of these men were tied to Chiang Kai-shek by reason of interest, habit and fear. They had no belief in their own cause; in fact, they did not have a cause.

  In a sense, the older leaders of the Kuomintang were adventurers. In their youths, they rebelled against the traditions of their times. They helped overthrow the Manchu emperor, they founded the republic, fought against the warlords and united in a common brotherhood dedicated to the overthrow of Western imperialism which had dominated their country for a hundred years. But the subtle tragedy that William Bolitho says lies in wait for all adventurers had overcome these men: they had ceased to be adventurers.

  Chiang Kai-shek, a stock market gambler, a consort of Shanghai gangsters, a bold maker of coups d'etat, turned into a mealymouthed despot, given to prayers and moral exhortations. Madame Chiang, the little Christian who had thrown in her lot with a then disreputable militarist, became a middle-class woman given to respectable airs. Wang Ching-wei, the brilliant Kuomintang leader who in his youth plotted to assassinate the Manchu emperor and then became premier of China was so affected by a desire to conserve his wealth and power that he became the chief puppet of the Japanese and ended up his days behind guarded walls, a prisoner of his greed and his fear. T. V. Soong, a man of courage, intelligence and imagination, one of the few who ever dared stand up to Chiang Kai-shek, a bold constructor of banks and financial systems, a man of conscience who searched his soul with Vincent Sheehan after the massacres of 1927, turned into a nervous, banal millionaire. Chen Li-fu, the party leader, in his youth staked out his claims for adventure in the domains of the mind, studying Western science with the zeal of a true rebel. But his intelligence lost its curiosity and he gave himself up to the mouthing of moth-eaten doctrines. Sun Fo, the son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of the republic who dreamed of a China freed from the domination of foreign powers, found the great adventure of building an independent nation too much for him and ended up by begging the United States to establish military and naval bases on China's soil.

  It is fascinating but depressing to follow the lives of Kuomintang leaders and see them first facing the future then turning toward the past, wooing the unknown then taking refuge in the known, eagerly seizing power and wealth then trying to conserve both while fear crept in and deadened their sensibilitics. Even the greed of some Kuomintang leaders which was one of their strongest motivations to action lost its pristine magnificence. During the Japanese war and the early days of the civil war the Kuomintang bureaucrats turned to squabble among themselves over the wealth of the country which was fast diminishing.

  During the latter days of the civil war their acquisitive instincts turned into conservative instincts. They wanted to hold on to what they had. "When pirates count their booty," says William Bolitho, "they become mere thieves." It is hard not to apply this statement to many of the leaders of Nationalist China.

  在许多国民党领导人的身上,除了贪得无厌以外,还可以看到另外一个因素:壮志未酬。那些认识孙中山的元老们,当年是怀着革命热情追随蒋介石平定天下的,但他们怀着一种莫名其妙的内疚心情。他们原先是致力于建立新制度的革命志士,结果却变成了寡头统治的拥护者,保卫起旧制度,其实是保卫起自己的权势来了。但是青年时代的理想有时却依然难以忘怀,他们的心灵因此受到煎熬。国民党的领导人患着一种不可救药的心病。他们本来矢志打倒军阀,结果却成了中国历史上一个最大军阀的扈从。他们原本矢志建立民主制度,结果却建立了一个使中国古代帝王相形见拙的专制统治。他们曾经许愿要改善民生,结果却造成民不聊生,比人们所记得的以往任何时候都更差。他们原本一心为中国摆脱列强控制而奋斗,结果却自己也变得依附于列强。

  因此这些人失去了奋斗的目标,他们不再有任何信念。其中许多人已不知理想为何物。加上蒋介石的恐怖统治已经使许多官僚变成了没有灵魂的木头人,只能盲目地服从他们的领袖走向毁灭。还有些人道德沦丧,不可能有多大作为。这些人的倒行逆施,无需过细探究,这里随便举几个例子:有位达官的小姐随身带着皮鞭,供抽打黄包车夫用。有个师长把梅毒遗传给了儿子,竟要上海的一位美国医生把儿子弄死。珍珠港事件爆发后,香港的华人争相出逃,一位官太太把她的几条狗塞进飞机座舱,硬挤掉了几个人的机座。某将军在一九四八年夏诱奸了南京一个小公务员的八岁女儿,使她染上了淋病之后,又对女孩的父亲和邻居进行威胁,扬言如果他们胆敢控告他的话,就要把他们全都抓起来。他们之所以能这样为非作歹,就是靠着有这位独裁者在台上。

  这种人怎么可能有勇气把他踢开呢?答案只能是否定的。他们也不可能鼓起多大的勇气来保卫蒋。眼看大势已去,他们的贪婪和恐惧并不一定使他们团结起来,倒往往反而使他们四分五裂。各人都想自找一条活路。

  孙中山夫人在二十年以前就与蒋介石决裂,因为他认为蒋背叛了她丈夫的三民主义,直到最后她始终拒绝同蒋打交道,甚至连国民党内部的反对派发起要求媾和的运动时,她也不屑于参加。她的妹妹蒋夫人则逃奔美国,恳求杜鲁门总统拯救她的丈夫。孔祥熙博士既是孔夫子的后裔,又是耶鲁大学的毕业生以及生财有道的大富豪,他一身兼备三者的智慧、干劲和远见。他也来到美国当阔寓公,并回味他过去担任蒋政府行政院长兼财政部长时的盛况。翁文灏是一位经济(地质)学家,一九四八年春应召出任行政院长。他先后四、五次提出辞呈,最后宣告他“不问国事“,居家“吟诗填词”。戴季陶是一位国民党“元老”,在香港自杀。陈布雷是蒋介石的私人秘书,有名的秀才,他致书蒋介石,引用古诗说;“油已尽,灯将灭”,随后也自杀了。这是封建主义向中国的专制寡头最后告别时发出的半夜里猫头鹰一样的凄厉叫声。

  事情就这样发展下去。国民党的元老们下不了狠心去推翻他们的专制寡头。但他们可以离开他远走高飞。由于上层的人们普遍抱着这种态度,无怪乎他们的反蒋活动往往无非就是痛骂几声,挖苦几句和低声诅咒而已。一位部长可以对外国记者说:“我们的政府是一个法西斯独裁政权。”你等着他再往下说,以为在他面前的是个敢说敢干的革命志士,不想后来他却只是冷冷地一笑了事。

  Behind the greed of many Kuomintang leaders, one notes another factor: disappointed hopes. Among the older men who had known Dr. Sun Yat-sen and followed the generalissimo with revolutionary enthusiasm to power there lurked a strange feeling of guilt. They had begun as revolutionists seeking to construct a new order, but they had become oligarchs defending an old order, or rather, their power. Memory of youthful dreams, however, sometimes persists to poison the will. Kuomintang leaders were suffering from a mortal sickness of the soul. Sworn to end warlordism, they had ended up in the train of one of the biggest warlords in Chinese history. Sworn to establish democracy, they had created a despotism which made the ancient emperors of China look like fumbling amateurs. Promising to improve the "livelihood of the people," they made it worse than it had been in the memory of living man. Dedicated to freeing China from foreign powers they had become dependent on them.

  So these men had no cause. They no longer believed. Many of them had forgotten how to dream. Moreover, Chiang's terror had ripped out the souls of many bureaucrats so that they could do little more than blindly follow their leader on the road to destruction. Moral contamination affected the capacity for action of others. There is no need to go into their bizarre activities here in any detail, but we may mention in passing the official's daughter who carried a whip with her to beat ricksha coolies; the division commander who asked an American doctor in Shanghai to kill his son because he had inherited his father's syphilis; the official's wife who loaded dogs onto a plane in place of her fellow-countrymen who were fighting to escape Hongkong after Pearl Harbor; and the general who in the summer of 1948 seduced the eight-year-old daughter of a minor official in Nanking, infected her with gonorrhea and then threatened to arrest the girl's father and his neighbors if they pressed suit against him.

  How could such people summon the moral energy to throw off the dictator whose very existence guaranteed that they might continue in such actions? The answer is, they could not. But they could not summon much energy to defend Chiang either. Moreover, their greed and their fright before the collapsing situation did not necessarily unite them; it often divided them. Each man tried to save himself in his own way.

  Madame Sun Yat-sen, who deserted the generalissimo twenty years ago because she believed he had betrayed her husband's principles, refused to have anything to do with him right to the end and refused even to join oppositional elements within the Kuomintang who were heading a peace movement. Her sister, Madame Chiang, fled to the United States to plead with President Truman to save her husband. Dr. H. H. Kung, descendant of Confucius, Yale University alumnus and financial wizard, combining the wisdom, gusto and foresight of all three, also came to the United States where he could enjoy his wealth in safety and muse on the days when he had been premier and finance minister in Chiang's government. Wong Wen-hao, an economist summoned to the premiership in the spring of 1948, resigned four or five times and finally let it be known that he spent his days at home - reading and writing poetry - because he "no longer feels interested in national affairs." Tai Chi-tao, an "elder statesman" of the Kuomintang, committed suicide in Hongkong, Chen Pu-lei, personal secretary of the generalissimo and famous feudal literatus, wrote a letter to Chiang in which he quoted the words of a classical poem - the oil is exhausted; the light is dying - then he, too, killed himself. With an owl scream in the dark, feudalism paid its last tribute to China's despot.

  So it went. The old Nationalist revolutionaries could not steel their hearts to overthrow their despot. But they could run away from him. With such an attitude prevailing it is no wonder that the movement against Chiang in the upper circles often reduced itself to vicious snarls, gallows jokes and muttered imprecations. "Our government is a fascist dictatorship," a minister would remark to a foreign correspondent. And you would wait there thinking you were in the company of a desperate revolutionist. But it would all end up with a sepulchral laugh.

  在政府内部的对立面自由派中间也没有出现过铁杆反对派。马歇尔曾经认为,拯救中国的办法是由政府内部的和少数党的自由派在“蒋介石的领导下”执政。但是这种设想不过是一厢情愿。中国的自由派手无寸铁。而在中国,一个没有枪杆子的自由派,就像一条既不会咬人也不会吠叫的看家狗那样毫无用处。问题还在于究竟谁算自由派?根据西方的传统所谓自由派是指尊重别人观点的人。但是,由于有维护专制独裁的儒家传统影响,这种人实在少有,甚至可以说在中国根本就没有,不管是在国民党内、共产党内、少数党内或其他地方,统统没有。而且除了前面已经提到的那些奋起反蒋的知识分子和学生以外,根本就没有什么自由派愿意那么公开表明自己的立场和观点。在政府内部肯定没有这样的自由派。在统治阶级内部,想要搞掉蒋介石的大胆批评家为数极少,更多的人只是想“感化” 他。在内战期间镇压学生的恐怖浪潮中,有个美国人让一位在政府任职的大学教授来找我,并建议我撰文介绍此人是“强烈反对蒋介石的人,是能够拯救中国的优秀人物之一”。经过长谈,我才发现这个所谓能够拯救中国的人物曾经作为一个基督教团体的代言人晋见蒋介石,把这位独裁寡头吹捧为“伟人”,最后还吟诵了一首歌颂乔治,华盛顿的诗,言下之意是蒋应当像华盛顿一样争取成为亿万人民祟敬的“国父”。

  自由派想用吟诗填词的办法来感化这个心肠歹毒的中国独裁者。但是即使把那有抑扬格的五音步诗行译成中文,也不可能感召蒋介石进行改革,更不可能使他放弃自己的权位。当时确实有人喊出了这样的口号:“如果我们不打倒蒋介石,我们就会与他一起完蛋。”

  那些到外国使馆拜访的中国知识分子和大专院校的白面书生十分醉心于进行一次自上而下的革命,以避免发生自下而上的革命。但是这种想法不过反映他们无可奈何的心慌,却从来没有形成为一个具体的阴谋。中国自由派很有才华,可惜却很软弱。反正他们挺愿意把搞掉蒋介石的光荣任务交给老的国民党地方军阀去干,尽管他们一直是十分鄙视这些军阀的。这些地方军阀比较固执,因此也就稍微果断一些。现在他们又重新登上政治舞台,成为国民党内部反蒋最坚决的一派。

链接:杂牌军的结局——西北军将领(一)

链接:杂牌军的结局——西北军将领(二)

  Nor did any iron opposition within government circles show up at the other end of the political spectrum - among the liberals. George Marshall had seen the salvation of China in a movement by government and minority party liberals to take power "under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek." But this type of salvation was little better than a pious hope. Liberals in China were unarmed and a Chinese liberal without a gun was no more effective than a watchdog without a bite or a bark. And who were these liberals? By Western tradition a liberal is one who has respect for another's viewpoint. But such men, due to the effects of the authoritarian Confucian tradition, were so few as to be practically nonexistent in China, either in the Kuomintang, the Communist party, minority parties or anywhere else. Furthermore, except for the already mentioned intellectuals and students who stood up courageously against Chiang, there were few liberals - certainly not within the government - willing to show their colors so openly. Within the ruling classes, for every courageous critic who wanted to get rid of Chiang, there were two who wanted to "reform" his character. During the civil war, in the midst of one of the terror campaigns against the students, a university professor, a member of the government, was sent to me by an American with the recommendation that I write an article about "an ardent opponent of Chiang Kai-shek, one of the better type of men in whom the salvation of China lies.?A long conversation revealed that this particular savior of China had visited the generalissimo as spokesman for a Christian group, had praised the dictator as a "great man" and had ended up by reading a poem about George Washington. The implication was that Chiang should try like George to become the revered "father of his country."

  With poesy the liberals wanted to soothe the savage breast ot China's dictator. But iambic pentameter, even when translated into Chinese, could not lure Chiang into making reforms, much less into abdicating his seat of power. It is true there were some phrase makers who cried out: "If we don't put down Chiang Kai-shek, we will go down with him."

  The idea of making a revolution from above in order to forestall a revolution from below held an irresistible charm for Chinese intellectuals as well as pale-faced college men in the halls of foreign embassies. But such ideas hung in the air as mooded despair. They never developed into a hard plot. The heart of Chinese liberalism was literary, but rather weak. In any case it was quite willing to surrender the honor of getting rid of the generalissimo to the old Kuomintang provincial militanists of whom it had been so contemptuous. These leaders were more hardheaded and for that reason a little more resolute. They now re-entered the political picture and offered the most determined opposition to Chiang within his own party.

  我们在本书头几页就已说过,蒋介石发动反共内战的时候,早已使所有反对过他的军阀和政界人士几乎都不起作用了。可是说也奇怪,正是由于这些人当时不起作用,才使他们后来又得以在中国政治舞台上东山再起。所以产生这种怪现像的原因在于抗日战争期间国民党的社会结构发生了特殊变化。在一九三七年和三八年间,日本人把中国政府逐出沿海地区,使蒋介石失去了中国多半的工厂和外贸收益。其结果是在一九三八年至一九四五年期间,他不得不越来越多地依靠内地的封建头子以保住自己的权位。这就使民族工业家和银行家的经济力量和政治影响逐渐削弱,而使“坐轿子”的土绅们权力不断增长,同时也使国民党内的封建因素相应增长。在一两年里国民党内又掀起了一场派系斗争,争夺的目标是中国内地的唯一真正财富——土地和土地的产物以及在这些产物的基础上兴起来的贸易渠道。

  在政治上,这场斗争突出地表现在国民党右翼CC系经济实力的相对上升。抗日战争结束时,国民党内的买办势力利用自己在政府中占据要津和同美国关系密切的有利条件,接收了沦陷区的大部分敌伪财产,把CC系排挤在一边。因此CC系的人需要继续维护国民党的一党专政,以加强他们自己的经济地位。他们成为主张进行反共战争的急先锋。战争使CC系有机会跟在军队的后面去各地成立党部,通过农民银行和交通银行借助于地主士绅组织农村合作社。同时,CC系的人还利用主管党务工作的职权,接管了许多家报刊,用以攻击它在国民党内的敌人。除此以外,他们还操纵学生掀起反对国民党内的敌对派系和内战期间好几任行政院长的风潮。由于这些争斗,国民党内的中间势力纷纷被吞并,就像小商人被大托拉斯和垄断组织吞并一样。国民党内形成两极日益分化,分为左翼和右翼,有权的和无权的,主张革新的和反对革新的两极。由于官僚势力的压迫,民族银行资本家的力量不断削弱。国民党的领导人都亲西方,他们之间展开了一场争夺美援管理权的斗争。谁的实力最差,谁就被排挤在外。中国社会上无以为生的人数直线上升,同时在国民党内部也不断有人因受排挤而无法在党内立足。与此同时,由于共产党的土地改革和军事胜利,再加上蒋家官员的劫掠,使满洲、华北和华中的地方豪绅的经济根基遭到破坏。相比之下,蒋的高级官员却贪污腐化,腰缠万贯,国民党内的右派势力又进一步增长。这些刚刚倾家荡产的地方豪绅自然就觉得无法再忍耐了。就像被逼得走投无路的佃户同地主拼命一样,这些国民党的小头头现在也豁出来要同党内的高级领导人拼了。

  We have already remarked at the beginning of this book that when Chiang Kai-shek started the civil war against the Communists he had rendered ineffective nearly every warlord or provincial military man who had ever opposed him. Now it is a curious fact that the very powerlessness of these men was just what enabled them in the long run to make a comeback in Chinese politics. This seeming paradox is explained by a peculiar change which took place in the social structure of the Kuomintang during the Japanese war. In 1937 and 1938, when the Japanese drove the Chinese government away from the coast, Chiang Kai-shek was deprived of most of the nation's industrial plants and the proceeds from foreign trade. As a result, between 1938 and 1945, he was compelled to rely more and more on the feudal barons in the interior to maintain himself in power. This brought about a decline in the economic strength and the political influence of the native industrialists and bankers while the power of the "sedan chair" gentry grew and along with it the feudal elements within the Kuomintang. Within a couple of years, a war of cliques developed within the party for the control of the only real wealth in China's interior - land and the produce of the land and trade communications resulting from that produce.

  Politically this struggle was highlighted by the rise in relative economic strength of the right-wing CC Clique, of the Kuomintang. At the conclusion of the Japanese war, compradore interests in the Kuomintang, using their superior administrative capacities and their contacts with American interests, gained most of the spoils from the occupied areas, leaving CC Clique out in the cold. Thus, the CC men, needing continued party dictatorship to strengthen their economic position, became the spearhead of the movement for war against the Communists. This war gave the CC Clique an opportunity to follow in the wake of the army and to organize local party bureaus and also, through their Farmers Bank and Bank of Communications, to organize rural co-operatives with the aid of the landed gentry. At the same time, through its control of the party, the CC men took over numerous newspapers and publications which it used to assault its enemies within the Kuomintang. In addition, they also manipulated the students in movements against rival cliques and various wartime premiers. Because of these struggles the middle elements of the Kuomintang were devoured much as small businessmen are devoured by giant trusts and monopolies. The Kuomintang gradually became more and more polarized between right and left, between those with power and those without power, between those who wanted reform and those who resisted reform. The native bankers grew weaker under pressure from the bureaucrats. Kuomintang leaders, oriented toward the West, became involved, in a war for control of help coming from the United States. Those with the least power were pushed aside. Just as the Chinese people disinherited from society had grown in leaps and bounds, so there took place a disinheritance within the Kuomintang itself. At the same time, Communist land reform and Communist military conquests, plus carpetbagging by Chiang's officials, deprived the gentry and local civilian leaders in Manchuria and North and Central China of their economic bases. The comparative opulence and the corruption of Chiang's top bureaucrats along with the increased power of the rightist clique in the Kuomintang now seemed intolerable to these newly dispossessed leaders. As the tenant, with his back against the wall, had turned on the landlord, so the petty party leaders were now ready to turn on the top party leaders.

  

  一方面是党内独裁变本加厉,另一方面,党的下层受到剥夺——这种情况为那些一度失势的国民党军阀开创了重登政治舞台的机会。谚云;同病者常相怜。那些老军阀长期被蒋剥夺了权力,现在国民党内新的失意政客自然就成了他们的同路人。但是,最高层的反蒋运动还有待于蒋介右在党内的夙敌挂帅。

  蒋在政治上树敌不少。其中三个比较活跃的人物是白崇禧、何应钦和李宗仁。他们都是国民党的元老,都是高级将领,而且先后都曾经反对过蒋的独裁统治。抗日战争结束时,蒋介石用分隔的办法把他们孤立起来。李宗仁将军被抬得高高的,当上了有名无实的委员长北平行辕主任。何应钦将军去了美国。白崇禧将军被任命为国防部长,这是一个没有什么实权的职务。把三个人这么一分开来,他们自然就无法纠合在一起了。

  但是这三位却比蒋介石棋高一着。李宗仁将军在北平联络了北方将领,同时为博得美国的欢心,摆出一副开明姿态,保护知识分子和学生免受蒋家宪兵的迫害。白崇禧设法混到汉口担任华中剿匪总司令的要职。何应钦将军在美国时参加了道德重整运动,头头是道地大谈中国需要民主。

  三位将军之间形成了一种松散的联盟,在中国俗称“白狐狸联盟“,因为他们三人的姓氏白、何、李同一种有仙术的动物“白狐狸”三个汉字谐音而得名。

 

 These twin developments - increased party dictatorship plus the disinheritance of the lower party ranks - gave hitherto powerless Kuomintang militarists a chance to reenter the Chinese political picture. Misery loves company and the old militarists who had long been deprived of power by Chiang now found companions of the road in new malcontents within the Kuomintang. It remained, however, for the generalissimo's oldest enemies within the party to take leadership of the movement against him at the highest levels.

  In Chiang's political closet there were many skeletons. Three of the more lively ones were Pai Chung-hsi, Ho Ying-chin and Li Tsung-jen. All of them were old members of the Kuomintang. All of them were generals. And all of them at one time or another had opposed China's dictator. At the conclusion of the Japanese war, the generalissimo isolated these three men by separating them. General Li Tsung-jen was kicked upstairs and made titular head of the generalissimo's bureau in Peiping. General Ho went to the United States. General Pai was appointed defense minister, a post with little meaning. So segregated, the three could not pull together.

  But the triumvirate outsmarted the generalissimo. General Li, in Peiping, cultivated the northern generals and also curried United States favor, adopting a liberal coloring and protecting intellectuals and students from Chiang's gendarmes. Pai maneuvered himself into a strategic position in Central China and became commander of the government's defense at Hankow. General Ho, while in the United States, joined the Oxford Movement and talked knowingly of the need for democracy in China.

  The three generals formed a loose union among themselves which became popularly known in China as the White Fox Alliance - a term derived from the similarity in sounds between their names and the Chinese characters for an animal with magical powers known as Paihuli.

  一九四八年四月国民代表大会在南京召开,这些将军第一次有机会向蒋介石一手包揽党政大权的做法提出挑战。国大代表们乖乖地选举了蒋介石为中国总统;但是紧接着,从满洲和华北各省来的代表们,其中包括银行家、教育工作者和士绅却拥护李宗仁出来竞选副总统,同蒋介石内定的人选孙科唱对台戏,因为这些人对蒋的官僚们掠夺他们的家乡,对蒋不愿武装当地民众的做法极为反感。

  这样一来,蒋介石和CC系一手把持国民党的计划不言而喻地受到了威胁,他们怕得要死,所以对李施加了沉重的压力,逼他退出竞选。在投票前夕,蒋的秘密警察登门拜访了那些出头露面支持李宗仁竞选的人,劝他们转而支持孙科。他们对代表们说这是蒋介石的命令,若不服从就有生命危险。李在这种威胁下退出了竞选。他随即致函国大,对于恐吓代表,不让他们自由行使选举权的作法深表愤慨。这一下会场顿时大乱,有些代表异常激动,一反平时谨小慎微的常态,竟喊出了“打倒大独裁者蒋介石”之类的口号。蒋内定的人选孙科狼狈不堪,也退出了竞选。

  蒋和CC系都感到自己做得过份了。他们企图通过东方式的幕后活动来挽回局面。当时人们传说蒋介石想要仿照美国的做法,由他本人指定副总统。后来他终于改变主意,重新召开国大,举行选举,让李宗仁当上了副总统。

 

  The first opportunity any of the generals had to challenge Chiang's control of the party, and hence of the government, came in April 1948 during the convening of the national assembly in Nanking. Meekly, delegates elected Chiang Kai-shek president of China. Immediately afterward, however, delegates from Manchuria and North China, among whom were bankers1 educators and gentry who were disgusted with the way Chiang's bureaucrats had looted their provinces and with Chiang's unwillingness to arm the population, rallied around Li Tsung-jen and backed his candidacy for the vice-presidency against Sun Fo, the generalissimo's choice for the office.

  Chiang Kai-shek and the CC Clique, fearful of the implied threat to their control of the party, brought heavy pressure on Li to retire from the race. The night before the balloting Chiang's secret police visited the known supporters of Li and advised them to switch to Sun Fo. Delegates were told this was an order from the generalissimo; if they did not obey, their lives would be in danger. Under this threat Li withdrew his name from the election. He then addressed the assembly with a letter in which he expressed his deep indignation that terror had been employed against delegates to prevent them from exercising their rights to vote freely. The assembly was thrown into a great state of confusion. Some delegates were so aroused that they lost their usual caution and shouted such slogans as "Down with dictator Chiang Kai-shek." In embarrassment, Sun Fo, Chiang's candidate, also withdrew from the race.

  Both Chiang and the CC Clique realized they had gone too far. They attempted to remedy the situation by some Oriental maneuvering behind the scenes. The story was circulated that the generalissimo wanted to follow the custom of the United States and name the vice-president himself. Finally the generalissimo then changed his mind, the assembly reconvened, the election was held and Li became the vice-president of the country.

  二十年来,蒋介石对国民党的控制,这是第一次受到挑战,他也是第一次这样吃瘪。但是,尽管国民党的队伍当时发生了分裂,蒋还能在首都南京继续控制局势。等到蒋军在徐州兵败如山倒,共军直逼长江边以后就不行了。这时,除了最死硬的顽固分子以外,所有人的情绪都变了。

  当时,要求媾和的压力极为强烈,来自四面八方。上海的商人不愿眼看自己的财产成为中国独裁者垂死挣扎的牺牲品,害怕饥民同败兵合伙打劫,所以就开始同当地守备部队的司令拉关系,收买他们的部队。上海的外侨,特别是美商(不管美国究竟是采取什么政策)也希望别在上海地区打仗,因此就同人们一起愤愤要求蒋辞职。他们要求媾和,即使让共产党控制政府也在所不惜。那就是说,必须搞掉蒋介石。

  可是中国的独裁者决不是人们想要他下台就会下台的,非得有人来把他撵下来不可。要把他撵下来可不容易,因为他手里有秘密警察,还有汤恩伯将军的部队为他效忠。汤是蒋的同乡,蒋把他从前线抽回来担任淞沪杭警备总司令。但是,即使是共军尚未占领的地区,蒋也根本不能完全控制。到一九四八年十二月中旬,在他连遭惨败以后,国民党恐怕也就只有一百万第一线部队来抵挡共军的进攻了。这些部队几乎全都分散在全国各地,没有可能集中起来为南京组织有效的军事防御。当时国民党有二三十万兵力集结在上海以西六百英里的长江中游有中国的芝加哥之称的汉口周围, 这是最大的一个部队集结。这里的部队有一部分是忠于蒋的,但是却归蒋的宿敌白崇禧将军指挥。

  白及其同伙想要除掉蒋,使国民党政权得以苟延残喘。他建议蒋下野。蒋回答说,要等外国进行调停的希望完全破灭,他才引退。白一方面等着蒋走这一步,一方面将南京方面在华中的军队全部冻结。他严密控制长江航运,将部队撤出徐州战场,并派他的前任参谋长去香港,同与共产党有联系的民主党派拉关系。

  白崇禧这么干,其他将领也竞相效尤,中国人把这种做法称之为“恕不从命”。这种情况使得蒋更加“左右为难”:他一方面必须争取同共产党停战以取得喘息机会,另一方面又必须对付自己手下拒不听命的将领。蒋本来一直禁止传出和谈消息,现在却大造和谈空气。与此同时,他拼命设法争取外国的支持,以支撑自己摇摇欲坠的门面。

 

  For the first time in twenty years Chiang's control of the party had been challenged and he had been defeated. Despite the break in party ranks, Chiang was able to maintain control in the nation's capital at Nanking until the collapse of his armies at Suchow and the advance of the Communists to the Yangtze River. This changed the temper of all but the most ardent die-bards.

  The pressure for peace was severe and came from every quarter. Shanghai merchants, having no desire to see their property sacrificed in a last-ditch defense of China's dictator and fearing an alliance between hungry mobs and still hungrier soldiers, began maneuvering among local garrison commanders and paying off their troops. Shanghai's foreign community, particularly American businessmen (no matter what the United States policy was), also had no desire to see a battle around the port and they too began to add their pettish voices to the chorus demanding that Chiang resign. They wanted peace even at the cost of Communist domination of the government. That meant: get rid of Chiang.

  But China's dictator could not be exorcised by mere wishes. He had to be driven out. This was difficult because he controlled the secret service and had the loyalty of the armed forces of General Tang En-pa, fellow-provincial of the generalissimo, whom Chiang had pulled out of the front lines and made commander of the Nanking-Shanghai area. Yet Chiang by no means had complete control over the areas still Unconquered by the Communists. By the middle of December 1948, after his severe defeats, there were perhaps only a million front line Kuomintang troops to oppose any further advance of the Communists. Nearly all of these troops were scattered at indecisive places throughout China, with no chance of massing them effectively for a military defense of Nanking. One of the biggest concentrations of troops, numbering nearly a quarter of a million soldiers, was at Hankow, the Chicago of China, six hundred miles up the Yangtze River from Shanghai. Some of these troops were loyal to Chiang, but they were under the command of General Pai Chung-hsi, an old opponent of Chiang.

  Pai and his associates wanted to get rid of Chiang in order to save something from the wreck of Kuomintang power. Pai suggested that Chiang resign. Chiang answered he would do so when all hope of foreign mediation had vanished. While waiting for Chiang to take this step, Pai froze Nanking's military assets in Central China: he, put traffic on the Yangtze River under strict control, recalled troops from the Suchow battle and sent his former chief of staff to Hongkong to contact dissident democratic groups who were in touch with the Communists.

  This move and similar ones by other generals, which became known in China as "polite insubordination," placed Chiang in a double dilemma: he had to gain a breathing spell through a truce with the Communists and he had to deal with his recalcitrant generals. Therefore, Chiang allowed peace rumors, which he had heretofore suppressed, to gain momentum, and at the same time he sought desperately to obtain foreign support to bolster his dying prestige.

  蒋首先求救于美国。在满洲地区的败局已定后,国民党改组派的孙科博士就敦促美国在据说中国拥有主权的领土上建立陆、海军事基地,接管中国最大的内河长江,并派麦克阿瑟将军到中国主持援蒋事宜。改组派是蒋介石在国民党内主要依靠的力量。这个主张其实只是当年蒲立特计划的进一步具体化。然而,这种主张竟然出自孙中山先生的儿子之口,确实大大伤害了许多中国人的民族感情。让蒋介石同裕仁一样屈居麦克阿瑟之下,充当儿皇帝,这种主张也有损于蒋的面子。它成了使蒋政权一蹶不振的一个新因素。

  孙科的呼吁发出不久以后,蒋就派自己的夫人前往美国。上海一家报纸报道说,她倒是有几片“橄榄叶”可以奉献给美国领导人;第一是,中国的内河航行权,第二是,把整个台湾让与美国建立军事基地,第三是,扩大美国联合军事顾问团的权力;第四是,完全由美方人员来管理美援。

  孙科博士和蒋夫人提出的这些建议,在美国受到了冷遇,因为美国的决策人看透蒋介石已经实在拿不出什么货色来了。但是,当时美国国内的政局却使蒋的一些亲信幻想美国还是会干预中国内战,挽救他们个人的权位。

  据说蒋介石曾于一九四八年十二月就他是否应当引退的问题征求其驻美代表的意见。这些驻外代表大概不敢得罪他,建议他坚持下去,以待美国国会内部情况的变化。但是中国国内的形势却不等人了。共产党一直注意观察国民党内的动向,这时毅然决定动手了。

  Chiang first turned toward the United States. Shortly after the collapse of resistance in Manchuria, Dr. Sun Fo, a member of the National Reconstruction Group of the Kuomintang from which Chiang drew much of his party support, urged the United States to establish military and naval bases on the supposedly sovereign soil of China, to take over her greatest inland waterway, the Yangtze River, and to send General MacArthur to China to take command of an aid program. This was nothing but an elaboration of the old Bullitt plan. But to hear the son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen make such a proposal was a distinct shock to the national feelings of many Chinese. The fact that Chiang was to be offered an equal partnership with Hirohito as a kind of subemperor under MacArthur also injured Chiang's prestige. Thus, another element of decay was introduced into Chiang's power.

  Shortly after Dr. Sun's appeal, Chiang sent his wife to the United States. A Shanghai newspaper reported that she had a number of "olive leaves" to hold out to American leaders: 1. China's inland shipping rights; 2. Concession of all Formosa as a United States military base; 3. Broadened powers for the joint US Military Advisory Group; 4. Complete handling by American personnel of US aid.

  These proposals by Dr. Sun and Madame Chiang were received coldly in the United States for it was plain to American policy makers that Chiang no longer had anything to offer. The political situation in the United States, however, led some of Chiang's intimates to hope that the United States might still interfere in China's civil war to save their personal power.

  In December 1948, Chiang is reported to have asked his representatives in the United States whether he should resign. The agents, presumably not disposed to offend Chiang, told him to hang on and wait developments in Congress. But the situation in China would not wait. For the Communist party, which had been keeping a careful eye on the shifts within the Kuomintang, suddenly decided to force matters.

  一九四八年圣诞节,共产党广播了四十三名“战犯”的名单。名单上不单有蒋介石、他的夫人、他的几个姻亲、高级政府官员和驻美外交官,而且还包括为媾和和争权而进行活动的省的军政要员。共产党的这个圣诞节礼物,给了吵成一团的国民党领导人当头一棒。白崇禧和湖北省参议会立即向蒋提出实现和平的问题。

  这个穷途末路的老独裁者仍然妄想扭转局面。一九四九年元旦,他广播了自己的“和平文告”。这真是一篇现代战争史上少有的奇文,提出了实质上是为争取喘息时间的一个不战不和的方案。蒋介石侈谈国家的独立完整,却不让美国的海军陆战队撤离中国国土,也不要求美国归还在华的海军基地。同时,国民党政府还着手同苏联订立有关新疆省的一些协定。蒋在文告中要求维护使其政府合法化的法统,并确保他赖以统治中国的军队的“完整性”。总而言之,他所提出的和平条件根本不现实,共产党是决不可能接受的。

  但是这篇文告说明,国民党坚决打到底的决心已经动摇。共产党抓住了这个破绽,猛打猛冲,势如破竹。就在蒋介石发表求和文告的当天,共产党的新华社发表了一篇具有历史意义的社论标题是:《将革命进行到底》社论谴责国民党“反动派”的“和平阴谋”,指出美国政府正极力在革命阵营内部组织反对派,“使革命就此止步”,或迫使它“带上温和的色彩,务必不要太多地侵犯帝国主义及其走狗的利益”,社论号召全国各阶层人民团结起来打倒旧中国的统治者:

  “现在摆在中国人民、各民主党派、各人民团体面前的问题,是将革命进行到底呢,还是使革命半途而废呢?如果要使革命进行到底,那就是用革命的方法,坚决彻底干净全部地消灭一切反动势力,不动摇地坚持打倒帝国主义,打倒封建主义,打倒官僚资本主义,在全国范围内推翻国民党的反动统治,在全国范围内建立无产阶级领导的以工农联盟为主体的人民民主专政的共和国。

  “如果要使革命半途而废,那就是违背人民的意志,接受外国侵略者和中国反动派的意志,使国民党赢得养好创伤的机会,然后在一个早上猛扑过来,将革命扼杀,使全国回到黑暗世界。现在的问题就是一个这样明白地这样尖锐地摆着的问题。两条路究竞选择哪一条呢?”

  这些话听起来简直就像列宁本人说话的口气一样,甚至就像马克思或恩格斯说话的口气一样。因为同《共产党宣言》的作者一样,这篇社论的作者也“不屑于隐瞒自己的观点”。过去那些出于策略考虑的灵活做法和笼络人心的政治宣传,全都给抛到九霄云外。人们原来以为共产党只会成立一个“改良”政府的幻想,也就完全成了泡影。共产党实质上等于是在说:“要么拥护我们,要么反对我们,两条道路由你挑吧!”

  On Christmas Day, 1948, they broadcast a list of forty-three "war criminals." The list included not only Chiang Kai-shek, his wife, his various in-laws and top government officials and diplomats in the United States, but also various provincial politicians and militarists who were carrying on their own maneuvers for peace and power. This Christmas package fell like a sword among the squabbling Kuomintang leaders. Pai Chung-hsi and the Hupeh Provincial Council immediately brought the question of peace before the generalissimo.

  The old dictator, caught in a cul-de-sac, tried to wriggle out. On New Year's Day, 1949, he broadcast his own "Appeal for peace." This was one of the most curious documents of modern warfare. In essence it was a no-peace-no-war formula designed to gain time. Chiang spoke of the national independence of China, but made no move to dismiss American marines from Chinese soil or to demand the return of naval bases used by the United States. At the same time, the government began to make certain treaties with the Soviet Union in Singkiang Province. Chiang wanted to preserve the constitution under which his regime was legitimized and also the "entity" of the armed forces by which he ruled the country. All in all his conditions of peace were so unrealistic that the Communists could not possibly accept them.

  But a breach had been made in the Kuomintang's will for war and the Communists poured in to widen it. On the same day that Chiang issued his peace appeal, the Communists?New China News Agency published an historic editorial called "Carry the Revolution to the Very End." Denouncing the "peace plots" of the Kuomintang "reactionaries" and warning that the American government was trying to organize an opposition within the revolutionary camp "to halt the revolution" or to force it to "take on a moderate coloring so as not to encroach too much on the interests of imperialism,?the agency called for a closing of all ranks against the rulers of old China:

  "The question now confronting the people of China is: are they to carry the revolution through to the end or are they to abandon the revolution in mid-stream? If the revolution is to be carried through to the end, then this means using revolutionary methods to wipe out all reactionary forces. This means the unswerving overthrow of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism. This means overthrowing the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang throughout the entire country and establishing a republic of the people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat with an alliance of the workers and peasants as the main body. If the revolution should be abandoned in mid-stream, that would be going against the will of the Chinese people, giving in to the will of foreign aggressors and Chinese reactionaries, enabling the Kuomintang to gain a respite, permitting the wounded beast to nurse his wounds and then spring up again one day to throttle the revolution so that the entire country would return to the world of darkness.

  The question of the moment is presented just as clearly and sharply as this: there are two roads; which one do you choose?"

  This might have been the voice of Lenin himself speaking. Or even that of Karl Marx or Engels. For like the authors of the Communist Manifesto, the authors of this editorial "scorned to conceal their aims." Gone were the tactical shifts, gone the political double talk, gone the illusions of a mere "reform" government. What the Chinese Communists were saying in essence was: "You are either for us or against us. Choose!"
  国民党的领导人决不愿意结束他们的社会制度而选择共产党的革命道路。但是他们知道怎么也得牺牲蒋介石了,至少也得作出这样的姿态来。不管蒋介石怎样哀求也无法使国民党团结起来支持他。一九四八年一月八日,他派自己的亲信张群去汉口和长沙,争取华中政治负责人白崇禧的支持。同日又呼吁法、英、美、苏四国政府调停中国内战。结果在国内外都碰了壁。

  蒋的这些活动不过是因兽犹斗。他已陷入重围,只好四处求助。不管是国民党内的旧友、东山再起的宿敌、美国、以至于苏联,他都一一求助,结果只是白费力气。共产党迅速采取行动把蒋介石同他的老部下分割开来。

  一月十四日,毛泽东蔑视一切外国对中国内战的调停,宣告人民解放军有力量“粉碎和消灭”整个国民党统治机器。但是为了实现和平,共产党愿意在下列条件的基础上结束战争 ,

(一)惩办战争罪犯;
(二)废除伪宪法;
(三)废除伪法统;
(四)依据民主原则改编一切反动军队;
(五)没收官僚资本;
(六)改革土地制度;
(七)废除卖国条约;
(八)召开没有南京反动分子参加的政治协商会议, 成立民主联合政府,接收南京国民党反动政府及其所属各级政府的一切权力。

  这等于要求国民党无条件投降,是国民党所无法接受的。但是,毛的声明已经把蒋的求和文告驳得体无完肤。蒋在宣传上已经无地自容,不得不下野。下野当然会危及他的威信。但是为了平息国民党内部日益增长的恐慌情绪和反蒋浪潮,为了争取更多的时间在长江以南建立防御体系,为了由国民党政府的其他人物出面继续进行和谈,以便在和谈的掩护下加紧争取外国援助,蒋介石觉得自己离开南京不失为良策。

  Kuomintang leaders had no intention of choosing the revolutionary road of the Communists and thus liquidating their own society. Nevertheless, they saw they would have to sacrifice, or appear to sacrifice, the generalissimo. Plead as he would, Chiang could not get the Kuomintang to close ranks and rally behind him. On January 8, 1949, he sent his personal trouble shooter, Chang chun, to Hankow and Changsha to ask the support of Pal Chung-hsi, Central China political leader, and on the same day appealed to the four governments of France, England, the United States and the Soviet Union to mediate China's civil war. He was turned down - both inside and outside the country.

  Chiang's movements were now those of an animal in a cage. One by one he shakes at every locked opening: his old cronies in the Kuomintang, his revived enemies, the United States, even the Soviet Union. All to no avail. With characteristic directness, the Communists moved in to separate Chiang from his protecting followers.

  On January 14, Mao Tze-tung, scorning all foreign mediation of China's war, declared that the People's Liberation Army had the power to trample the whole Kuomintang machinery of rule "into dust and extinction." However, for the sake of peace, the Communist party would end the war under the following conditions:

1. Punishment of war criminals.
2. Abrogation of the bogus constitution.
3. Abolition of the Kuomintang's illegal regime and rule.
4. Reorganization of all reactionary armies in accordance with democratic principles.
5. Confiscation of bureaucratic capital.
6. Reform of the agrarian system.
7. Abrogation of treaties which betray the nation.
8. Convocation of a Political Consultative Conference without the participation of reactionary elements and establishment of a coalition government to take over all power from the Kuomintang Nanking government and its lower organs of administration.

  Such terms amounted to a demand for unconditional surrender. They could not be accepted by the Kuomintang. Yet Mao's statement completely discredited Chiang's peace appeal. There was no longer any corner in the field of propaganda where he could hide. He had to retire. Such a move would naturally endanger his prestige. But the generalissimo found it politic to leave Nanking in order to quell the rising tide of fear and opposition within the Kuomintang, to gain more time to build up defenses south of the Yangtze and to seek foreign aid behind the screen of continued peace negotiations carried out by other elements of the government.

  蒋介石是搞这种幕后阴谋勾当的老手。他在毛泽东提出和平条件后,就召集了陈立夫、谷正纲、黄少谷、陶希圣等十来个亲信共商大计。据报道,蒋虽然行将下野,但仍将继续控制和谈。他的亲信将受到国民党秘密警察的保护,中央调查统计局则受权惩办所有不服蒋领导的人。最重要的政治犯将移解华南。

  蒋在南京的最后几天,是在秘密警察严密保卫下度过的。可能他是害怕再次遭人劫持。据说,他每天晚上都要到停泊在长江上的一艘英国赠予国民党的军舰上过夜,万一南京城内出事,他就可以马上开溜。其实并没有出什么事。

  一月二十一日下午两点,蒋介石向李宗仁移交职务以后,登上一架双引擎的美国飞机,离开南京,飞往二百一十英里外的原籍浙江奉化。蒋介石在中国掌权二十二年,只有一两次间断,但是中国的老百姓对于蒋下野离京却完全无动于衷。在日本投降以后的三年半中,蒋的威望已经下降到最低点。同样一个蒋介石,一九四五年在上海跑马厅举行的抗日胜利庆祝大会上,曾是受到全场十万群众热烈欢呼的风云人物,如今黯然归里,既没有一个人欢呼也没有一个人掉泪,也许他从此就默默无闻了。

  但是蒋介石自己决不会甘心情愿就此默默无闻。他临走时发表了一篇告别文告,闪烁其辞地为自己卷土重来埋下了伏笔。在他离开南京后的第二天,有一道发给前线军官的命令传达了蒋军参谋总长顾祝同的指示,里面把话说得十分明白。命令说:

  “总统离京事前作了周密部署,现由李宗仁副总统和孙科行政院长主持政局。当前国际风云多变,我军胜利在握,吾等均系总统及参谋总长门生,理应善自治军”云云。

  中国的旧势力就是这样竭力维护其下台的领袖。

  In this kind of backstage intrigue, Chiang was an experienced hand. On hearing Mao's peace demands, he called together a dozen of his more faithful followers, including Chen Li-fu, Ku Cheng-kang, Huang Shao-ku, Tao Hsi-sheng and others. It was reported that Chiang, though going into retirement, would maintain control over the peace movements. His political cohorts would be protected by the Kuomintang secret police, while the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics was empowered to punish all those who did not accept his leadership. The most important political prisoners would be moved to South China.

  Chiang spent his last days in Nanking closely guarded by his secret police. Possibly he was afraid that he might be kidnaped again. It was reported that he slept each night aboard a former British warship anchored in the Yangtze River. In the event of an uprising in the capital, he could make a quick getaway. But no uprisings occurred.

  At 2 P.M., on January 21, after turning his office over to Li Tsung-jen, the generalissimo boarded a two-engined American plane and flew to his ancestral home in Fenghwa in Chekiang Province, 210 miles from Nanking. For twenty-two years, with one or two interruptions, Chiang had been at the helm of the Chinese state, but his retirement and departure were greeted with indifference by the common Chinese people. During the three and a half years since the surrender of Japan, Chiang's prestige had dipped to an all-time low. The same man who had been a magnet for a hundred thousand cheering Shanghai Chinese at the victory celebration in Racecourse Park in 1945 now drew neither cheers nor tears as he headed back to his ancestors and perhaps oblivion.

  That oblivion, however, would not be a matter of Chiang's own choosing. Behind him the generalissimo left a farewell message that was couched in terms ambiguous enough to leave the road open for his return. On the second day after his departure, an order transmitting instructions from Ku Chu-tung, chief of staff of Chiang's armies, and retransmitted to officers in the field, cleared up all doubts. This message read:

President left Nanking with full advance preparations. Vice President Li Tsung-jen and executive head Sun Fo will take. political responsibilities. The international scene is full of changes, and we have every guarantee of victory. We are all students of the President and the Chief of Staff and should keep the troops well in hand.

  Thus did the forces of Old China seek to rally around their retired leader.